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1.1 INTRODUCTION
Empirical researchers in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom set out to measure 
inequality in health ever since the mid-nineteenth century (Farr 1839; Ackerknecht 1953; 
Coleman 1982).  Although many studies went before it, the Black report  (Townsend and 
Davidson 1982) played a crucial role in getting the issue of socioeconomic differences 
in health on the political agenda in a number of countries, in the United Kingdom 
especially. For that reason, it is sometimes regarded as the beginning of the current and 
continuing research into the measurement of health inequalities. In fact, the influential 
British Medical Journal regarded it the most important medical report since the Second 
World War. 
Why do researchers study variation in health? Insight in variation in health may help to 
raise health levels, one might argue. That does not explain, however, why health variation 
is studied in relation to socioeconomic status - a complex social construct - rather than 
to specific (socioeconomic) factors that are thought to cause disease. Researchers 
seem to favour measures for socioeconomic status and other summary measures that 
relate to societal notions of an inequitable distribution of health (Wagstaff, Paci et al. 
1991; Gakidou, Murray et al. 2000; Mackenbach, Bakker et al. 2002). So, variables that 
describe the (causal) relations as observed in the data best are infrequently used. It 
seems that inequalities in health are of most interest because of their moral concern. 
In fact, according to a World Health organisation (WHO) study across 51 countries 
(Gakidou, Murray et al. 2003), people consider the equitable distribution of health 
almost as important as the average level of health when evaluating the performance of 
a health care system. 
In the next section we will discuss which part of the distribution of health this thesis is 
concerned with. 
1.2 HEALTH INEQUALITY
1.2.1 Terminology
The normative nature of health equity studies is often obscured by popular terminology, 
such as inequality and disparity. Some argue that the term inequality is not inherently 
normative (Braveman and Gruskin 2003). Indeed, equality can be seen as a 
mathematical property of a distribution. Absolute health equality is however of little 
interest as arguing for total equality seems just as debatable as arguing for other ethical 
viewpoints. Health variation may result from choice or could compensate for unjust 
variation in other domains of life. Moreover, one can only test for total equality, because 
the mathematical definition of equality gives no clue as to how to measure the extent of 
inequality. 
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As concluded before, the measurement of the extent of inequality is of interest because 
it is of moral concern. Assuming there is variation in health that is or is not of moral 
concern, then health inequality studies aim to measure only the variation of the first 
sort. This is captured by the definition of socioeconomic inequalities in health used by 
Mackenbach, Bakker et al. (2002). It says that inequalities are equal to the “systematic 
differences in morbidity and mortality rates between individual people of higher and 
lower socioeconomic status to the extent that these are perceived to be unfair.” While 
the above shows the normative use of the term “health inequality”, for this thesis 
we have preferred it above the unequivocal term “health inequity” in line with the 
common practice in the literature to “avoid judgmental or moral connotations that may 
be associated with the use of health inequities” (Braveman and Gruskin 2003). 
1.2.2 From theoretical ethics to empirical ethics
In order to measure the extent of health variation for normative purposes, we need an 
ethical stance. A host of ethical viewpoints is readily available. Arguing for one or the 
other would not do injustice to societal preferences, as few people - let alone societies - 
qualify as pure supporters of one ethical principle. Yet, the proximity to societal ethical 
preferences or, if one prefers, social justice, largely determines the value of empirical 
research in ethics. Techniques to unravel such preferences or notions about justice, such 
as stated preference analysis or “veil of ignorance” experiments, are based on strong 
assumptions (Dworkin 1977; Carneiro, Hansen et al. 2001; Heckman 2001; Bryan and 
Dolan 2004). Nonetheless, these techniques may ultimately be more defendable than 
the sometimes implicit but always debatable choices of researchers.
While such empirically grounded ethical stances are being gathered, many researchers 
have tried to develop equity principles. We do not aim to review these here, but we will a 
summary of the efforts by Whitehead (1985). She has been - and still is - very influential 
in SES-related differences in health and health care research. 
Whitehead distinguishes seven causes of variation:
1.   Natural, biological variation.
2.   Health-damaging behaviour if freely chosen.
3.   The transient health advantage of one group over another 
  when that group is first to adopt a health-promoting behaviour.
4.   Health-damaging behaviour where the degree of choice of lifestyles is 
  severely restricted.
5.   Exposure to unhealthy, stressful living and working conditions.
6.   Inadequate access to essential health and other public services.
7.   Natural selection or health-related social mobility involving the tendency 
  for sick people to move down the social scale.
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She argues that the first three causes listed are generally considered as just causes 
of variation, while the latter four are unjustified causes of variation. Whitehead 
acknowledges the role of  individual responsibility, and thus is distinctly non-egalitarian. 
She also points out that variation in health caused by society and beyond the control 
of the individual is unjust, but variation out of control of both individual and society is 
just. While most researchers feel that society can be held more responsible for ill-health 
it causes, many feel it should still aim to remove inequality due to factors outside both 
individual and society.  
Whitehead proposes the following definition: “Equity in health implies that ideally 
everyone should have a fair opportunity to attain their full health potential and, more 
pragmatically, that no one should be disadvantaged from achieving this potential, if it 
can be avoided” (Whitehead 1985). This definition shows that while she acknowledges 
that unavoidable causes for variation may exist, society should not be acquitted from 
remedying the resulting ill health. Yet, the definition does not require a society to pour 
unlimited resources into undoing variation it cannot reasonably avoid, in order to be 
equitable. 
In line with the above, freely chosen health-damaging behaviour should also be removed 
from total health variation in order to obtain that part of the health variation that is 
viewed as inequitable. The question remains why people would choose to damage their 
health. It seems fair to assume that most people will only (knowingly) risk their health 
if some benefit is expected elsewhere, for example by receiving a higher wage when 
taking up a risky job. Costs and benefits of choices may well vary systematically between 
groups. Other causes for variation, not mentioned by Whitehead, could be bounded 
rationality or lack of information. Both may cause people to make health-damaging 
decisions. 
All of the above would cause as much variation in health as it would in opinion about 
their classification of free or restricted choice. In the absence of consensus over societal 
preferences or principles of social justice, researchers cannot avoid making normative 
choices when measuring inequality. These commonly made normative choices may not 
hold. For example, society may give more weight to a “shortage” of health compared to 
a set standard of health than to “excess” health compared to that standard. In other 
words, excess health of one individual within a group may not compensate a shortage 
of health of another individual on a one to one base. Consequently people may prefer 
to be in the group with the least variation in health even though the groups have equal 
average health. Similarly, society may care differently about the loss of one extra health 
increment as the health of the individual deteriorates. Society may also care more about 
one individual than another, for example a young mother versus an 87-year old person. 
By not acknowledging such preferences when choosing between summary measures, 
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researchers are not avoiding normative choices; they are merely superimposing norms 
that may or may not command widespread support in society.  
1.2.3 Choosing between measures of inequality
When measuring the extent of variation in health, further choices have to be made. 
These choices concern the health concept, the unit of time, and univariate versus 
bivariate or multivariate analysis. The concept of health in question depends on the 
reason why health variation is a cause for moral concern (Asada 2005). If health is an 
intrinsic part of utility or well-being, then we need to measure health-related quality of 
life or health utility. If health is seen as instrumental to other intrinsic components of 
well-being (Sen 1992), then health-related functional limitations should be focussed on. 
Variation, disorders in particular, are merely instrumental to both concepts of inequity, 
and thus important in explaining health variation, yet are of little intrinsic interest.
If health is an intrinsic part of wellbeing, then we probably want to evaluate health-
related wellbeing over an individual’s life span. If health is seen as a contributing factor 
to other intrinsic components of wellbeing, then health-related functions may serve 
a different purpose in different stages of life and may thus be valued differently in 
different life stages. For example, the loss of reproductive health may only worry people 
of a certain age. Weights for each health-related function at each stage in life is not yet 
empirically substantiated, but early work in this field is getting published (Anand and 
Dolan 2005; Brouwer, Van Exel et al. 2005). 
Another question is whether health variation per se is of moral concern or only health 
variation that is related to other characteristics, such as SES. The first approach is 
sometimes referred to as univariate, (Braveman, Krieger et al. 2000) or individual 
(Murray, Gakidou et al. 1999), and the latter is referred to as bivariate or group 
based.a Both approaches provide answers to different questions (Braveman and Gruskin 
2003). 
Finally, a choice between relative and absolute measures of inequality has to be 
made. Both Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer et al. (1991) and Mackenbach and Kunst (1997) 
discuss measures of absolute differences that indicate the difference in expected 
health between the two extreme SES groups or individuals, and relative differences that 
indicate the absolute difference relative to either the expected health of one group or 
individual or to the average level. Both groups of authors and many other researchers in 
both social epidemiology and economics have focussed mostly on relative inequalities, 
because relative inequalities are insensitive to a change in the mean (Wagstaff, Paci et 
al. 1991) and are more suitable to  evaluate egalitarian policies (Mackenbach, Cavelaars 
et al. 1997). In this thesis, we apply relative measures of inequality.
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1.2.4 Inequalities in health or ill-health?
When applying relative measures of variation, the question of whether to focus on health 
or ill-health becomes important. Both the extent of the variation and the relative ranking 
of groups or countries depend upon this choice (Clarke, Gerdtham et al. 2002; chapter 
three). This can easily be illustrated. Let A and B be two countries, let health be defined 
as (quality adjusted) life expectancy that may vary between zero and one hundred years 
and ill-health be defined as a one hundred minus health. Table 1.1 depicts the average 
health levels in groups 1 and 2.
Clearly, the ratios are much more unequal when using ill-health rather than health. 
Perhaps more importantly, the ranking of countries depends on the choice of health 
outcome measure, with country B having lower health inequality than A when health is 
chosen, and vice versa when ill-health is chosen. The choice to measure inequality in 
ill-health rather than health probably explained the relatively high inequality in ill-health 
(mortality) of Sweden (Mackenbach, Kunst et al. 1997); a country which performed well 
in both absolute inequality in mortality and in life expectancy (Mackenbach, Kunst et al. 
1997; Mackenbach, Bakker et al. 2002). 
Equally, the choice between health and ill-health also considerably affects the time 
trends in health inequality. This becomes clear when writing the health concentration 
index as a ratio:
 
C SI I 
h 
h 
r = 2 2 σ 
      
(1.1)
   
and the ill-health concentration index as: 
 ( )
C SI I 
h h  
ih 
r = 2 2 σ 
 -      
(1.2)
(see chapter 2) where h indicates the mean level of health, h the (arbitrary) standard 
level of health, h h-  the mean level of ill-health and SII the slope index of inequality (the 
estimated difference between the health of the best off and the worst off person). The 
probability limit for 2 2 σ r  equals the constant 1/6 and may be ignored for now. 
The concentration index for health will not change if both nominator and denominator 
increase or decrease by the same percentage. An increase in health that is accompanied 
by a smaller increase in the slope index of inequality leads to a decrease in the 
Health Ill-health Health Ill-health
1 80 20 97 3
2 90 10 99 1
Ratio 0.89 2 0.98 3
A B
Table 1.1 Ratios of health versus ill-health
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concentration index. If, however, one measures inequality in ill-health, a reduction in ill-
health will have to be matched by an equal percentage reduction in the slope index of 
inequality in order to hold the concentration index constant. Therefore, when inequality 
in ill-health is more likely to rise over time than inequality in health, this may explain 
the consistent increase in inequality found by Wagstaff (2002), but not the consistent 
increase found by Gravelle and Sutton (2003).
Both health and ill-health ratios compare the obtained level of health to a certain 
standard. In the example of country A and B, it is zero in the case of health and a 
hundred in the case of ill-health. Ratio measures, however, require a ratio scale and 
a ratio scale requires a natural zero point, one that may not depend on the data (see 
chapter 8). While the standard for health is natural, the standard for the ill-health is open 
for debate. It may vary from country to country and within countries over time, effectively 
ruling out ill-health based measures. 
A choice for a health based measure in line with the measurement of inequities in 
health care that are traditionally measured in terms of health care contacts or resources 
used, rather than in terms of lack of contacts or lack of resources used )Wagstaff, Van 
Doorslaer et al, 1991). Like in other areas in which egalitarian policies are evaluated, 
such as income inequality, it is natural to focus on resources rather than the lack of 
resources compared to some arbitrary standard. 
The above reasoning equally applies when the measure of health is not quality-adjusted 
life expectancy but some proxy for it, such as health-related utility. However, when 
the focus of research shifts from an ethical perspective to disease aetiology or other 
modelling of causation, the above considerations need not apply as long as one avoids 
ethical interpretations of the extent of the inequality. 
We argue for a relative measure of inequality based on health rather than ill-health, and 
an application may be found in chapter 4. 
1.2.5 Choice of index
Several articles compare the properties of the available indices. Frequently referred 
to articles have been written by economists (Wagstaff, Paci et al. 1991) and social 
epidemiologists (Mackenbach and Kunst 1997). Both arrive at complex measures 
that are argued to capture SES related differences in health best but have the 
drawback of easily leading to misinterpretation (Mackenbach and Kunst 1997). While 
the earlier relative index of inequality is mathematically similar to the concentration 
index, the relative index of inequality as defined by Mackenbach and Kunst (1997) 
is not (chapter 2). The latter may be easier to interpret but has different properties. 
To help interpret the extent of inequality as measured by a concentration index, we 
developed a redistribution interpretation for the concentration index (chapter 2). Both 
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the concentration index and the relative index of inequality require a health measure 
that is either measured on a dichotomous or a ratio scale (chapter 8).
1.2.6 Health status measurement
From the above it follows that a health measure should measure health rather than 
ill-health. Lacking information about quality adjusted life expectancy, we have chosen 
a cross sectional measure of health measured by self-reported health. Variation in this 
subjective measure may not accurately capture variation in true health, but on the other 
hand variation in true health may affect health-related utility differently for different 
individuals. The subjectivity may well capture those health limitations that matter to the 
individual (Simon 2002; Simon, De Boer et al. 2005). As such, true health is sensitive 
to different circumstances and coping capabilities among individuals, which may well be 
systematically related to socio-economic class. From an equity perspective, it is unclear 
to what extent health measures should be sensitive to these factors.
1.2.7  Applying ratio scale properties to an ordinal health measure
The measure of health above is measured on an ordinal scale. In order to use inequality 
measures such as the concentration index or the relative index of inequality, one needs 
to dichotomize the health measure or a ratio scale variable. Dichotomising multiple 
categories into healthy and non-healthy always leads to a loss of efficiency, and the 
choice of a cut-off point may well affect the measured inequality (see chapter 3). 
Alternatively one could convert the ordinal scale into a ratio scale. However, converting a 
lower quality variable into a higher quality variable is usually viewed as impossible (Sen 
2001) as it requires adding information to the variable that was usually lacking in the 
first place. 
Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (1994) first upgraded an ordinal scale health variable by 
assuming a latent ill-health variable that had a log-normal distribution from which the 
ordered responses were drawn. In international comparative research (Van Doorslaer, 
Wagstaff et al. 1997) they assumed a separate log-normal distribution to underlie the 
observed ordered health for each of the countries, implying that while responses to the 
self assessed health questions differed between countries, the underlying mean level 
of health and the distribution of health were identical across countries. 
To relax the assumption above, Van Doorslaer and Jones (2003) mapped the self 
assessed health responses on the McMaster Health Utility Index Mark III (Feeny, Furlong 
et al. 1995; Torrance, Feeny et al. 1996; Horsman, Furlong et al. 2003). Rather than 
using mid-point values as we did earlier (Van Doorslaer and Koolman 2000), they used 
cut-point values in combination with grouped data or interval regression. This approach 
had several advantages (Van Doorslaer and Jones 2003), but also one disadvantage in 
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that the Health Utility Index had no natural zero point. In fact, recent Canadian surveys 
include negative Health Utility Index scores (health states worse than death), and thus 
do not meet the requirements of a ratio-scale variable. These negative scores did not 
arise in the first wave (in 1994-1995) of the Canadian National Population Health Survey 
used for the study Van Doorslaer and Jones (2003) and we applied their mapping 
approach and treated the Health Utility Index as if it had ratio scale properties. 
1.2.8  Factors that may cause unavoidable variation
Whitehead mentions biological variation as an example of an unavoidable cause of 
variation, and therefore as equitable. Most empirical researchers seem to follow this 
line of reasoning (Kakwani, Wagstaff et al. 1997; Gravelle 2003). Age- and sex-related 
variations in health were deemed examples of such unavoidable health, as both could 
not be caused by SES and thus could not mediate the effect of SES on health. This 
is obviously to some extent contentious, as actual observed health variation by age 
and sex may partly reflect differential treatment of men and women and of young and 
old by certain societies. Nonetheless, when comparing health inequalities between 
groups, researchers generally choose to standardise for differences in the age and sex 
distribution. As gene information gradually becomes more available one would expect 
that the current set of standardising factors would be extended.
1.2.9 Adjustment
Adjusting for age and sex was performed using direct and indirect standardisation 
techniques (Kakwani, Wagstaff et al. 1997; Gravelle 2003), a choice of terminology that 
does not seem grounded in either epidemiology or economics. Indirect standardisation 
was used to perform what some refer to as regression-based standardisation (Szklo and 
Nieto 2000) and others refer to as regression-based stratification (Hernan, Hernandez-
Diaz et al. 2004). The introduction of regression-based adjustment methods followed 
the upsurge in popularity in regression-based adjustment in epidemiology that started 
about 15 years ago. This was mostly a result from the developments in computer 
technology and modern software packages that made such computations convenient, 
which overcame the drawback of the required burdensome computations.
Another possibly more helpful distinction is one between non-parametric adjustment, 
such as direct adjustment, matching or stratification versus parametric adjustment, 
such as regression-ased stratification. Non-parametric adjustment techniques share the 
attraction of not having to make regression model assumptions. On the downside these 
approaches are often cell-based and quickly become inefficient or even impossible as 
the number of factors (the dimensions) to control for increases, or when the standardising 
factors are measured as continuous variables (the curse of dimensionality). On the 
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flipside, parametric techniques require assumptions such as the strong assumption 
that the estimation of the effect of the standardising factors has to be the true causal 
effect.
1.2.10 Decomposing the concentration index
Two new decompositions were made available before the first paper of this thesis was 
written. Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer et al. (2003) building on work by Rao (1969) introduced 
a decomposition of the health concentration index into factors. This decomposition 
is very powerful both when the factors are causally related and merely associated 
with the outcome of interest. When the model is associational then the decomposition 
still allows one to compute the contributions of particular groups, thus allowing policy 
makers and scientist alike to focus their efforts on specific groups. Chapter 4 presents 
a first application of this decomposition to health inequalities in a comparative study 
of European countries, allowing a better understanding of the differences in health 
inequality. 
1.3 HEALTH CARE INEQUITY
1.3.1  From ethics to empirical ethics
Interest in the distribution of health care is often derived from an interest in the 
inequitable distribution of health (Murray and Frenk 2000; Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 
2000). Health care use could both be a cause of health inequity and it may serve to 
reduce health inequity caused by other factors. This is, perhaps contrary to expectation, 
not how inequity in health care is typically defined. Policy documents typically state a 
preference for equality of access, i.e. access should depend on need and not on ability 
to pay (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993).b 
Most studies aim to measure violations of the horizontal version of “treatment according 
to need” rather than access according to need. This is because equality in access is 
hard to measure and because when access and treatment are systematically unequal, 
e.g. poorly educated individuals systematically opt out of the use of effective treatment, 
then that decision will often be dubious and may in itself be a result of an inequitable 
process. On the other hand, the treatment according to need would fail as an equity 
principle when systematic variation is due to individuals exercising their right to refuse 
needed health care if they so wish, for example for religious or ethical reasons. This 
is the reason why the WHO has advised against the use of this principle for equity in 
health care (Whitehead 1985). See Culyer and Wagstaff (1993) and Wagstaff and Van 
Doorslaer (2000) for a discussion.
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Both equality in access and in treatment according to need require a measure of need. 
The concept of need depends crucially upon the chosen ethical perspective. If the 
interest lies in equity in health, then marginal need could be defined as the marginal 
contribution to health per monetary unit spent on health care. Total need may then be 
defined as the minimum amount of resources required to exhaust capacity to improve 
health adapted from Culyer and Wagstaff (1993). If the interest lies in equality of 
capabilities, and ones capabilities depend on ones functionings which in turn depend 
on health see (Sen 1992), then need could be defined as the minimum amount of 
resources required to exhaust capacity to improve functionings. As health improvements 
might differ in the way they affect functionings, both definitions might lead to different 
levels of need. Most work in this field has taken the equity in health perspective.
In practice measuring a concept of need as described above is complex as it involves 
the estimation of an attainable health gain for an extra monetary unit spent on 
each individual, which is often not feasible with the available data. Many researchers 
therefore revert to defining need as the predicted use based on an individuals health 
characteristics. This approach requires that (1) ill-health is related to capacity to benefit 
from health care in the same way across socio-economic classes and (2) costs per 
health improvement do not systematically vary between socio-economic classes. Both 
assumptions may be rather strong as the distribution of different diseases varies across 
socio-economic classes (Shaw, Dorling et al. 1999) and both cost and effectiveness of 
treatment vary with these diseases. Furthermore, disease outcomes vary systematically 
with socio-economic class (Shaw, Dorling et al. 1999), suggesting that the production of 
health with the same input results in differential outcomes and equal outcomes would 
require different inputs.  
Even if access and received treatment were equal, the limitations of health care delivery 
may imply that it cannot entirely remove systematic health inequity; it may merely reduce 
it.c The more severe the limitations of health care, the less equal treatment will reduce 
the variation in health. The WHO approach could induce unequal health care such that 
those (groups) with lower health receive more health care than they would receive based 
on need alone (Murray and Frenk 2000). This may seem inequitable from an equal 
access viewpoint, but it would do more justice to the reason why the distribution of 
health care is studied at all. 
In practice at this time, studying the causal contribution of national health care to the 
reduction of health inequities does seems rather challenging as, in most studies even 
at individual level,  health care does not seem to increase health very much, if at all 
(e.g., see Newhouse and Insurance Experiment Group, 1993). Most of these studies 
evaluate the marginal health effects of health care. Differences between health states 
in developed countries are likely to lie at that margin and thus may not explain many 
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of the differences in health inequities. More is to be expected of studies at the micro-
level which study the distributional impact of an intervention. Such impact could be 
weighted together with the cost-effectiveness ratio and other ethical considerations 
when considering the coverage of the intervention.
This approach of measuring need also implies that the system gets it right on average 
in its vertical (between those of unequal need) distribution of resources, even though 
this vertical standard may vary from country to country and within countries over the 
years. This raises questions with respect to vertical equity, but these are not addressed 
here. While many of the issues touched upon above require further study, for this thesis 
we have followed the convention of measuring violations of treatment according to need 
and coin them inequitable.
We were able however to get a better understanding of which group or factor contributes 
what amount to the observed health care inequity by developing a novel method to apply 
the factor decomposition when the underlying model is non-linear in its coefficients. This 
method is then applied to decompose horizontal inequities in health care as measured 
with the concentration index. Milanovic (1997) also proposed as decomposition that 
could be applied to the concentration index, which is introduced to the health (care) 
inequality literature in chapter 2. Chapter 6 also decomposes the concentration index 
into at least one visit and subsequent visits to physicians, following the already popular 
use of two part models to model health care use in health economics.
1.4 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS
Health inequality and health care inequity measurement are undergoing permanent 
evolution. Many issues have been solved in the past, many are currently addressed and 
possibly even more are still to be raised. With this thesis we hope to contribute to the 
advancement of the measurement and the evidence base of both socioeconomic health 
inequality and socioeconomic health care inequity.
Chapter 2 responds to the complex interpretation of complex measures of inequality by 
presenting a novel way to interpret the concentration index in terms of the redistribution 
percentage that is required to obtain an equal distribution of health or health care. It 
also shows that the concentration index is a multiplication of a correlation coefficient 
between the rank of the ranking variable and the outcome variable and the coefficient of 
variation of the outcome variable, and that the relative index of inequality, as redefined 
by Mackenbach and Kunst (1997), is not mathematically similar to the concentration 
index, and thus has other properties. 
The extent of the inequality may be easier to interpret if it is expressed in the relative 
index of inequality, as defined by Mackenbach and Kunst. However, when the outcome 
variable is categorical, it is often based on an odds ratio, making the interpretation much 
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more complex. Chapter 3 facilitates the interpretation of the relative index of inequality 
by introducing a novel method to compute the relative index of inequality based on 
prevalence rate ratios rather than odds-ratios.
More evidence of health inequality as measured by the concentration index is presented 
in chapter 4. These results are based upon the European Community Household Panel 
that was set up to provide more comparable data. To better understand what factors are 
associated with this health inequality, we provide an application of the decomposition 
approach introduced by Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer et al. (2003) in income related 
inequalities in health. We introduce bootstrap techniques to construct confidence 
intervals that incorporate more sources of bias. To find out to what extent greater health 
inequality is due to differences in health elasticities of these factors or to variation in 
the income distribution of these factors, we subsequently compare all countries with the 
country with the smallest health inequality, using the Oaxaca (1973) decomposition. For 
chapter 4 we use the third wave of a longitudinal data set. These panel data grow less 
representative due to (health-related) possibly drop out or attrition. 
In chapter 5 we study whether drop out is health-related and whether the association 
between income and health is sensitive to correction for drop out using inverse 
probability weighting techniques. Some of the income related inequalities observed may 
result from income related inequity in health care use, which is why many EU member 
states have stated that health care ought to be distributed according to need, and 
not to income (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1993). Using the data from the European 
Community Household Panel that is more comparable than data used before (Van 
Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al. 2000), we test whether health care is indeed distributed 
according to need, or if that income does play a role. To better understand the origins 
of inequity in health care we also compute concentration indices and apply a method to 
decompose GP and specialist visits inequalities in factors when the underlying model is 
non-linear in the coefficients. We also study both the probability of a visit, the number 
of visits for those who had at least one visit, and the total number of visits, as both may 
follow from different decision processes. 
Private health care insurance may well improve access to health care and is likely to 
be concentrated among the better off in terms of income. The latter is confirmed by 
Van Doorslaer, Koolman et al. (2002) and in chapter 6. To carefully study the effect of 
voluntary health insurance we aim to go beyond the conditional distribution and present 
the causal effect of voluntary health insurance on health care consumption using an 
instrumental variable approach in chapter 7. This thesis is concluded with a discussion 
of both methods and findings and a summary.
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Notes
a. Even though the unit of measurement may be the individual, which has lead to some confusion Wolfson, 
 M. and G. Rowe (2001). On measuring inequalities in health. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 
 79(6): 553-560.
b. Revealed preferences often fail to correspond with stated preferences for equality in access, for 
 example when governments allow for preferential treatment which is only accessible through substantial 
 (co)payments or private insurance.
c. It could even increase it, for example because health production may be more efficient for the higher 
 SES groups.
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Interpretation
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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to add a more intuitive understanding to the concept of a concentration 
index for measuring relative inequality with an application of health-related measures 
by income. An existing and a new redistribution interpretation of the Gini are presented 
and applied to the concentration index. Both indicate the share of the total amount of 
any variable that needs redistributing in a particular way from rich to poor (or vice versa) 
to achieve equality. The characteristics of these redistribution schemes are compared. 
The paper also draws attention to the relationship between a concentration index, a 
correlation coefficient with relative income rank and a coefficient of variation of the 
variable of interest. These relationships are illustrated using data on inequality in dental 
care utilisation in European countries taken from the European Community Household 
Panel survey. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Concentration indices (CIs) and curves have now become fairly standard measurement 
tools in the health economics literature on equity and inequality in health and health 
care (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 2000). They were first introduced by Wagstaff, Van 
Doorslaer and Paci (1989) and have since been used successfully to describe and 
measure the degree of inequality in various measures of health (e.g. Van Doorslaer 
et al., 1997), health care utilisation (e.g. Van Doorslaer et al., 2000) or in health care 
payments (e.g. Wagstaff et al., 1999). Wagstaff, Paci and Van Doorslaer (1991) have 
reviewed and compared the properties of the CI with alternative measures of health 
inequality and concluded that it shares the same properties as one of the two relative 
index of inequality measures that are used by epidemiologists but that concentration 
curves have an additional advantage in terms of their visual representation of the 
location of deviations from proportionality and the possibility to perform checks of 
dominance relationships (Van Doorslaer et al., 2000; Wagstaff, 2000). 
2.2 REDISTRIBUTION SCHEMES AND THE GINI
While the Gini coefficient has proven the most popular measure of income inequality 
for decades, it lacks a straightforward intuitive interpretation. For this reason, other 
measures of inequality are sometimes presented alongside or instead of the Gini. 
One popular alternative is the Schutz-coefficient (Schutz, 1951; Lambert, 1993), also 
referred to as Pietra-ratio (Kondor, 1971), maximum equalisation percentage (Kondor, 
1975), or Robin Hood Index (Kennedy et al., 1996) in the income literature. The Schutz-
coefficient can be interpreted as the percentage of total income that needs transferring 
from the group with above average incomes to the group of individuals with below 
average incomes in order to reach equality. It is defined as half the relative mean 
deviation (Kondor, 1971): 
 
 y y= -S 
yn i i 
n 
=
1 
2 1 
Σ      (2.1)
While easy to interpret, the Schutz-coefficient bears no unique relationship with the Gini, 
and may therefore lead to a different ranking when comparing groups. It also fails to 
meet the principle of transfers, i.e. that every transfer from higher to lower incomes 
results in a lower index of income inequality. 
Blackburn (1989) has proposed an alternative (hypothetical) redistribution scheme that 
does have a unique relationship with the Gini, and can therefore serve to interpret the 
magnitude of a Gini.  The redistribution requires a reallocation of a fixed lump sum 
amount from all units above the median income to those below the median income. 
22 chapter 2
The fixed amount k is defined as:
 k=200ΔG      (2.2)
where k is the percentage of the mean level of the variable of interest and ΔG is the 
required change in the Gini coefficient. As this amount will be taken from half the units, 
the total share that needs to be redistributed in order to obtain total equality is 
 Rb=100G      (2.3)
where Rb is the percentage that needs redistributing. The Blackburn redistribution is 
depicted by the reallocation of area a to area b in figure 2.1.
Fractional rank of income  
 
y 
y mn 
a 
b 
0.5 1 0 
Figure 2.1 The Blackburn redistribution
Because the redistribution is a lump sum and is not related to the actual distribution 
of income, it does not remove all income inequality. The Blackburn redistribution only 
reduces the Gini to zero if one holds the income ranks constant to their pre-redistribution 
position. Although the Gini based on the post-redistribution income rank will be lower, it 
may not even be close to zero.
2.3  REDISTRIBUTION INTERPRETATIONS OF THE      
 CONCENTRATION INDEX 
The CI is derived from the Gini but differs, as the ranking variable and the variable of 
interest (for which the inequality is evaluated) are different. Hence, the CI is a bivariate 
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measure of inequality, measuring inequality in one variable related to the ranking 
of another. Like the Gini, the CI has the disadvantage of lacking a straightforward 
interpretation in natural units. As the CI is a bivariate measure, a redistribution of the 
variable of interest need not affect the ranking based on the other variable. Therefore, 
the critique that Blackburn’s redistribution only holds if the ranking is preserved, is in 
the case of the CI of little importance. 
2.3.1   A linear redistribution scheme 
However, other possible redistribution schemes with different properties are conceivable. 
We propose a new redistribution scheme that makes use of some properties of the 
so-called ‘convenient regression’ that is often used to compute a CI (Kakwani et al., 
1997). The convenient OLS regression is given by
 i i  y r  =
2 2 
1 1  1 
σ 
α      β  ε r i y 
+ , +     (2.4) 
where σ r 
2  is the variance of r, y y i = n 1 i 
n 
1 Σ / = , r is the fractional rank of income and ˆ β 1  
is an estimate of the CI.a This regression is a convenient device for computing a CI that 
does not require additional assumptions. This can be shown using the properties of the 
summation operator and the nth partial sum of ri , which is equal to n/2 (n/1 + n/n):
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From this result we can now derive a redistribution of the transformed y variable on 
the left hand side of equation 2.4  that reduces ˆ β 1  to zero. Figure 2.2 shows the rank-
predicted linear distribution of the transformed y variable which, by definition, passes 
through the means point 0 5  2 2 . ;  σ r ( ). As a result, the sum of all deviations from the mean 
on the right half of this distribution (area c) exactly equals the sum of all deviations from 
the mean on the left hand side of the distribution (area d). Equality requires c (and d) 
to be zero. The area c/(d + e) is the estimated proportion of the (transformed) y variable 
that needs redistributing from the richest to the poorest half, and we will refer to it as the 
linear redistribution scheme (Rl). Note that area c is always equal to 1/8 times the area 
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ˆ β 1 1  r r  n -( ). For large samples, the latter area is equal to the slope coefficient ˆ β 1  because 
p r  rn lim( ) =1 1- . Therefore, area c equals 
 
1 
8 1 
 β ˆ . Using this result and equation 2.4, we 
now have
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Since c e< , Rl varies between -50% and 50% of (transformed) y. 
The transformed y variable on the left hand side of equation 2.4 is, however, not a 
natural scale and is therefore still difficult to interpret. Therefore, we use p r li m σ 
2 1 
12 =  
to reduce the left hand side to y /(6   )y i . To find the percentage of all y that needs to be 
redistributed, we multiply area c by 6 and arrive at
 R C= =l 30 0 4 1 75 β      (2.7)
which holds approximately for large samples. An additional advantage of this result is 
that Rl has an interpretation quite similar to the Schutz-coefficient and is directly related 
to the CI. In the appendix we show that the two are identical in this case as a result of 
the fixed shape of the predicted concentration curve when based on equation 2.4.
2.3.2  Lump sum and linear redistribution compared
When comparing Blackburn’s constant amount redistribution and the linear redistribution 
as a function of relative rank, we see that the latter redistribution scheme is more 
‘effective’ in the sense that the total amount of y that needs redistributing is smaller. 
This follows from the principle of transfers’ property of the CI, i.e. that every transfer of y 
0  
e  
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Figure 2.2 The linear redistribution
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Figure 2.3 Concentration curves of dental visits in Portgal before and after redistribution
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from higher to lower income households leads to a CI closer to zero if the CI is positive, 
and vice versa if the CI is negative. Since the linear redistribution transfers more from 
and to the extreme income households, it is therefore more effective. The principle of 
transfers’ property can be shown using the equation for ˆ β 1 
        (2.8)
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Redistributions will only affect the numerator and more so to the extent that deviations 
before and after affect the units that are further away from the median income unit. 
The most effective redistribution will affect only the richest and the poorest units and 
leave the rest of the distribution untouched. While this may help to obtain a zero 
CI, the resulting concentration curve will not match the diagonal, and income-related 
inequalities in parts of the income distribution will remain. Therefore, we introduce 
an ‘appropriateness’ characteristic (A) to compare redistribution schemes: the mean 
squared concentration curve deviations from perfect equality, where Lp denotes the 
post redistribution concentration curve 
 A 
n 
L r  i 
p 
i 
i 
n 
=
1 2 
1 
Σ = -( )      (2.9)
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This appropriateness measure does not allow areas above and below the diagonal 
to compensate each other and places greater weight on deviations further from the 
diagonal. 
Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of y before and after the Blackburn and the linear 
redistribution for dental care visits in Portugal. The most appropriate redistribution 
scheme will redistribute from all those with a ‘surplus’ of dental care contacts to 
individuals with a ‘shortage’ of contacts (in relation to their income rank). It would 
remove all income-related inequality throughout the income distribution and equate the 
concentration curve with the diagonal, but the unique relationship with the CI would be 
lost. 
From figure 2.3 it can be seen that the Blackburn redistribution is less appropriate than 
the linear redistribution as it shows large deviations from the diagonal because the units 
just left of the median are treated very differently from the ones just right of the median. 
For Portugal this results in very low post redistribution consumption of dental care for 
the households just above the median income. Appropriateness of both redistribution 
schemes can be compared using the ratio of Alin divided by Ab. Table 2.1 shows that 
the linear redistribution is the more appropriate redistribution in eleven of the thirteen 
countries. 
Three points are worth making. One, we now have two intuitive interpretations of a CI in 
more natural units. An index value of 0.10 means that a lump sum redistribution of 10% 
of the total amount of y (which can be health in utility units, health care use in doctor 
*yrtnuoC Alin /A  b
Germany 1.97 1.37 0.020 0.083 0.016 1.73 1.2% 0.74
Denmark 1.75 1.22 0.080 0.084 0.056 5.21 4.2% 0.73
Netherlands 1.63 1.03 0.099 0.080 0.056 7.94 4.4% 2.21
Belgium 1.34 1.80 0.057 0.081 0.057 4.02 4.4% 2.42
Luxembourg 1.73 1.96 0.019 0.083 0.022 1.14 1.6% 0.93
United Kingdom 1.45 1.33 0.096 0.081 0.072 6.24 5.5% 0.58
Ireland 0.66 2.20 0.171 0.079 0.205 11.91 16.2% 0.49
Italy 1.11 2.54 0.094 0.085 0.140 10.37 10.3% 0.36
Greece 0.76 2.69 0.078 0.084 0.121 7.58 9.0% 0.44
Spain 0.82 2.90 0.078 0.083 0.131 8.15 9.8% 0.24
Portugal 0.84 2.79 0.167 0.080 0.259 10.45 20.1% 0.67
Austria 1.91 1.41 0.019 0.084 0.015 1.23 1.1% 0.73
Finland 1.43 1.68 0.094 0.084 0.091 6.18 6.8% 0.54
* t-statistics were estimated using Newey-West estimator of       (Kakwani et al., 1997)
Table 2.1 Inequality in annual number of dentist visits in 13 EU member countries (ECHP, 
1996)
y ρ(y, r) σ r 
2 CI t R l 
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σ y y 
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visits or health care payments in Euro’s) is required from the richest half to the poorest 
half of the population in order to equalise the distribution. Using the linear redistribution 
scheme, the amount to be redistributed is only 7.5%. Neither redistribution scheme will 
make the distribution completely equal. The amount to be redistributed under the linear 
scheme equals ˆ yi -y  for every individual, where ˆ yi  is the rank-predicted value from an 
OLS regression. Such redistribution removes all income-related inequality by equalising 
the rank-predicted distribution, not the actual distribution.
Secondly, the redistribution interpretation also makes clear that both of these indices 
have ratio scale properties if the underlying y variable has ratio scale properties and 
the r -related variation in y is linear. In other words, when an index value doubles, also 
the degree of inequality doubles, or twice as many units of y need redistributing. This 
is important if these indices are going to be used as observations in further statistical 
analysis or comparisons. 
Finally, expression (2.3) easily lends itself to a generalisation in the case where one 
is only interested in the degree of inequity, i.e. in the inequality remaining after having 
standardised or adjusted for demographic differences (as in Van Doorslaer et al., 1997) 
or in the degree of inequality of health care use after having standardised for need 
differences as proxied by morbidity variables (as in Van Doorslaer et al., 2000). We did 
not attempt any standardisation for differences in dental care needs here. 
2.4  INEQUALITY, VARIATION AND CORRELATION
The above suggests that a CI basically records the association between a variable and 
the relative rank in the income distribution. However, it does more than just that. This 
can most easily be illustrated using a slightly manipulated result derived by Milanovic 
(1997) between a Gini, a coefficient of variation of y and a correlation coefficient ρ  y r,( ) 
between income and rank. Replacing the Gini by the CI, the equivalent relationship for 
the CI becomes
  
 C 
y 
y r  r y = ( )
12 
3 
2 σ σ 
ρ ,      (2.10)
Again, for a large sample the first component in equation 2.1 is a constant and the 
difference between ˆ C and ˆ ρ only depends on the second component, the coefficient of 
variation of y. This means that, even if the correlation of two variables with rank is the 
same, income-related inequality will be greater for the one with the greater variability. 
A CI, unlike a correlation coefficient, but like a covariance, takes into account both the 
strength of the association and the magnitude of the differences. However, unlike a 
covariance but like a correlation, it is normalised in the interval [-1,1]. 
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The relevance of the magnitude of the differences can be illustrated with the distribution 
of dental visits across income groups in European countries. Table 2.1 presents the 
mean number of dentist visits, the coefficient of variation, the correlation coefficient 
with rank in the income distribution, the variance of the fractional rank, the CI, and its 
t-value (Newey and West, 1987) (which is the same for the CI and the percentage to 
be linearly redistributed). Blackburn’s redistribution percentage is not reported as it is 
simply the CI times hundred. The results are estimated for thirteen EU member countries 
using the ECHP wave 3 sample-weighted data (see EUROSTAT, 1999). 
The number of visits to the dentist has a positive correlation with income rank, and 
therefore all CIs of dentist visits are positive and significant. The CIs vary substantially 
between 0.015 for Austria and 0.259 for Portugal. The percentage to be linearly 
redistributed to achieve equality equally varies greatly between 1.1 percent for Austria 
and 20.1 percent for Portugal. In most countries, except Portugal, Ireland and Italy, 
equalising dental care utilisation across the income distribution requires redistributing 
less than 10% of all visits. 
Comparing results across countries, we see that the correlation coefficient and the CI do 
not provide identical pictures. Depending on the variability relative to the mean dental 
utilisation, as given by the coefficient of variation, a similar correlation can be translated 
into a higher or lower degree of inequality. Take the comparison between Ireland and 
Portugal. The correlation between dentist visits and income rank is very similar ( ˆ ρ=0.17) 
but because the variation in Portugal is much higher than in Ireland, its inequality in 
dentist use is also much higher. For a similar reason, inequality is twice as high in 
Spain as in The Netherlands, despite the fact that income rank is more highly correlated 
with dental visits in The Netherlands. This result could mimic the differences in the 
coefficients of variation in dental health in both countries. In other words, two systems 
could result in identical correlation coefficients and respond identically to need, yet 
present quite different inequality indices as a result of differing coefficients of variation 
in health. This also holds for inequity, as standardisation does not level out differences 
in coefficients of variance.
2.5 CONCLUSION
Concentration indices have gained popularity in research aimed at measuring and 
explaining degrees of relative inequality in health-related variables of interest. It has 
been argued that their appeal to policy-oriented users of such research is limited by their 
alleged difficult interpretation. This paper draws attention to the relationship between a 
CI and two other - more intuitive - measures of redistribution and correlation. 
The first useful result is the relationship between a CI and redistribution schemes 
which remove income-related inequality in the variable of interest. We propose a new 
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(linear) redistribution scheme which bears some resemblance but also offers certain 
advantages over Blackburn’s lump sum redistribution. We show that it is more effective 
than the lump sum and more appropriate. We also show that there is a very simple and 
straightforward relationship with the Schutz coefficient. The percentage to be linearly 
redistributed is approximately equal to three quarters of the Blackburn redistribution. 
Using these redistribution schemes, a CI value can easily be translated into a percentage 
redistribution required from rich to poor to make estimated income-related inequality 
equal to zero, but not, however, to obtain equality! 
The second result draws attention to the difference between a CI and a simple 
correlation with rank. CIs can also be interpreted as variation-weighted correlation 
coefficients: the strength of the association with rank is ‘weighted’ by the coefficient 
of variation in producing the measured degree of inequality. While the contribution 
of the correlation with rank accounts for most of the variation in CIs, the coefficient 
of variation still varies by almost a factor three. Therefore, it too plays an important 
role in explaining the differences in CIs between countries. The distinction may also 
have ethical implications, as societies may strive for a zero CI through zero correlation 
between income and health care use but not through few will prefer zero variation in 
health care use. Finally, policy makers wanting to lower an income-related inequality may 
now target both components separately. 
Note
a. By rescaling the dependent variable, we can alternatively calculate the CI from yi =α2+β2r1+ε2,i, where 
 CI = β1 = 2
2 
2 σ  β r y / . The so-called slope index of inequality (SII) equals β1, while both 2 β y / (Pamuk, 
 (1985) and (α2+β2)/α2 (Mackenbach and Kunst, 1997)) have been referred to as the relative index of 
 inequality (RII) often used by epidemiologists.
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Proof that for large samples and with linear redistribution of y with respect to r the 
percentage to be linearly redistributed index equals 3/4 of the CI.
Let relative y of individual i be determined by 
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Using OLS we obtain a rank-predicted estimate of relative y, equal to ˆl r  i( ). The predicted 
concentration curve L r  ˆ
ˆ
i( ) is obtained by integrating ˆl r  i( ) over ri.
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for r Î ( )0 1  , . In that case R can be estimated as
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The maximum difference can be found by setting the first derivative of equation 2.11 
with respect to r equal to zero, or 
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Obviously, equation 2.15 will be zero only at the mean of ˆ yi , where lˆ r  i( )  equals 1, and 
this value of a linear function will only be reached at the mean of r. Since p r  li m 12= , 
substituting r = 12 in equation 2.14 gives
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we obtain
 +  β         β R ˆ ˆ ˆ12 12 14 4 18 4 18 4β ˆ= -- =     (2.18)
Using equation 2.12 it follows that,
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Since 2p rli mσˆ 112 = , we now have p R CIlim 34= .
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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a method of estimating relative risks, rather than odds ratios, 
when conducting logistic regression. Odds ratios and relative indices of inequality based 
on odds ratios are popular instruments when measuring health inequality. However, 
measures based on odds ratios are hard to interpret when the prevalence of an outcome 
is greater than a few percent, which is often the case in health inequality research. In 
this paper we propose a procedure that uses the estimates derived from logistic and 
other types of regression to compute a (standardized) relative risk. These measures 
have a more intuitive interpretation and thus allow a better appreciation of the extent 
of the relative health inequality. We apply the procedure using logistic regression to 
compute the relative risks between the lowest and highest income quintiles and relative 
indices of health inequality based on ranking all individuals according to income. In 
addition, we provide related methods to compute their absolute counterparts and 
suggest a method for statistical inference. Empirical illustrations are derived from 
self-assessed health of the elderly in European Union member states. Results show 
that both magnitude and ranking vary markedly between the relative risk and odds 
ratio-based methods. This method of relative risk estimation can be applied to other 
categorical outcome data, statistical models and fields of research.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
In research on socio-economic health inequalities, relative risks (RR) and related 
measures such as relative index of inequality (RII) are the most commonly used 
measures of relative health differences (Anand, Diderichsen, Evans, Shkolnikov, and 
Wirth, 2001; Huisman, Kunst, and Mackenbach, 2003; Mackenbach and Kunst, 1997). 
These measures have been used to express the magnitude of health inequalities 
in single, meaningful terms that facilitate comparisons between studies, places and 
periods. Recent papers stressed that these relative measures need to be complemented 
by measures of absolute health inequalities, such as rate differences and the slope 
index of inequality (SII). Nonetheless, measures of relative health inequalities are 
acknowledged as key instruments for monitoring and explanatory research.
When measures of relative health inequalities are used, the choice for a specific 
measure is commonly determined by the nature of the health outcome variable that 
is studied. When count data are used, such as in incidence and mortality analyses, 
researchers often apply log-linear regression analyses that yield RR estimates.  On the 
other hand, when categorical data are used, such as prevalence rates and cumulative 
incidence rates, researchers commonly apply logistic regression analyses that produce 
Odds Ratios. 
In fact, the OR offers little more information than the untransformed coefficient of the 
logistic regression, the log OR, itself. The log OR also has the advantage that when 
the study groups are interchanged only the sign will differ, enhancing comparability 
of results across studies. Nevertheless, in epidemiological studies the OR is nearly 
always preferred over the untransformed coefficients. This suggests the use of the OR 
as an approximation of the RR in the interpretation of the measured inequality. If the 
probability of an event is close to zero, such as in population studies of rare diseases, 
the OR will overestimate the RR only slightly. However, in many epidemiological studies, 
and especially in studies of socio-economic inequality in health, outcomes are common 
and the OR may no longer resemble the RR. 
The tendency to use OR for categorical outcomes also effected the use of a measure 
that was especially developed within health inequalities research, the RII (Wagstaff, Paci, 
and Van Doorslaer, 1991; Mackenbach and Kunst, 1997; Koolman and Van Doorslaer, 
2004). The RII has been introduced as the ratio of the probability of self-reported 
morbidity of the individual at the very bottom of the social hierarchy compared with that 
of the individual at the very top of the hierarchy. These predicted probabilities are based 
on the systematic association between morbidity and socio-economic position of all 
individuals, and are usually adjusted for demographic factors. As such the interpretation 
of the RII is like a RR. While it may be hard for non-researchers to be on top of the 
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intricacies of the assumptions involved in the different statistical models, we believe 
that the general idea is sufficiently intuitive.
In studies with a categorical outcome, however, the RII is typically measured as an OR. 
This OR can be described as the ratio of the odds of having a health problem in the very 
bottom of the educational or income hierarchy compared to the very top of the hierarchy, 
see (Huisman, Kunst, and Mackenbach, 2003). Other studies equally correctly describe 
the OR, yet the OR remains hard to interpret, let alone when used in combination with 
the RII concept. This may seriously conflict with the researchers’ wish to express the 
magnitude of health inequalities in concrete terms that can be intuitively grasped by a 
broad audience.
This paper presents a method to construct RRs in studies with categorical outcomes, 
irrespective of the statistical model used. First, we will clarify the relationship between 
the OR and the RR with a description of the mathematical relationship and a numerical 
example. Next, we will provide a procedure to construct a RR and a RII based on a RR 
using a logistic regression and suggest methods for statistical inference and estimating 
absolute counterparts of these relative measures (risk difference and slope index of 
inequality). We will illustrate these methods by estimating the income related inequality 
in health of the elderly population of the EU. Finally, we will discuss the pros and cons of 
presenting RRs versus ORs.
3.2  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ODDS RATIO AND THE RELATIVE 
 RISK
The odds of an event (1) of group a is the ratio of the probability of an event over the 
probability of a non-event (0),
 
p y
( )p y
( )
= =0 1
= =1 1Odds
a
a
a
1
a
0= =
|
|
 
 
    (3.1)
The OR is the ratio of the odds of an event in group b divided by the odds of an event in 
group a, as is shown in the first part of equation (3.2). The formal relationship between 
the OR and RR is given by:
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From the last part of equation (3.2) it follows that the OR is equal to the RR multiplied by 
term III. The latter reduces to one when the prevalence approaches zero. This confirms 
that the OR best approximates the RR if the prevalence of an event is low. Term III shows 
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Table 3.1 Example relationship relative risk and odds ratio
Country X Country Y
Prevalence (%) 0.05 0.6
Group A 0.02 0.3
Group B 0.08 0.9
Relative riska 4.0 3.0
Odds ratioa 4.3 21.0
Risk Differencea 0.06 0.60
Risk Differencea,b 0.06 1.09
a Group A is the reference group 
b Risk difference when odds ratio is interpreted as relative risk and average prevalence levels are  
 held constant
Probability of event
that the OR becomes infinitely larger than the RR if the probability of an event in group b 
( b 
1  ) becomes more common while it does not for group a ( a 
1  ). 
Note that part I of equation (3.2) shows an attractive feature of the OR compared to 
the RR. Regardless of whether the OR estimates inequality in events or non-events, 
the magnitude of the inequality and, thus, the ranking of groups is not affected. This is 
because the OR based on events is the inverse of the OR based on non-events. The RR 
does not share this property.
Table 3.1 illustrates the relationship between the OR and the RR with a numerical 
example based on two imaginary countries (X and Y) and two groups (A and B). In the 
first country the prevalence is low (5%) and in the second the prevalence is high (60%). 
The OR approximates the RR in the first country, but is much higher in the second. In 
fact, if one mistakenly interprets the OR of country B as a RR, then the risk difference 
(RD) between both groups is more than 100%.a Furthermore, it is clear that when 
prevalence levels vary between countries, so may inequality rankings. Note that this 
reranking will not take place in a study where all groups are compared to one reference 
group, i.e. the prevalence within the reference groups does not vary. 
The above illustrates that in studies where the outcome is common, RRs and ORs-
based measures are quite distinct. In practice, researchers often appear not to make 
an explicit choice between the two, by presenting the typical output that follows from 
the appropriate statistical model. For example RRs are frequently presented when the 
outcome measure is survival time or a count and ORs are commonly presented when 
the outcome is categorical. Below we will present a general method to compute RRs 
irrespective of the statistical model used.
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3.3 A METHOD TO ESTIMATE RELATIVE RISKS
The procedure to compute a RR varies with independent variable of interest. We 
will begin with a dichotomous dependent variable and a dichotomous independent 
(dummy) analysed using a logistic regression, which is the most common model used 
to compute ORs. It is popular when compared to other regression models because 
(1) fitted probabilities always remain within the [0,1] interval; (2) the partial effect of 
a characteristic on the outcome is modified by other characteristics of the individual 
included in the model and depends on the level of the variable when the variable is not 
dichotomous (due to the non-linear transformation: the link function).b (3) coefficients 
are log ORs which can easily be transformed into ORs. The first two advantages remain 
in the following procedure.
The procedure to compute a RR for a dummy is presented in four steps:
1.   Estimate the logistic regression and retain its coefficients; 
2.   Predict the outcome for each individual while fixing the category of interest at 
  one; 
3.   Repeat Step 2 but now fix the dummy at zero;
4.   Divide the average outcome of Step 2 by the average outcome of Step 3.
This will result in a RR. This RR is directly comparable to the OR that follows from a 
logistic regression.c, d
To obtain an adjusted RR one may add standardising variables to the regression model. 
More formally, when using a logistic regression Step 2 and 3 can be calculated using 
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where y is the outcome variable; d is the dummy of the independent variable of interest, 
xi1… xik are the individual specific values for the k standardising variables and αˆ, β ˆ
and δ ˆ ... 1 k 
 
 are the corresponding estimated coefficients from the logistic regression. 
This formula is used to predict the probability of an event for each individual in the 
sample while holding d constant at one. The distribution of the standardising variables 
as observed in the study population should not be altered during Step 2 and 3. The 
resulting predictions of Step 2 can be interpreted as the predicted probability of an 
event had each individual been part of the group where d equals one. Step 3 is similar 
except term βd ˆ   is now left out. The average predicted probabilities needed for Step 
4 are defined as ˆ p p d i,d i 
n = 
= 1 Σ ˆn 1 / . The above shows that this RR is based on what 
is sometimes referred to as the average partial effect. This procedure implicates that 
the resulting RR is based on the functional form imposed by the logistic regression, 
or whichever regression model is chosen. Please note that (all) regression based 
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standardisation requires a structural model, such that estimated coefficients have a 
causal interpretation. 
If the variable of interest is categorical then all relevant categories need to be 
manipulated analogous to the adjustment of the dummy in the above procedure. If the 
variable of interest is a rank variable with ranks varying between zero and one, then the 
rank should be set to one in Step 2 and to zero in Step 3. The latter procedure produces 
a relative index of inequality based on a RR and can be interpreted as the average RR of 
each individual reporting an event had he or she moved from the very highest to the very 
lowest rank. For count or continuous variables, one may estimate similar partial effects 
and use them to construct a RR. 
For statistical inference, we suggest using resampling techniques (Efron and Tibshirani, 
1994). Resampling techniques require no distributional assumptions and can be 
adjusted to take the complex sampling frame of many modern surveys into account. 
We prefer the bootstrap method rather than the jackknife method, as the jackknife 
can be sensitive to non-smooth distribution of the statistic of interest. While this is not 
problematic in most instances, it may in some.
We can also manipulate this procedure to estimate the absolute counterparts of the 
RR and the relative index of inequality: the risk difference (RD) and the slope index of 
inequality (SII). This would amount to subtracting the average probabilities that result 
from Step 2 from those of Step 3. The RD is the average predicted difference in risk of an 
event between two groups, adjusted for all other variables in the analysis. Similarly, the 
SII represents the absolute difference in the probability of reporting an event between 
the person with the lowest rank and the highest rank. The SIIs are based on the same 
model assumptions that underlie their relative counterparts such as those related to the 
functional form. This SII, therefore, does not impose a linear relationship between the 
rank and the outcome variable. The SII reflects the average standardised difference in 
outcome for everyone in the sample had he/she either the highest or the lowest rank.
The above procedures may seem straightforward; its application can prove cumbersome. 
To overcome this drawback, we provide two solutions. First, on request we provide fully 
automated and annotated syntax for the statistical packages SPSS, SAS and Stata. 
Secondly, we present and discuss a more convenient alternative method to compute a 
RR based on an individual with average characteristics.
3.4 RELATIVE RISK BASED ON AN AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL
Statisticians and econometricians sometimes construct an average individual and 
estimate the effect of a change in the variable of interest on the outcome for this 
individual, rather then predicting differences in for each individual in the sample. This is 
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sometimes referred to as the partial effect evaluated at the mean. We will refer to the 
RR based on this procedure as the RR evaluated at the mean (RRm).
For this method we introduce an average individual who has the average standardising 
variable characteristics. The procedure is as follows:  
1.   Estimate the logistic regression on the entire sample to obtain its        
  coefficients;
2.   Compute the averages for all standardising covariates that describe the 
  characteristics of the average individual;
3.   Predict the outcome for the average individual whilst in the lowest socio-
  economic class;
4.   Repeat Step 2 for the highest socio-economic class;
5.   Dividing the outcome of Step 2 by that of Step 3. 
Formally, when using logistic regression Step 2 can be calculated using: 
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where x1…k are the standardising variables that are now kept at their means. Setting 
dichotomous covariates (dummies) at their averages implies setting the value of the 
average individual to the proportion of individuals with that characteristic. For example, 
assigning the value 0.532 for the dummy (female) when 53.2 percent of the (weighted) 
sample is female. 
The relative index of inequality based on PEM is straightforward to compute, but comes 
at a price. First, like the popular conversion presented by (Zhang and Yu, 1998) it fails 
to take full account of the way the distribution of the standardising variables affect 
the partial effect. Secondly, the average individual does not exist and the method is 
therefore sometimes argued to be unappealing. Consequently, some researchers prefer 
to replace the means of the standardising variables with their most likely value, in order 
to create a reference individual with more likely characteristics. In the example above 
this individual would be female. As a result, men are not represented in the RR, even 
though sex was adjusted for in the regression. Likewise researchers sometimes prefer to 
use median values for continuous variables to hold the standardising variables constant. 
The median may be a better representative of the populations if the continuous variable 
has a skewed distribution. 
3.5 EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION
To show the effect of the methods we have re-estimated the results from Huisman, 
Kunst, and Mackenbach (2003). As we have used data from the same source (European 
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Community Household Panel, ECHP) and the same year (1994), we refer the reader to 
Huisman, Kunst, and Mackenbach (2003) for a discusssion of the data, methods and 
results. Because the provider of the data (Eurostat) does not allow users to keep a copy 
of the data, our estimators are based upon an updated version of the database (2002) 
and are, therefore, slightly different.
As suggested above, we used the bootstrap method for statistical inference. The 
standard bootstrap procedure hinges on the assumption that the observed distribution 
is a random sample of the underlying population distribution and that individuals 
within the sample are independent. This assumption does not hold for the complex 
stratified multi-stage sampling designs used in many countries to gather ECHP survey 
data. To mimic the complex sample design, for each replication we stratified each 
country sample equal to the original stratification. Then, we drew a random sub-sample 
with replacement of the primary sampling unit and subsequently from the secondary 
sampling unit (the household) each of a size equal to the original sample size, and 
included all individuals in the selected households in each bootstrap sample. For each of 
the 2000 bootstrap samples we computed the RR using the above procedure. Finally, we 
based the 95% confidence intervals on the percentile scores. The bootstrap procedure 
was adjusted to take account of different sampling frames used and for countries that 
did not make the relevant information available (see table 3.3). 
Table 3.2 shows the prevalence, rate difference, OR and RR of reporting less than 
good health of the lowest compared to the highest income quintile for EU countries 
in 1994. The analysis is performed on individuals age 60 and above and is stratified 
for both men and women. The results are directly comparable to Table 4 of Huisman, 
Kunst, and Mackenbach (2003). The prevalence of reporting less than good health 
varies markedly from country to country and within country between sexes. The lowest 
observed prevalence is 41 percent for Danish men and the highest is 86 percent for 
Portuguese women. For the comparison of groups we chose the highest socio-economic 
group is as the reference group. The RD is positive for most groups, which indicates 
that individuals in the lowest socio-economic group have a higher risk of reporting less 
than good health in all countries for both men and women. Consequently, most ORs are 
greater than one. It is striking to see how much ORs vary between countries. For males, 
the lowest inequality measured in ORs was observed among Belgian men (OR = 1.2) and 
the highest inequality among Irish males (OR = 3.5). While for females, the lowest for 
inequality was observed for Belgium (OR = 0.9) and the highest for Greece (OR = 2.7). 
Throughout, we obtain clearly lower RRs and observe less variation. Should one 
mistakenly interpret ORs as RRs, then one would ‘overestimate’ the relative difference 
between 1.7 times for Belgian men, to 7.4 times for Portuguese women. Even though the 
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extremes for males remain the same, the ranking of countries clearly depends upon the 
choice for either OR or RR. 
Table 3.3 presents a SII and RII based on OR and RR with confidence intervals of 
reporting less than good health of men and women in the lowest income compared to 
the highest income for EU countries in 1994. A SII is estimated using the average partial 
effects. RIIs based on ORs deviate considerably more from one (equality) than those 
based on RRs. The differences are now even greater than those between RRs and ORs 
(table 3.2) because the SIIs are greater than the RDs. 
No. Odds (OR-1)a
obs. Ratio (RR-1)
Men
Belgium 740 44% 5% 1.22 1.12
Denmark 644 41% 15% 1.87 1.46
France 1527 60% 12% 1.69 1.24
Germany 979 57% 17% 2.00 1.34
Greece 1646 60% 11% 1.60 1.22
Ireland 1000 43% 28% 3.49 2.13
Italy 1744 71% 15% 2.15 1.26
Netherlands 927 46% 12% 1.64 1.32
Portugal 1543 76% 21% 3.19 1.37
Spain 2082 65% 17% 2.17 1.33
United Kingdom 1257 48% 19% 2.22 1.58
Women
Belgium 936 56% -1% 0.94 0.97
Denmark 817 50% 8% 1.41 1.21
France 1939 67% 14% 1.88 1.26
Germany 1174 64% 8% 1.43 1.13
Greece 1960 68% 21% 2.66 1.40
Ireland 1017 46% 18% 2.16 1.58
Italy 2068 80% 10% 1.91 1.14
Netherlands 1126 51% 9% 1.48 1.22
Portugal 1898 86% 4% 1.36 1.05
Spain 2675 74% 14% 2.03 1.21
United Kingdom 1604 50% 14% 1.78 1.40
a Displays the OR’s ‘overestimation’ of RR compared to no inequality (OR = RR = 1).
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Table 3.4 shows the effect the choice of measure has on the ranking of countries 
according to income related inequality in reporting less than good health. The RII based 
on an OR results in a much lower position for Portuguese men than that based on either 
RR or RRm. Similarly we observe a drop for the women of the United Kingdom of several 
Odds Relative 95% CI Relative 
Country Ratio Risk of RR Risk Me
Men
Belgiuma 44% 8% 1.38 1.20 [0.90-1.66] 1.20
Denmarkb 41% 22% 2.54 1.74 [1.25-2.51] 1.75
Francec 60% 17% 2.04 1.33 [1.15-1.56] 1.33
Germanyd 57% 20% 2.27 1.42 [1.17-1.74] 1.43
Greecea 60% 24% 1.95 1.31 [1.13-1.52] 1.30
Ireland 43% 15% 4.92 2.51 [1.91-3.40] 2.67
Italyc 71% 36% 2.83 1.36 [1.22-1.54] 1.35
Netherlandsd 46% 20% 2.05 1.47 [1.15-1.92] 1.48
Portugal 76% 17% 4.34 1.43 [1.28-1.61] 1.41
Spain 65% 25% 3.07 1.48 [1.32-1.67] 1.47
United Kingdom 48% 24% 2.74 1.69 [1.36-2.13] 1.71
Women
Belgiuma 56% 3% 1.11 1.05 [0.85-1.30] 1.05
Denmarkb 50% 14% 1.78 1.33 [1.04-1.72] 1.33
Francec 67% 20% 2.52 1.36 [1.21-1.54] 1.36
Germanyd 64% 12% 1.73 1.22 [1.05-1.43] 1.22
Greecea 68% 16% 3.34 1.48 [1.32-1.69] 1.47
Ireland 46% 25% 2.72 1.73 [1.35-2.26] 1.74
Italyc 80% 23% 2.25 1.18 [1.09-1.28] 1.17
Netherlandsd 51% 13% 1.65 1.28 [1.05-1.59] 1.28
Portugal 86% 12% 1.37 1.04 [0.98-1.12] 1.04
Spain 74% 4% 2.61 1.28 [1.18-1.40] 1.28
United Kingdom 50% 18% 1.88 1.37 [1.15-1.65] 1.37
a Strata were not made available/unreliable. 
b Original households were sampled directly. 
c Primary sampling units were not made available/unreliable.
d Strata and primary sampling units were not made available.
e Relative risk is evaluated for a individual with mean characteristics.
Table 3.3 Prevalence, slope index of inequality and relative index of inequality in reporting 
less than good health, EU countries, 1994, men and women 60+
Slope
Index of 
Inequality
Preva-
lence
Relative Index of Inequality
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positions when in the inequality measure is based upon a RR. When we compare RR and 
RRm-based measures of inequality, we see that the ranks are mostly comparable, with 
only few countries trading places. 
3.6 DISCUSSION
We set out to present a procedure to construct relative risks (RR) irrespective of the 
statistical model used. This procedure allows researchers to consider both odds ratios 
(ORs) and RRs, whereas previously, a categorical outcome variable almost automatically 
implied the presentation of an OR. As this procedure is somewhat cumbersome to 
compute, we offer a straightforward procedure based on a hypothetical individual with 
average characteristics and example programs for popular statistical packages. We 
also propose ways to construct the absolute difference counterparts of these relative 
measures and suggest a method to perform statistical inference. In an empirical 
illustration we apply these methods to measure income related health inequality in the 
elderly population of the European Union. 
The results show that the RR and the RR evaluated for an individual with (sample) 
mean characteristics (RRm) show little difference. There are two explanations to why the 
observed differences are so small. First, there may be a small effect of the curvature 
of the relationship between income rank and self-reported less than good health. This 
may not be surprising as curvature plays less of a role when estimating sample indices 
with a prevalence of around 50 percent and because our income variable is already 
transformed into relative ranks. Secondly, other characteristics may not influence the 
partial effect on the outcome very much in this example. This too, seems reasonable as 
Men Women
RII-OR RII-RR RII-RRm RII-OR RII-RR RII-RRm
Belgium Belgium Belgium 1 Belgium Portugal Portugal
Greece Greece Greece 2 Portugal Belgium Belgium
France France France 3 Netherlands Italy Italy
Netherlands Italy Italy 4 Germany Germany Germany
Germany Germany Portugal 5 Denmark Netherlands Spain
Denmark Portugal Germany 6 UK Spain Netherlands
UK Netherlands Spain 7 Italy Denmark Denmark
Italy Spain Netherlands 8 France France France
Spain UK UK 9 Spain UK UK
Portugal Denmark Denmark 10 Ireland Greece Greece
Ireland Ireland Ireland 11 Greece Ireland Ireland
Table 3.4 Order of EU countries from the lowest to the highest income related inequality of 
self assessed health as measured by several methods, 1994, men and women 60+
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we adjusted for age only and all age groups are mutually exclusive. Had we used several 
categories of standardising variables, which is often the case with health care utilisation 
research, then the differences could have been more significant. Nonetheless, we think 
that RRm-based methods will generally make a good approximation of the RR-based 
methods and have the advantage of being much less cumbersome to compute.
The results show that the OR cannot be viewed as an approximation of a RR. That the 
relationship is demonstrably weaker as the prevalence is higher. That the ranking of 
countries varies between the two measures. Clearly the choice between both measures 
is an important one and can now be based on theoretical rather than distributional 
considerations. Therefore, the question arises whether RR should be preferred above 
OR-based measures in research on socio-economic inequalities in health? We think 
there is no definitive answer to this question. Underneath we will list some considerations 
when choosing between the two.
First and foremost, the preferred measure should capture relative inequality best, i.e. 
matches best with societal notions about relative inequality. A RR of three means that 
the relative difference of two groups/individuals is a factor three, irrespective of the 
overall prevalence. While in such a case, the OR varies between just above three to 
infinity as prevalence levels go up. In other words, we need to answer the question 
whether society is more worried about relative inequality when the prevalence is higher. 
And if so, whether this worry is correctly represented by the weight the OR attaches to 
it. Although an answer may not be available at this time, an infinite weight when the 
prevalence level approaches one is certainly questionable. Incidentally, the above also 
explains why ORs are hard to interpret by non-researchers. For that reason alone, they 
are unsuitable for descriptions of health inequalities directed at the general public or 
other uninitiated audiences. One way to deal with the issue of weighting prevalence is 
to present both the RR and its absolute counterpart which are related through overall 
prevalence.
When the dependent variable is ordered and the choice of cut-off is subjective, then this 
choice will not affect the OR under the assumption of proportional odds (also referred to 
as the parallel regression assumption). However, as prevalence levels will vary with the 
choice of cut-off so will RRs. By implication -under the proportional odds assumption- 
ORs will be more comparable across countries or over time if cut-points between self-
assessed health categories vary between countries or changes over time, as they may 
(Sen, 2002). In practice though, tests as provided by (Brant, 1990) often show that the 
assumption of proportional odds is violated (Scott Long, 1997), in which case the OR is 
sensitive to the choice of cut-point. 
Furthermore, the RR is sensitive to the choice of outcome category that is defined as an 
event (1) and which as a non-event (0) (i.e. whether one is evaluating the inequality 
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Notes
a. The bottom right figure was derived assuming the OR in interpreted as a RR, i.e. Rb/Ra=21 (E1a), which 
 can be rewritten as Rb = 21Ra  (E1b), while the average prevalence equals 0.6, i.e. Rb + Ra = 1.2 = 
 66/55 (E2). Substituting equation E1b in equation E2 gives 22Ra = 66/55. Solving gives Ra = 3/55 and 
 Rb = 63/55. To obtain the RD we subtract Ra from Rb, which equals 60/55, which we rounded to 1.09.
b. See for a discussion on concepts of interaction the chapter by the same title in Rothman and Greenland 
 (1998).
c. The exponentiation of the log link (rather than the logistic link) function coefficients directly give RRs. A 
 drawback of this link function is that the predicted probabilities are no longer confined to the [0,1] inter
 val.
d. As expected, when this procedure is applied using Poisson regression, the result of Step 4 provides the 
 exact RR normally obtained by taking the antilog of the coefficient.
in health or ill-health). As this choice influences both magnitude and ranking, it can 
never be made arbitrarily. The RR thus forces the researcher to be explicit in the choice 
for a positive or a negative definition of the health outcome indicator. The RR shares 
this feature with the concentration index (Clarke, Gerdtham, Johannesson, Bingefors, 
and Smith, 2002; Koolman and Van Doorslaer, 2004). This drawback may become an 
advantage when both positive and negative indicators are of interest, but are not equally 
important or have different implications for research or policy. 
The OR of inequality in health is the inverse of the OR of inequality in ill-health. Thus 
ranking never varies with the choice of which category to label as an event. In fact, the 
log OR (the untransformed coefficient) only changes sign when the choice of event is 
reversed, facilitating comparisons over time or place. Because of this and the fact that 
the log OR does not tempt people to interpret it as a RR, we recommend presentation 
of the log OR above the OR, especially when the outcome is not infrequent (roughly 
above 5%).
Although the choice between a RR and a OR may depend on many factors, the freedom 
to choose between both of them when the dependent variable is categorical is a step 
forward and allows a careful choice of methods to describe and display socio-economic 
inequalities in health.
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ABSTRACT
This paper provides new evidence on the sources of differences in the degree of income-
related inequalities in self-assessed health in thirteen European Union member states. 
It goes beyond earlier work by measuring health using an interval regression approach 
to compute concentration indices and by decomposing inequality into its determining 
factors.  New and more comparable data were used, taken from the 1996 wave of 
the European Community Household Panel. Significant inequalities in health (utility) 
favouring the higher income groups emerge in all countries, but are particularly high in 
Portugal and – to a lesser extent – in the UK and in Denmark. By contrast, relatively low 
health inequality is observed in the Netherlands and Germany, and also in Italy, Belgium, 
Spain Austria and Ireland. There is a positive correlation with income inequality per se 
but the relationship is weaker than in previous research. Health inequality is not merely a 
reflection of income inequality.  A decomposition analysis shows that the (partial) income 
elasticities of the explanatory variables are generally more important than their unequal 
distribution by income in explaining the cross-country differences in income-related 
health inequality. Especially the relative health and income position of non-working 
Europeans like the retired and disabled explains a great deal of “excess inequality”. 
We also find a substantial contribution of regional health disparities to socio-economic 
inequalities, primarily in the Southern European countries. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
Persistent differences in health by socio-economic status (SES) have long been a 
serious health policy concern in many European countries and have recently also been 
put at the forefront of the European Union’s National Action Plans as agreed upon at 
the Lisbon European Council. In the recent Atkinson Report’s (Atkinson et al., 2002) 
recommendations on Indicators for Social Inclusion in the EU, a less unequal distribution 
of self-reported health by income quintiles is seen as an intrinsic part of the broad 
goals of social inclusion and cohesion endorsed by the European Union. Comparative 
research which exploits cross-national variation but uses comparable data from all 
member states offers the prospect of providing insights into the reasons for cross-
country differences.
In previous work (Van Doorslaer et al., 1997), we have employed concentration indices 
and curves to test for differences across eight European countries and the US in 
the extent to which self-reported (ill-) health was unequally distributed across income. 
We then found that significant income-related health inequalities were present in all 
countries but also found substantial differences across countries. A country’s degree of 
(income-related) health inequality appeared to be particularly closely associated with its 
degree of income inequality. While a fair degree of comparability was achieved, it was 
still limited by the fact that the comparison had to be based on secondary analysis of 
country-specific health interview and socioeconomic surveys. Inevitably, and despite all 
efforts at harmonization and improved comparability, differences in income and health 
variable definitions constrained the type of comparisons that could be performed. A 
similar study for six European countries using comparable methods also found that 
income-related inequality in self-assessed health was strongly associated with income 
inequality (Cavelaars et al., 1997). They noted that the measured degree of income-
related health inequality decreased substantially when other socio-economic indicators, 
notably education level, occupational status and especially employment status were 
controlled for. 
This paper updates and substantially extends the evidence on income-related inequalities 
in Europe by using both new data sources and new methods. First, we use new data from 
the third wave (1996) of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) Study, which 
were recently released by the European Commission’s Statistical Office (EUROSTAT). It 
provides a rich new source of comparable household level data on income, health and 
various other socio-economic characteristics from all European Union member states. 
Second, we measure and explain self-reported health using a recently proposed method 
based on interval group regression (Van Doorslaer and Jones, 1997). Third, we explore 
potential causes of cross-country differences in income-related health inequality using 
a new method for decomposing the estimated inequality into the contributions of 
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various determinants (Wagstaff et al., 2003). Fourth, we examine the causes of ‘excess 
inequality’ by decomposing the differences with the European country with the lowest 
degree of inequality. Finally, we perform statistical inference based on a bootstrapping 
procedure of the decomposition method. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we set out the methods used to 
measure, explain and decompose the sources of inequality. Section three describes the 
data and variables used and section four gives the results of the analysis. We end with 
conclusions and discussion in section 4.5. 
4.2  METHODS
4.2.1  Measurement of health 
As in previous work, we mainly use respondents’ self-assessments as our measure 
of general health status. While this measure may seem simple and subjective, it has 
been shown to be a powerful predictor of subsequent mortality (Idler and Benyamini, 
1997) and, more importantly, its predictive power does not appear to vary systematically 
by SES (Burström and Fredlund, 2001) which means that inequalities in self-assessed 
health (SAH) also have predictive power for inequalities in mortality (Van Doorslaer and 
Gerdtham, 2003). It basically provides an ordinal ranking of individuals’ self-perception 
of their health status. However, in contrast to previous work we now have empirical 
distributions of SAH based on the same question “How is your health in general?” 
and the same five response categories ranging from “very good” to “very bad”. This 
is the WHO recommended wording for self-perceived health questions in European 
health interview surveys (WHO, 1996). This health ranking variable basically provides an 
ordinal ranking to which many previous researchers have responded by dichotomising 
it into two categories: individuals reporting to be in good or very good health versus 
those in less-than-good-health. This practice has been shown to have the undesirable 
property of leading to rank reversals when comparing health inequality over time in the 
Netherlands (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 1994) or across countries in Europe (Van 
Doorslaer and Koolman, 2000).
One approach used to exploit all information contained in the 5-point scale, was to 
assume that underlying these responses is a latent self-assessed health variable with a 
skewed, standard lognormal distribution to obtain latent ill-health scores for each of the 
response categories (Van Doorslaer et al., 1997; Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 1994). 
While this approach makes the arbitrary assumption that the distribution of latent ill-
health is identical (i.e. the standard lognormal one) in all countries, its joint distribution 
with income can still vary and the relative inequality associated with income around 
this identical mean can still be examined. The restrictive assumption of a common 
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underlying health distribution was necessitated by lack of a cardinal scale for the ill-
health scores and by the differing questions and response categories across countries. 
The availability of one SAH measure with an identical wording of question and response 
categories in the ECHP (albeit translated and asked in the various European languages) 
makes this restrictive standard lognormal assumption redundant. A more promising 
strategy is to use information on the empirical distribution of generic health measures 
with well-tested properties. While preference-based valuations of health states are 
now available also for generic instruments like the SF-36 (Brazier et al, 1998) and the 
EuroQol (Dolan, 1997), the Canadian Health Utilities Index (HUI) Mark III (Feeny et al., 
1995; Feeny et al., 2002) is the only instrument which is now routinely included in a 
general population health survey. Scoring the SAH levels using external information on 
an instrument such as the HUI therefore has the attraction of obtaining a more ‘natural’ 
index for the SAH scores as utilities between 0 and 1. 
Appropriate econometric analysis of an ordered categorical dependent variable, such 
as SAH, is typically based on the ordered probit or logit model or, if information on 
the scaling of the variable is available, the interval (or grouped data) regression model. 
Interval, or grouped data, regression provides a more efficient alternative to the ordered 
probit model when the values of the boundaries of the intervals are known (Jones, 
2000). Our approach here is to use the empirical distribution function of HUI scores 
in the 1994 Canadian National Population Health Survey sample obtained in Van 
Doorslaer and Jones (1997) to scale the intervals of SAH for all European countries. To 
do this we assume that there is a stable mapping from HUI to the (latent) variable that 
determines reported SAH and that this applies not only to Canadian but also to European 
individuals. We compute the cumulative frequency of observations for each category of 
SAH and then find the thresholds µj of the empirical distribution function (EDF) for HUI 
that match these frequencies. Formally, 
 µj = F
-1(Gj )      (4.1) 
where F-1(.) is the inverse of the EDF of HUI and Gj is the cumulative frequency of 
observations for category j of SAH. 
Because we use HUI thresholds to scale SAH, the linear index xi β for the interval 
regression model gives us a prediction of each individual’s level of health utility as 
derived from the observed SAH level. It is the predicted level of HUI knowing that an 
individual has characteristics x. The prediction is both continuous and linear in the xi’s. 
Linearity is a useful property which implies that concentration indices calculated using 
the predictions are suitable for decomposition analysis (cf. section 2.3). In effect, the 
interval regression technique exploits the between-SAH category variation to generate 
some within-SAH category variation in HUI, while HUI itself is unobserved. Moreover, 
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by incorporating external information to scale the categorical observations of SAH, 
the predictions are measured on the same scale as HUI and do not require ex post 
re-scaling, as is often done with ordered probit predictions. 
4.2.2  Measurement of inequality
As before, we use the health concentration index as our measure of relative income-
related health inequality (Wagstaff et al., 2003).a Suppose we have a continuous 
cardinal measure of health (utility) yi. A concentration curve L(s) plots the cumulative 
proportion of the population (ranked by income, beginning with the lowest incomes) 
against the cumulative proportion of health. If L(s) coincides with the diagonal, everyone 
enjoys the same health. If, by contrast, L(s) lies below the diagonal, inequalities in 
health exist and favour the richer members of society. The further L(s) lies from the 
diagonal, the greater the degree of inequality. The health concentration index, C, is 
defined as twice the area between L(s) and the diagonal. C takes a value of zero when 
L(s) coincides with the diagonal and is negative (positive) when L(s) lies above (below) 
the diagonal. The minimum and maximum values of C using individual-level data are -1 
and +1 respectively: these occur when all the population’s ill-health is concentrated in 
the hands of the most and least disadvantaged persons respectively. 
Since the estimation and comparison of inequality estimates across countries requires 
representative and therefore suitably weighted sample data, the computation formula 
for C given by Kakwani et al. (1997) can be modified to accommodate sample weighting 
as follows:
 = -C N 
w y  R i i  i i 
N 
=
2 1 
1 μ Σ      (4.2) 
where, 
 μ =
=
1 
1 N 
w y  i i  i 
N 
Σ       (4.3)    
is the (weighted) mean health of the sample, N is the sample size, wi is the sampling 
weight of individual i (with the sum of wi equal to N), and Ri is the fractional rank 
(for weighted data) of the ith individual. The latter is defined as Lerman and Yitzhaki 
(1989):
 R 
N 
w w  i j  i j 
i 
= +
=
-1 1 
2 1 
1 
Σ     where w0 = 0   (4.4)
and thus indicates the weighted cumulative proportion of the population up to the 
midpoint of each individual weight.  
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C can be computed conveniently using the weighted covariance of μ and the fractional 
rank (for weighted data) as Kakwani et al. (1997):
 v ,( )C
N
w y  R y Ri i  i w i i  i
N
= -( ) - = ( )
=
2 21
21μ 
μ 
μ 
co Σ   (4.5)
where covw denotes the weighted covariance.
4.2.3  Decomposing inequality
A straightforward way of decomposing the measured degree of inequality into the 
contributions of explanatory factors, proposed in Wagstaff et al. (2003), requires the 
specification of a linear additive regression model of health such as 
 y i k  ki k i =  + +α ε β Σ x      (4.6)
where y is the health measure, the xk variables are health determinants and ε is a 
disturbance term. One could think of this equation as a reduced form of a demand 
for health equation where all xk are exogenous determinants. Given the relationship 
between yi and xki in equation (4.6), the concentration index for y, C, can be written as:
 C x C G  C k k  k k = +( /  ) /β        μ μ ε Σ     (4.7)
where μ is the mean of y, xk is the mean of xk, Ck is the concentration index for xk (defined 
analogously to C) and GCε is the generalized concentration index for εi. Equation (4.7) 
shows that C is equal to a weighted sum of the concentration indices of the k regressors, 
where the weight or “share” for, say, xk, is the elasticity of y with respect to xk. The 
residual component — captured by the last term — reflects the inequality in health that 
is not explained by systematic variation across income groups in the xk. In the case of 
the interval regression approach, no residuals can be computed and the decomposition 
reduces to the first term in equation (4.7). 
If we define the estimated health elasticity of determinant k as
 ˆ 
k  k k  η β ˆ / μ x ≡ 
      
(4.8)
and using estimated concentration indices, we can rewrite the decomposition as 
  C C  ˆ ˆ ˆ k k  k = η  Σ       (4.9)
In other words, estimated health inequality is just a weighted sum of the inequality 
in each of its determinants, with the weights equal to the health elasticities of the 
determinants. As a result, total inequality can be partitioned into what has been labeled 
(cf. Kakwani et al., 1997) ‘potentially avoidable’ and ‘unavoidable’ health inequality. 
The unavoidable part of the inequalities is comparable to, for instance, the age-sex 
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expected health inequality by income due to demographics. Using the method of 
indirect standardisation (Kakwani et al., 1997), one can compute the age-sex expected 
inequality as C* and subtract this from C to obtain an estimate of ‘potentially avoidable’ 
inequality as I* = C-C*. Note that if y is predicted only on the basis of age and sex (as 
in (Van Doorslaer et al., 1997)), then ˆ C  in equation (4.9) is identical to C*, i.e. the degree 
of inequality to be expected simply on the basis of the unequal distribution of age and 
sex across income groups. The current approach, based on ‘full’ equations rather than 
‘auxiliary’ standardising regressions for age and sex only, has two advantages. First, we 
standardise only for the purely ‘demographic’, i.e. partial effects on health, not the ‘total’ 
effects of age and gender. If other relevant variables are omitted in the standardising 
equations, these ‘partial’ effects run the risk of omitted variable bias (Schokkaert and 
Van de Voorde, 2003; Gravelle, 2001). Secondly, the unavoidability of, for instance, 
gender-related differences in income-related health inequality is contentious and it 
seems therefore preferable to decompose the total relative inequality in health into 
its various determinants, including demographic structure, leaving it to the user 
of the results to standardise for whatever background characteristics are deemed 
appropriate. 
The decomposition also makes clear how each determinant k’s separate contribution to 
total income-related health inequality can be decomposed into two meaningful parts: 
(i) its impact on health, as measured by the health elasticity (ηk), and (ii) its degree 
of unequal distribution across income, as measured by the (income) concentration 
index (Ck). This decomposition method therefore not only allows to separate the 
contributions of the various determinants, but also to identify the importance of each 
of these two components within each factor’s contribution. This property makes it a 
powerful tool for unpacking the mechanisms contributing to a country’s degree of health 
inequality.
4.2.4  Statistical inference
When inequality has been measured and decomposed into its sources, it is useful to be 
able to statistically test for cross-country differences. Given the complexity of the survey 
designs of the ECHP samples and the complex composition of the contribution terms 
in equation (4.9), we have opted to use a “bootstrap” method (Efron and Tibshirani, 
1993; Deaton, 1997) to assess sampling variability and to obtain standard errors for 
the estimates of both C  and for η  k k  C , for each k. A bootstrap procedure hinges on 
the assumption that the observed distribution is a random sample of the underlying 
population distribution, and that individuals within the sample are independent. In our 
bootstrap we have corrected for differences in sampling probability, but not for the 
different types of the multi-stage sampling designs used in the ECHP. The latter was 
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impossible because the necessary information ─ such as the primary sampling units 
─ was not provided for all countries. Our bootstrap estimators of the t-statistics were 
computed using a five-step approach. First, we have inflated our sample size to allow 
for the differences in sampling probability by multiplying the sampling weights by the 
inverse of the smallest weight and rounded to the nearest integer. Second, from this 
expanded sample we have drawn a random sub-sample of the size of the original 
sample with replacement. Third, we have run the entire procedure to obtain estimates 
of the factor contributions and I*, including the interval regression, the construction of 
a fractional rank and a covariance matrix. This procedure differs from the calculation of 
the point estimates in that it is not weighted, as the differences in sampling probability 
are taken into account in the inflation of the sample. Fourth, by repeating this whole 
process, we generated 1000 resample data sets, each providing us with estimates of 
the contributions. Fifth, using these datasets we computed the standard deviations and 
t-statistics for each factor’s contribution and for I*. 
4.2.5 Decomposing inequality differences between countries
More interesting than a mere country-by-country decomposition of inequality is the 
decomposition of between-country differences in health inequalities into (a) the 
differences in inequality in the determinants of health, and (b) differences in the 
health effects of these determinants across countries. This is not straightforward 
because some differences (e.g. in the mean of xk) may be offset by other differences 
(e.g. in Ck). These changes will, in general, not be independent of one another and the 
decomposition method has to take these interdependencies into account. One approach 
of dealing with this problem is to apply a decomposition method proposed in Wagstaff 
et al. (2003). If we denote by ηki the elasticity of y with respect to xki for country i, and 
by Cki the concentration index of determinant k in country i, then we can apply Oaxaca’s 
(1973) method by choosing country i for reference values of ηki and country j for values 
of Cki to obtain:
 ( )C C  + -Δ C C  C Ci j  ki  ki kj k kj k ki kj= - = -( )
 Σ Σ η η η , (4.10)
with the alternative being:
 = - ( )( ) + -Δ C C  C Ci j kj  ki kj k ki k ki kj = -
 Σ Σ Cη η ηC . (4.11)
Then ΔCk, the contribution of any variable xk to ΔC, equals the sum of two terms, i.e. 
 = -Δ C C C  k i ki k  j k  j k  i k  j ( ) + -( )η ηk C η    (4.12)
Both terms consist of a product of an elasticity and a concentration index. Note that 
while equations (4.10) and (4.11) produce identical ΔC’s and ΔCk’s, their decomposition 
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in equation (4.12) is not unique and may lead to slightly differing results depending 
on the choice of i or j as ‘index country’ for the estimates of ηki and Cki. To facilitate 
some assessment of the relative importance of the inequality versus the elasticity 
component of ΔCk, we have computed, for each determinant, the relative excess 
elasticity compared to the Netherlands, i.e. ( )η      η η ki kj kj - /  and the relative excess 
inequality, i.e. ( )C C Cki kj kj- / , for j = NL.
 
4.3   DATA AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
The data used in this paper were taken from the third wave (held in 1996) of the 
European Community Household Panel Users Database (Eurostat, 1999). The ECHP is 
a survey based on a standardised questionnaire that involves annual interviewing of 
a representative panel of households and individuals 16 years and older in each EU 
member state. It covers a wide range of topics including demographics, income, social 
transfers, health, housing, education, employment, etc. 
Our health measure is the answer to the question “How is your health in general?” rated 
in 5 categories (Very Poor, Poor, Fair, Good to Very Good).b The relative frequencies of 
the European-wide 1996 ECHP responses were (2.4%, 7.9%, 24.3%, 42.2% and 23%). 
These are remarkably close to the relative frequencies for the response categories 
(Poor, Fair, Good, Very Good and Excellent) in the Canadian 1994 NPHS, which were 
(2.4%, 8.6%, 27%, 37.2% and 24.8%) despite the different wording. For the estimation of 
the interval regression we have used the HUI thresholds obtained in Van Doorslaer and 
Jones (1997): 0, 0.428, 0.756, 0.897, 0.947 and 1.
Our income measure (i.e. our ranking variable) is disposable (i.e. after-tax) household 
income per equivalent adult, using the modified OECD equivalence scale. This gives a 
weight of 1.0 to the first adult, 0.5 to the second and each subsequent person aged 
14 and over, and 0.3 to each child aged under 4 in the household. Total household 
income includes all the net monetary income received by the household members during 
the reference year (which is 1995 for the 1996 wave). It includes income from work 
(employment and self-employment), private income (from investments and property and 
private transfers to the household), pensions and other direct social transfers received. 
No account has been taken of indirect social transfers (e.g. reimbursement of medical 
expenses), receipts in kind and imputed rent from owner-occupied accommodation. All 
incomes were converted from national monetary units into a common reference unit 
(the “purchasing power standard”) (Eurostat, 1999). 
Other health determinants included in the analysis are: (i) Education level, i.e. the highest 
level of general or higher education completed is available at three levels: recognised 
third level education (ISCED 5-7), second stage of secondary level of education (ISCED 3) 
and less than second stage of secondary education (ISCED 0-2)); (ii) Marital status 
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distinguishes between married, separated/divorced, widowed and unmarried (including 
co-habiting); (iii) Activity status includes full-time employed, part-time employed, self-
employed, student, unemployed, retired, doing housework and ‘other economically 
inactive’.c Region of residence uses the EU’s NUTS 1 level (Nomenclature of Statistical 
Territorial Units), except for countries where such information was withheld for privacy 
reasons (NL, D) or because the country is too small (DK, L). Sample sizes before 
and after deletion of cases with missing observations, as well as the means for all 
variables are presented in Table 4.1. Most country’s sample sizes are between 7000 
and 11000 adults, but some are larger (Spain, Italy) and some are smaller (Denmark 
and Luxembourg). Cross-sectional sample weights at the individual level were applied in 
all analyses.
4.4 RESULTS
4.4.1  Measuring and decomposing inequality by country
The country means of the predicted health and explanatory variables presented in 
Table 4.1 provide an interesting basis for simple cross-country comparisons. The 
predicted HUI means (using the interval regressions from Table 4.2) show average health 
utility values above 0.9 for some of the richer countries such as Belgium, Denmark and 
the Netherlands, but also for poorer countries like Ireland and Greece. By far the lowest 
mean health is predicted for Portugal (0.82 only) but also France and Italy have relatively 
low mean health scores. 
Luxembourg is the richest country in the EU with by far the highest disposable income 
per equivalent adult, but not the best health. Greek and the Irish adults, on the other 
hand, report better health than would be expected on the basis of their mean incomes. 
The countries’ demographic structures, as presented by the age-sex dummies, do not 
differ dramatically but illustrate that Ireland and the Netherlands are relatively younger 
countries with just 20% of adults over 60, while in most other countries this age 
group represents almost a quarter or more of their population (see bottom of table). 
While cross-country differences in education are somewhat more difficult to compare 
due to inter-country differences in definitions of educational qualifications, the low 
proportion of Portuguese with secondary level education is striking. Among the activity 
status variables, most notable are the high percentages of self-employed in Greece and 
Portugal, the low percentage of retired in Ireland, and the high variability of proportions 
reporting to be doing housework or to be in the non-economically-active category. 
The analysis of inter-individual variation in health requires the specification of a 
theoretical model explaining health behaviour. The models estimated below are not 
derived from a formal model of health production and investment but could be thought 
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66 chapter 4
of as reduced-form estimates of a static model of the demand for health. By definition, 
these reduced form estimates do not provide any guidance as to how individual choice 
behaviour affects health but they do allow for the estimation of the impact of partial 
changes in exogenous health determinants, some of which may be amenable to policy 
intervention. 
We estimated an interval regression equation per country using the Canadian HUI 
thresholds for the SAH variable and including the following explanatory variables: (i) the 
logarithm of equivalent disposable household income (to capture well-known concavity 
in this relationship), (ii) ten age-sex categories indicating the age groups 16-29, 30-44, 
45-59, 60-69 and 70+ for both males and females, (iii) three education level categories, 
(iv) eight categories of activity status, (v) four categories of marital status, and, where 
available, (vi) three categories of country of birth (dummies for other European and other 
non-European country) and (vii) where relevant and available, the region of residence. 
In the case of the dummies, one reference category was omitted, of course. The profile 
of the omitted reference category was the young, highly educated, employed, married, 
male with average income, born in the country in question and (if applicable) living in the 
omitted region (usually the capital region). 
The results of the interval regressions are presented in Table 4.2. No causal interpretation 
can be given to the coefficient estimates because they are purely cross-sectional 
and because the exogenous status of some of the explanatory variables (in particular 
household income and activity status) is contentious. Some general observations 
emerge. First, the (logarithm of) household income has a significantly positive coefficient 
in all countries except one: only in Denmark no significant partial association between 
health and income remains when these other factors are controlled for. The estimated 
coefficients are directly comparable because both income and health are measured 
in the same units in all countries. In general, and as expected, the income elasticity 
of health is lower in countries with higher income (Luxembourg is the exception). 
Secondly, the demographic effects are largely as expected: lower health for females and 
decreasing health with rising age. However, there seems to be sufficient variation across 
countries for homogeneity of (partial) age-gender effects across Europe to be rejected. 
Third, without any exception, higher levels of education are significantly associated with 
better health in all countries. Countries with the lowest ‘health return’ to education 
are Ireland and Belgium. Fourth, those who are married or cohabiting generally report 
better health than those who are not (or not any more), but there is substantial variation 
across countries in this pattern. Fifth, there is little or no clear health effect of being 
born in another country, European or other. Sixth, not surprisingly, there is important 
variation in reported health by activity status. Being unemployed, retired or otherwise 
not economically active (i.e. because of disability status) is associated with significantly 
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lower health, but generally – and more surprisingly – the same is true for those doing 
housework. Especially the partial association between retirement and other non-active 
status (and the difference between these two probably differs across countries) and 
health turns out to be strong. Notable exceptions include the Netherlands (for retirement 
status) and France and Germany (for inactivity status). Finally, for a number of countries 
it was possible to include dummies indicating region of residence to allow for regional 
variation in health status. The names of the corresponding regions are given in Tabl4.5. 
In some countries – France in particular – none of the region dummies is significant. 
In some other European countries, however, significant partial regional health effects 
emerge. Regions with, ceteris paribus, relatively worse health appear to be: the south of 
Belgium (Wallonia), the North West of the UK (including Northern England, Yorkshire and 
Humberside, East Midlands, the North West, Northern Ireland and Wales), the South 
of Italy, the non-Athens regions in Greece, the North-West of Spain, the North and the 
Lisbon area in Portugal and the South East of Austria.
The concentration indices, computed using equation (4.5) and presented in Table 4.3, 
tell an interesting story about income-related inequalities in themselves. First of all, in 
all EU member states self-reported health is unequally distributed in favour of the higher 
income groups. But there are substantial differences between countries. Portugal has 
far greater income-related health inequality than the UK and Greece. The Netherlands 
and Germany have very low health inequality, but also Italy, Belgium and Austria have 
relatively low CIs. To some degree, the pattern of income inequality (as measured 
by the CI of log income) follows the pattern of income-related health inequality, but 
exceptions are Denmark and Luxembourg, both of which show higher health inequality 
than expected on the basis of their income inequality. In terms of age groups, it is 
striking to see older women concentrated in lower income groups everywhere, but least 
of all in Spain and Italy. By contrast, older males tend to rank low in income only in 
Denmark, the UK, Ireland, Greece and Portugal. In all countries, higher educated are 
strongly concentrated amongst the richest, but most of all in Portugal and least of all 
in Germany. Retired are more concentrated among the lower income groups and the 
same is true for unemployed in all countries but Denmark. Immigrants seem worse off in 
most countries, but not in Austria and Portugal. The concentration indices of the regional 
dummies also clearly show which are the relatively wealthy and which are the less well-
off regions. Regional income disparities are particularly pronounced in Italy, Spain and 
Portugal.
We now turn to the more important question: how do these various characteristics 
contribute – or not – to the observed income-related health inequality in European 
countries? It is clear that a determinant’s contribution to inequality can be either positive 
or negative, depending on the sign of its health effect and its distribution by income, 
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as reflected in its concentration index. Table 4.5 summarizes the decomposition of 
each country’s income-related health inequality into the percentage contributions of 
the regressor variables. A positive (negative) x% contribution of variable X is to be 
interpreted as follows: income-related health inequality would, ceteris paribus, be x% 
lower if variable X were equally distributed across the income range, or if variable X had 
a zero health elasticity. The second row presents estimates of I* = C - C*, defined as the 
health inequality not due to demographics, i.e. the degree of inequality which would be 
observed if age and sex were equally distributed by income, or had no effect on health. 
It is computed by subtracting the contributions of age and gender from total inequality 
and it is comparable to the degree of potentially avoidable inequality as it was labelled in 
past work using the indirect method of standardisation (e.g. Van Doorslaer et al., 1997). 
The important difference is, however, that the age-sex contributions here are now 
estimated as partial effects, i.e. while controlling for income and other influences on 
health. We can see that I* is often but not always smaller than C. In other words: the 
health and income distribution of age and gender can both increase and decrease 
observed health inequality.
Figure 4.1 shows the countries’ ranking by I* with the confidence intervals obtained from 
the bootstrapped standard errors. In all countries, the degree of non-age-sex related - 
and therefore potentially avoidable - inequality I* is highly significant and different from 
Figure 4.1 Degree of income-related inequality in health utility, by country, with 95% 
confidence intervals (ECHP, 1996, age-sex standardised)
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zero. But there are large differences between countries. In the Netherlands, inequality 
is significantly lower than in any other country except Germany. In Portugal, on the 
other hand, inequality is significantly greater than in any other country. Table 4.A.1 
summarizes the results of all pair wise comparisons by showing the t statistics of the 
between-country differences in I* values.  
Figure 4.2 shows a simple scatter diagram of health inequality (as measured by I*) 
and income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient of income). The correlation 
is positive, but weak and not significant (r=0.47; P=0.10). The correlation with 
unstandardised inequality C is higher and significant (r=0.66; P=0.019) but also much 
lower than the r=0.87 reported in Van Doorslaer et al. (1997). The positive correlation 
is mainly due to the outlier position of Portugal, a role played by the US in Van Doorslaer 
et al. (1997). Especially Denmark and the UK show a much higher health inequality than 
would be expected on the basis their income inequality. The decompositions will allow 
us to explore these findings in greater detail.
Some general findings emerge from the decomposition results presented in Table 4.5. 
First, in all countries except Denmark, income itself accounts for a significant and 
sizeable contribution: between 25% and 40% of all measured inequality. The peculiar 
Danish result does not arise because Denmark has the lowest income inequality in 
the EU, but because of the complete lack of any (partial) linear association between 
household income and adult health. Apart from income itself, age, education and activity 
0.00
Figure 4.2 Income inequality and health inequality (r(G,c)=0.64; r(G,I*)=0.47)
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status are the most important ‘contributors’ to health inequality. While older females 
contribute significantly to higher health inequality, middle aged males - with worse health 
but better incomes than young males - reduce health inequality. Higher educational 
differences invariably and significantly contribute to inequality. The contributions of the 
activity status variables are less straightforward to generalise. This may be related to the 
variation in social security schemes across European countries leading to differences 
in meaning and uses of this categorization. In some countries (e.g. Denmark, Germany), 
it is mainly the (health and income distribution of the) retired which contributes to 
inequality, while in others (Netherlands, UK, Ireland and Spain), the ‘other economically 
inactive’ group has a greater contribution. In France the largest contribution comes 
from those reporting to be doing housework.d The important thing to note for a proper 
interpretation is that all of these contributions are partial, i.e. after having controlled 
for demographics and income. This means that, for instance, the retired report worse 
health than others of the same age and income. It must therefore mainly reflect the 
disadvantaged position of the early retired. In the next section we will further zoom in on 
the differences between the countries.
Marital status and immigration status generally show only minor contributions to health 
inequality. The contribution of region is mixed and again depends also on the regional 
detail available and the choice of the reference region. In general, the estimates show 
that region of residence does matter in the Mediterranean countries, especially in Spain 
and Italy, and to a lesser extent in Portugal and Greece. There is also some regional 
contribution in the UK but - perhaps surprisingly -  none at all in France.d 
4.4.2  Decomposing “excess inequality” 
The next interesting question is why some countries appear to be able to enjoy much 
lower health inequality than others. We have further explored the factors driving 
these differences between countries using the Oaxaca-type decomposition method 
presented in equations (4.10) and (4.12). In principle, with 13 countries and two index 
options, there are 24 possible ways of decomposing the inequality differences. With the 
information in Tables 1-5, the reader can reproduce all of these possible comparisons. In 
Table 4.6 we present the ΔCk estimates for just one of these options, with all countries 
compared to the country with the lowest inequality, i.e. the Netherlands, as the ’index’ 
country. In effect, this shows a decomposition of the ‘excess inequality’ compared to the 
Netherlands and the (column) percentage contributions presented here are comparable 
to the ones presented in Table 4.5. Generally, the same variables as in Table 4.5 
(i.e. income itself, female elderly, retirement and other non-active status) account for 
most of the differences, although the relative shares differ because of the relatively 
favourable position of older females and retired in the Netherlands. Note that virtually 
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M30-44
M45-59
M60-69 0.3% 0.47 -0.3% -0.29 -0.8% -1.13 2.1% 1.79
M70+ 0.2% 0.12 0.3% 0.13 1.0% 1.21 5.7% 3.85
F16-29
F30-44 0.5% 0.82 -4.3% -4.09 2.1% 1.94 -1.1% -1.22
F45-59
F60-69 4.5% 2.84 1.2% 0.72 2.1% 1.81 5.6% 3.10
F70+ 24.3% 5.42 9.2% 2.35 14.3% 4.35 18.4% 5.73
CI contr t-val CI contr t-val CI contr t-val CI contr t-val
C HUI pred 0.00434 0.00938 0.00337 0.00710
I* = C - C* 0.00461 7.05 0.01062 9.85 0.00372 9.22 0.00579 9.37
Ln (Inc) 36.7% 2.68 0.9% 0.10 31.6% 2.74 33.9% 4.49
-5.0% -3.90 -4.6% -4.29 -2.4% -2.42 -4.8% -3.82
-21.0% -7.10 -8.8% -5.47 -14.8% -6.39 -4.5% -3.50
1.6% 2.15 0.3% 0.56 1.2% 1.39 0.5% 1.01
-11.6% -5.18 -6.4% -4.66 -13.1% -5.52 -3.5% -2.42
Second Educ 0.0% 0.00 -1.0% -1.12 -0.6% -0.74 0.5% 1.27
Higher Educ 15.6% 4.67 18.1% 5.81 22.1% 4.89 10.9% 3.99
Part-time empl 0.0% -0.11 0.1% 0.34 -0.8% -1.59 4.5% 2.33
Self-employed 0.0% 0.02 -0.2% -0.55 -0.1% -0.14 -0.4% -1.20
Student -2.5% -3.01 -1.7% -2.46 -5.5% -2.65 -0.5% -1.28
Unemployed 8.9% 4.51 0.0% 0.05 16.7% 5.37 8.5% 4.78
Housework 3.1% 3.01 1.2% 2.08 17.6% 5.92 2.6% 1.88
Econ inactive 0.2% 0.64 1.0% 0.92 18.6% 4.64 8.2% 4.23
Retired 42.5% 6.86 90.8% 10.54 3.8% 1.47 6.8% 3.30
Divorced/sep 4.4% 2.52 2.4% 2.47 4.4% 2.88 1.6% 1.95
Widowed -1.5% -0.73 0.4% 0.15 1.6% 1.53 1.1% 0.71
Unmarried -1.1% -1.78 0.3% 0.23 1.1% 0.69 0.0% 0.01
47.0%2.026.0-%1.0-
80.1%9.024.1%0.1
Region 2 1.1% 1.43
Region 3 1.7% 1.75
Region 4
Region 5
Region 6
Region 7
Region 8
Region 9
Region 10
Region 11
Born oth Euro
Born non-Euro
Table 4.5 Health inequality contributions of regressors per country (in % of HUI
concentration index, and with bootstrapped t-values)
Netherlands BelgiumGermany Denmark
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CI contr t-val CI contr t-val CI contr t-val CI contr t-val
C HUI pred 0.01036 0.00745 0.01286 0.00769
I* = C - C* 0.00955 6.80 0.00788 10.25 0.01332 14.39 0.00600 12.49
Ln (Inc) 45.8% 3.80 36.1% 3.30 25.8% 4.44 25.1% 4.13
M30-44 -2.4% -1.87 -3.0% -2.94 -2.4% -3.42 -1.9% -2.48
M45-59 -1.7% -0.97 -13.0% -7.50 -5.0% -5.05 -2.1% -2.86
M60-69 0.0% -0.07 -1.3% -1.26 0.0% 0.12 0.2% 0.41
M70+ 1.5% 0.91 1.5% 1.06 0.6% 0.54 6.1% 4.31
F16-29 0.1% 0.24 1.6% 2.74 0.1% 0.27 0.0% 0.17
F30-44 0.5% 0.40 0.5% 0.58 -0.2% -0.86 0.0% -0.11
F45-59 -0.7% -0.28 -11.5% -6.71 -2.8% -3.80 -1.2% -2.11
F60-69 1.6% 0.95 1.2% 1.11 0.0% -0.05 3.3% 3.31
F70+ 8.9% 2.66 18.4% 6.64 6.0% 2.60 17.7% 6.99
Second Educ 8.4% 3.97 2.7% 3.22 1.6% 2.98 3.0% 2.23
Higher Educ 14.7% 3.31 21.1% 6.01 14.2% 7.30 6.3% 3.14
Part-time empl 0.1% 0.47 0.0% -0.19 0.0% -0.08
Self-employed 0.1% 0.21 -0.3% -0.90 -0.8% -1.25 -0.2% -0.33
Student -1.8% -1.88 -1.3% -2.40 0.3% 1.29 -0.2% -1.33
Unemployed 8.2% 2.21 4.3% 2.86 1.7% 2.56 3.9% 3.81
Housework -0.9% -0.56 26.5% 8.81 11.5% 7.01 13.2% 5.21
Econ inactive 1.2% 1.37 0.0% 0.29 17.2% 6.10 18.3% 6.42
Retired 12.7% 3.01 5.3% 3.02 22.5% 7.26 3.5% 3.14
Divorced/sep 0.8% 0.78 1.4% 2.29 1.3% 1.32 1.7% 1.75
Widowed -0.9% -0.90 3.2% 1.77 4.0% 1.92 2.7% 1.64
Unmarried 1.4% 1.55 3.6% 3.20 0.0% 0.07 0.2% 0.68
1.27 -0.1% -0.19 -0.3% -1.40 0.1% 0.48
1.26 1.4% 1.53 0.2% 0.90 0.1% 0.33
Region 2 0.5% 0.96 -0.7% -0.94 0.5% 0.62
Region 3 0.2% 0.22 -0.1% -0.55
Region 4 0.0% -0.05 -0.9% -2.04
Region 5 -0.1% -0.08 8.1% 2.97
Region 6 0.0% -0.02 0.4% 0.91
Region 7 0.1% 0.38 -0.5% -1.25
Region 8 0.9% 1.62 -0.4% -0.97
Region 9 0.4% 0.54
Region 10 -1.4% -2.18
Region 11 -0.6% -1.44
Table 4.5 (continued) Health inequality contributions of regressors per country (in % of 
HUI conc index, and with bootstrapped t-values)
Ireland
Born oth Euro
Born non-Euro
Luxembourg France UK
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CI contr t-val CI contr t-val CI contr t-val CI contr t-val CI contr t-val
C HUI pred
I* = C - C* 0.0062 12.51 0.0081 12.72 0.0056 13.37 0.0169 17.07 0.0058 7.91
Ln (Inc) 48.9% 5.63 39.1% 7.61 42.1% 6.58 35.4% 8.66 41.9% 4.05
M30-44 -6.7% -6.57 -2.6% -5.09 -3.1% -4.76 -1.3% -3.45 -2.0% -2.67
M45-59 -3.4% -2.64 -3.2% -4.36 -0.8% -0.82 -3.4% -4.98 -13.1% -6.29
M60-69 -4.2% -2.86 1.4% 1.61 1.2% 1.24 1.9% 2.64 0.1% 0.11
M70+ 2.4% 1.02 15.3% 7.79 2.9% 2.00 7.4% 6.83 7.3% 3.18
F16-29 1.5% 3.67 0.0% -0.31 0.3% 1.58 -0.1% -0.69 -0.3% -1.21
F30-44 -1.5% -2.07 -1.9% -3.98 -2.3% -3.61 -0.9% -1.96 0.5% 1.27
F45-59 -5.8% -3.36 -2.6% -3.23 0.8% 0.54 -3.0% -3.00 -10.5% -5.65
F60-69 5.7% 2.44 5.5% 4.60 1.4% 0.77 7.0% 5.88 6.9% 3.90
F70+ 13.4% 4.44 20.3% 9.08 15.4% 6.23 15.1% 9.19 31.1% 7.64
Second Educ 12.8% 10.06 3.6% 4.62 4.9% 6.18 3.3% 5.75 13.0% 6.38
Higher Educ 9.6% 7.10 7.4% 5.07 12.1% 6.24 7.0% 8.84 6.5% 4.29
Part-time empl 0.0% 0.03 0.0% -0.01 0.1% 0.58 0.2% 1.47 0.0% 0.45
Self-employed -0.5% -1.88 0.2% 1.88 -0.1% -0.36 0.3% 0.66 0.7% 1.76
Student -1.9% -4.36 -0.1% -0.49 0.0% -0.21 0.4% 2.34 -1.4% -2.88
Unemployed 1.8% 1.55 0.1% 0.44 -0.8% -1.03 0.5% 3.05 1.6% 2.53
Housework 6.2% 3.21 2.7% 4.74 4.3% 2.99 3.5% 5.64 11.4% 4.89
Econ inactive 8.7% 5.56 2.1% 1.59 14.5% 6.38 12.3% 7.73 0.4% 0.21
Retired -4.8% -4.40 14.1% 7.13 0.3% 0.38 19.9% 10.20 7.6% 3.18
Divorced/sep -0.1% -0.28 -0.1% -0.83 0.2% 0.94 0.1% 0.47 0.4% 1.03
Widowed 1.3% 2.09 1.9% 2.97 -0.9% -1.89 -1.2% -1.79 -0.5% -0.29
Unmarried 0.2% 0.44 -0.4% -1.70 0.0% -0.18 -0.6% -2.49 -0.2% -0.71
Born oth Euro 0.0% -0.2% -1.14 0.0% 0.52 0.1% 0.51
Born non-Euro 0.0% 0.0% -0.05 0.2% 1.01 -0.2% -0.84
Region 2 0.2% 0.37 0.0% -0.08 5.3% 5.79 -0.2% -0.36 0.2% 0.42
Region 3 2.7% 2.29 -3.2% -2.79 6.3% 3.45 0.2% 0.23 -1.7% -2.41
Region 4 -0.6% -0.58 0.3% 1.49 -3.1% -2.65 -0.8% -2.92
Region 5 -0.9% -1.56 8.2% 5.74 -0.8% -2.81
Region 6 -0.2% -0.44 -7.3% -3.42 -0.4% -2.09
Region 7 0.1% 0.74 -1.6% -2.12 -2.0% -5.36
Region 8 3.1% 2.34
Region 9 9.1% 4.70
Region 10 0.6% 0.43
Region 11 2.2% 2.23
 0.00730 0.00626  0.01190  0.00663  0.02180
Table 4.5 (continued) Health inequality contributions of regressors per country (in % of HUI 
conc index, and with bootstrapped t-values)
AustriaItaly Greece Spain Portugal
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Germany Denmark Netherl Belgium Luxemb France UK
Excess ineq
CI - CI NL 0.00097 0.00602 0.00373 0.00700 0.00409 0.00949
Ln (Inc) 54.3% -16.2% 36.0% 52.6% 39.8% 23.7%
M30-44 -13.8% -5.8% -6.9% -2.4% -3.5% -2.3%
M45-59 -42.4% -5.5% 4.8% 4.6% -11.6% -1.5%
M60-69 4.3% 0.1% 4.6% 0.3% -1.8% 0.3%
M70+ -2.6% 0.0% 10.0% 1.8% 1.9% 0.5%
F16-29 2.7% -0.3% -0.2% -0.4% 1.9% -0.4%
F30-44 -4.9% -7.8% -3.9% -0.3% -0.9% -1.0%
F45-59 -6.7% -2.6% 5.0% 5.3% -10.2% 0.9%
F60-69 13.0% 0.7% 8.8% 1.4% 0.4% -0.8%
F70+ 58.8% 6.4% 22.2% 6.3% 21.8% 3.1%
Second Educ 2.2% -1.1% 1.4% 12.7% 5.5% 2.4%
Higher Educ -7.1% 15.8% 0.7% 11.2% 20.3% 11.4%
Part-time empl 2.6% 0.6% 9.2% 0.8% 0.3%
Self-employed 0.3% -0.2% -0.7% 0.5% -0.5% -1.1%
Student 8.1% 0.4% 4.0% -2.6% 2.2% 2.4%
Unemployed -18.1% -9.3% 1.2% 14.8% -5.9% -3.7%
Housework -47.1% -7.9% -10.8% -9.3% 33.9% 9.3%
Econ inactive -63.4% -8.8% -1.1% -6.7% -15.2% 16.7%
Retired 176.1% 139.4% 9.5% 9.9% 6.6% 29.1%
Divorced/sep 4.6% 1.2% -0.9% -0.9% -1.0% 0.3%
Widowed -12.3% -0.2% 0.6% -2.1% 4.5% 4.8%
Unmarried -8.9% -0.2% -1.0% 1.6% 5.7% -0.4%
-0.2% 0.4% 2.0% -0.2% -0.3%
1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 2.5% 0.3%
%9.0-%9.0%1.22noigeR
%2.0-%3.0%3.33noigeR
%3.1-%0.04noigeR
%0.11%1.0-5noigeR
%5.0%0.06noigeR
%7.0-%1.07noigeR
%5.0-%7.18noigeR
Region 9 0.6%
Region 10 -1.9%
Region 11 -0.8%
Table 4.6 Contributions of regressors to excess health inequality per country versus
Netherlands (in % of excess concentration index of HUI in first row)
Born other Euro
Born non-Euro
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Netherl Ireland Italy Greece Spain Portugal Austria
Excess ineq
CI - CI NL
Ln (Inc) 20.1% 69.1% 42.1% 53.0% 36.1% 50.7%
M30-44 -1.5% -11.6% -2.7% -3.8% -1.1% -1.6%
%6.11-%4.1-%6.31%4.1%7.9%7.795-54M
%8.0%4.2%3.3%2.2%1.8-%0.196-06M
%6.21%6.8%9.4%0.12%1.4%1.01+07M
%5.1-%3.0-%8.0-%5.0-%9.1%9.0-92-61F
%8.0-%4.1-%8.6-%4.3-%8.5-%7.1-44-03F
%2.8-%1.1-%1.51%5.1%7.2%0.895-54F
%0.11%9.7%6.0%9.6%8.9%2.496-06F
%5.54%2.51%6.61%7.22%4.21%3.02+07F
Second Educ 5.8% 28.4% 5.3% 10.5% 4.1% 24.7%
Higher Educ -6.0% -5.0% 1.5% 1.8% 4.2% -6.9%
Part-time empl 0.6% 0.9% 0.3% 1.0% 0.4% 0.8%
Self-employed -0.3% -0.9% 0.4% 0.0% 0.3% 1.4%
%1.2%4.1%6.5%1.2%2.2%8.3tnedutS
Unemployed -6.1% -15.4% -6.4% -18.9% -2.5% -11.2%
Housework 9.9% -6.9% -3.1% -9.4% 1.0% 6.1%
Econ inactive 18.1% -2.8% -4.4% 10.2% 11.2% -15.1%
%8.01%9.22%2.3-%1.81%9.41-%3.3deriteR
Divorced/sep -0.4% -5.2% -1.9% -4.2% -0.7% -3.1%
Widowed 3.5% 1.0% 2.0% -3.5% -1.7% -2.3%
Unmarried -0.6% -1.0% -1.0% -1.2% -1.0% -1.3%
0.1% 0.0% 0.0% -0.4% 0.0% 0.3%
0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% -0.4%
Region 2 0.8% 0.4% 0.0% 10.8% -0.2% 0.4%
%1.3-%3.0%8.21%0.0%8.53noigeR
%9.0-%3.6-%0.0%2.1-4noigeR
%0.1-%7.61%0.2-5noigeR
%5.0-%8.41-%4.0-6noigeR
%3.2-%2.3-%3.07noigeR
%7.68noigeR
%6.919noigeR
%3.101noigeR
Region 11 4.8%
Table 4.6 (continued) Contributions of regressors to excess health inequality per country
versus Netherlands (in % of excess concentration index of HUI in first row)
Born other Euro
Born non-Euro
49300.033400.0 0.00290 0.00853 0.00326 0.01844
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all of the excess inequality in Denmark is due to the worse health and income position of 
the Danish retired compared to the Dutch retired. 
Another interesting question is: which of the two components of any contribution 
-  the health elasticity or the inequality by income - is the most important contributor 
to excess inequality? This distinction is not unimportant from a policy perspective, 
since in many cases health policies cannot directly alter the distribution of these 
characteristics by income, but they may be able to influence the health elasticity of 
some of these characteristics. As explained in section 4.2, the relative magnitudes of 
their contributions cannot easily be ascertained from comparing the two composite 
terms in each ΔCk described in equation (4.12) since they are both a product of a 
concentration index and an elasticity. Rather, a comparison of the relative differences 
( )C C Cki kj kj- /  and ( )η      η η ki kj ki - /  can provide some insight. These differences are 
presented in Table 4.7 as excess percentages versus the Dutch concentration indices 
and elasticities (Figure 4.3). 
Again, some general observations emerge. In many cases, the elasticity differences 
appear to dominate the inequality differences. Take the contribution of income: in 
all countries, without exception, the relative excess elasticity is greater - often much 
Luxembourg 
Italy 
Belgium 
Germany 
Greece 
France 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Austria 
UK 
Spain 
Portugal
Figure 4.3 Contributions to concentration indices of income-related inequality, 
by country, by source
0.020 - 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015 
Contributions to excess inequality vs Netherlands
Econ inact 
Income Educ Retired Unemployed 
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greater- than the relative excess inequality. This implies that it is not so much the 
differences in income inequality per se, but in the partial association between income 
and health that matter for income-related health inequality. The same observation holds 
for another important influence on such inequality: the partial association between 
health and retirement status appears in all countries as more influential than the degree 
to which retired are ranked lower in the income distribution. This is an important finding 
because, as we said before, it implies that reducing health inequalities seems more a 
matter of reducing these associations through appropriate health related policies than a 
matter of redistributing income. The observation does not hold for all other variables, 
but on the basis of Table 4.7, policy makers from each of the other countries can learn 
where the greatest opportunities lie for reducing income-related health inequalities if 
the goal is to come closer to the, apparently achievable, low degree of health inequality 
in the Netherlands. 
4.5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper adds considerably to the existing knowledge on inter-individual health 
disparities by income in Europe. First, by using a new data set with better and far 
more comparable measures of income and health, it provides more reliable estimates 
of the cross-country differences in health inequalities. Secondly, by using an interval 
regression approach to estimating more fully specified health (utility) equations, it 
achieves a more consistent and reliable estimate of the degree of health inequalities 
which is not due to demographic differences. Thirdly, by using a new decomposition 
technique, it allows to decompose the total observed income-related health inequality 
into the contributions of the health elasticity and the inequality by income for all health 
determinants included in the analysis. Fourth, by bootstrapping the entire estimation 
and decomposition procedure, it was possible to not only estimate but also statistically 
test for cross-country differences in the factors which drive inequality. Finally, an 
Oaxaca-type decomposition of cross-country differences enabled the identification of 
the relative contribution of ‘excess elasticity’ and ‘excess inequality’ in each of the 
determinants compared to a low-inequality country. 
We find that especially Portugal, but also the UK and Denmark, show up with a high 
degree of such inequality, while countries like the Netherlands, Germany, but also Italy, 
Belgium, Spain, Austria and Ireland show a relatively low level of health inequality. The 
correlation with income inequality is positive, but weaker than in previous research. The 
decomposition shows that (the health effect and distribution of) income itself is the 
most important but not the only driving factor. When abstracting from the contributions 
of demographic variables, mainly (the health effect and distribution of) education, 
labour force status and region are the prime other contributors to health inequality. 
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This is in line with findings for Canada (Van Doorslaer and Jones, 1997). But there are 
exceptions. Denmark’s relatively high level of income-related health inequality is not due 
to its income inequality (which is low) but almost entirely to the fact that early retired 
individuals have much worse health and are strongly concentrated among the lower 
income groups. Early retirement in this country may be used as a vehicle for those 
withdrawing from the labour force (early) for health reasons. In most other countries, 
it is either the health and income position of the retired, of other categories of non-
labour force participants (e.g. the other economically inactive), or of those with the 
lowest education, which are the most important contributors after income itself. In the 
southern European countries, a non-negligible portion of the income-related inequality 
is also due to regional health inequalities. 
But apart from the similarities, there are also some dramatic differences between 
European countries. Some are achieving a much lower degree of health inequality 
than others. The decomposition of these cross-country differences into the excess 
inequalities and elasticities of the determinants in comparison to the country with the 
lowest inequality (the Netherlands) brings out that in general the excess elasticities 
play a much greater part than the excess inequalities by income. This finding has very 
important policy implications. It means that reducing health inequalities appears to be 
more a matter of health policy than of income redistribution. 
Of course, the latter conclusion crucially hinges on a causal interpretation of the health 
equations and this brings us to the limitations of this study. As explained in section 4.1, 
the estimated health equations do not generally allow for such a causal interpretation. 
The partial cross-sectional association between income and health as measured in the 
regression coefficient of (log) income may also to some extent reflect reverse causality 
or joint determination by some unobserved underlying factor. The same applies to 
some of the other variables, notably the variables reflecting labour force participation 
status. In this paper, we did not attempt to account for endogeneity or unobserved 
heterogeneity. In the near future, when sufficient waves of the ECHP panel will become 
available, we intend to use panel data techniques to address this limitation of the 
present study. A second caveat concerns the external validity of using the Canadian 
threshold values for health utility to scale the SAH categories in the interval regression. 
While we do not expect this to be very influential for the inequality results obtained, 
ideally this ought to be tested using some European source of health utility thresholds 
and applying the validity tests applied in Van Doorslaer and Jones (1997) on the 
Canadian data. Recent results from similar tests (and decompositions) using Finnish 
and Danish data (Lauridsen et al., 2002) indicate that extremely similar results for both 
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countries are obtained when instead of the Canadian HUI threshold values, thresholds 
based on the distribution of the Finnish distribution of another generic health measure: 
the EQ15D. It therefore appears unlikely that our results are very sensitive to the choice 
of generic measure for the threshold values.
The new empirical evidence on cross-European differences in income-related health 
inequalities provided in this paper also generates some important new policy insights. 
Some European countries achieve much lower degrees of such inequality than others. 
These are not necessarily the healthiest or the richest countries. While a lower degree 
of income inequality will certainly help in reducing health inequalities, it is certainly 
not the sole or the main driver of the inequality differences. What appears crucial is 
the following: (i) the strength of the partial association between income and health; 
measures which can reduce either the health-harming effects of income losses or the 
income consequences of health losses (e.g. through replacement incomes) will definitely 
help; (ii) the associations between health and income (rank) of being outside of the 
labour force; only if it is very hard or nearly impossible to reduce the health elasticities 
by improving or maintaining the health of the non-active (e.g. in the case of the 
disabled or aged), then the only option to reduce these inequalities may be through 
appropriate income policies; (iii) regional differences in health and income; if there were 
no systematic regional disparities, clearly income-related inequality would also be lower. 
While the paper does not tell us what could be done and how to change the inequality 
components, it does show where the greatest potential for inequality reductions lie. 
Future research which can exploit longitudinal changes in income and health could 
help to further unravel the underlying causal pathways which generate the patterns of 
income-related health differences which have emerged from this study. 
Notes 
a. In this paper we often use the word inequality for socioeconomic inequality, which is only one part of 
 total health inequality. For a more detailed discussion of the relationships between these two concepts 
 of inequality, see e.g. Wagstaff, A. and E. Van Doorslaer, 2003, Overall versus socioeconomic health 
 inequality: a measurement framework and two empirical illustrations, Health Economics (Forthcoming) 
b. There is one important exception: the French questionnaire asked respondents to indicate the 
 satisfaction with their general health, ranging from very satisfied to very dissatisfied.
c. Due to an apparent coding error in the data, the status ‘retired’ for the Netherlands had to be r
 econstructed from age and income source information.
d. This peculiarity may have to do with the fact that only in France the question was one of a series asking 
 about satisfaction with work, income, housing, health and leisure.  
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ABSTRACT
This paper considers health-related non-response in the first eleven waves of the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the full eight waves of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) and explores its consequences for dynamic models 
of the association between socioeconomic status and self-assessed health (SAH). We 
describe the pattern of health-related non-response revealed by the BHPS and ECHP 
data. We both test and correct for non-response in empirical models of the impact of 
socioeconomic status on self-assessed health. Descriptive evidence shows that there 
is health-related non-response in the data, with those in very poor initial health more 
likely to drop out, and variable addition tests provide evidence of non-response bias 
in the panel data models of SAH. Nevertheless a comparison of estimates - based on 
the balanced sample, the unbalanced sample and corrected for non-response using 
inverse probability weights (IPW) – shows that, on the whole, there are not substantive 
differences in the average partial effects (APE) of the variables of interest. The main 
differences are between unweighted and one form of IPW-weighted estimates for the 
APE of income and education in those countries that have fewer than eight waves 
of data. Similar findings have been reported concerning the limited influence of non-
response bias in models of various labour market outcomes; we discuss possible 
explanations for our results.
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5.1   INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to explore the existence of health-related non-response in 
panel data and its consequences for modelling the association between socioeconomic 
status (SES) and self-assessed health (SAH). Using panel data, such as the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) or European Community Household Panel (ECHP), to 
analyse longitudinal models of health creates a risk that the results will be contaminated 
by bias associated with longitudinal non-response. There are drop-outs from the panels 
at each wave and some of these may be related directly to health: due to deaths, 
serious illness and people moving into institutional care. In addition, other sources of 
non-response may be indirectly related to health, for example divorce may increase 
the risk of non-response and also be associated with poorer health than average. 
The long-term survivors who remain in the panel are likely to be healthier on average 
compared to the sample at wave 1. The health of survivors will tend to be higher than 
the population as a whole and their rate of decline in health will tend to be lower. Also, 
the socioeconomic status of the survivors may not be representative of the original 
population who were sampled at wave 1. Failing to account for non-response may 
result in misleading estimates of the relationship between health and socioeconomic 
characteristics. To address this issue we describe the pattern of health-related non-
response revealed by the BHPS and ECHP data and we test and correct for non-response 
in empirical models of self-assessed health (SAH).
There are many recent studies that have used the BHPS, ECHP and other similar 
panels to estimate models involving measures of health and that have used regression 
analyses based on balanced or unbalanced panels which may be prone to problems of 
non-response. Examples include: Benzeval and Judge (2001) who analyse health and 
SES with the BHPS; Meer et al, (2003) who analyse health and SES with the US PSID; 
Buckley et al (2004) who analyse SAH and SES with the Canadian SLID; Contoyannis et 
al (2004a) who analyse health limitations in the BHPS; Wildman (2003) who analyses 
the relationship between mental health and SES in the BHPS; and Riphahn (1999) who 
analyses retirement and health with the GSOEP.
The paper adopts a broad definition of longitudinal non-response, that encompasses 
any observations that “drop-out” from the original wave 1 sample over the subsequent T 
waves. To borrow the taxonomy of reasons for non-participation used by Nicoletti and 
Peracchi (2005), non-response can arise due to:
1.  Demographic events such as death.
2.  Movement out of scope of the survey (e.g. institutionalization or emigration).
3.  Refusal to respond at subsequent waves.
4.  Absence of the person at the address.
5.  Other types of non-contact.
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To these points, we would add item non-response for any of the variables used in the 
model of health, which eliminates these observations from the sample. The notion of 
attrition, commonly used in the survey methods literature, is usually restricted to points 
3, 4 and 5. However our concern is with any longitudinal non-response that leads 
to missing observations in the panel data regression analysis. In fact it is points 1 
and  2 – death and incapacity – that are likely to be particularly relevant as sources of 
health-related non-response. The original sample consists of those who provide a full 
interview and usable information on SAH at the first wave of the panels. Non-response 
encompasses all of those who fail to provide usable observations for the model of SAH 
at subsequent waves. 
Our aim is to estimate models that focus on the relationship between health (SAH) and 
socioeconomic status (SES). We take a representative sample of individuals at wave 1 
and follow them for the 11 or 8 years of the BHPS and ECHP panels. The sample of 
interest is those n original individuals observed over a full T-year period (T=11 for BHPS 
and T=8 for ECHP). A fully observed sample from this population would consist of nT 
observations. Due to non-response we only observe i i 
n T =1 Σ  observations. The reasons 
for having incomplete observations include attrition (as conventionally defined in the 
survey methods literature) as well as individuals becoming ineligible, due to incapacity 
or death. This creates a problem of incidental truncation: we are interested in the 
association between SAH and SES for our n individuals over the full T waves. However 
the more frail individuals are more likely to die or drop-out before the end of the 
observation period, and their levels of SAH and SES are unobservable. This means that 
the remaining observed sample of survivors may contain less frail individuals – this is 
the source of potential bias in the relationship between SAH and SES across our sample 
of n individuals. 
We apply variable addition tests for attrition bias (Verbeek and Nijman, 1992) and 
inverse probability weighting to adjust for non-response in estimation of pooled models 
(Robins et al. 1995; Fitzgerald et al., 1998; Moffitt et al., 1999; Wooldridge, 2002a). 
Descriptive evidence shows that there is health-related non-response in the data, with 
those in poor initial health more likely to drop out, and variable addition tests provide 
evidence of non-response bias in panel data models of SAH. Nevertheless a comparison 
of estimates - with and without correcting for non-response using inverse probability 
weights - does not show substantive differences in the average partial effects of the 
variables of interest. So, while health-related non-response exists, it does not appear 
to distort the magnitudes of the estimated effects of socioeconomic status. Similar 
findings have been reported concerning the limited influence of non-response bias in 
models of various labour market outcomes; we discuss possible explanations for our 
results.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the BHPS and ECHP 
datasets. Section 5.3 presents a descriptive analysis of health-related non-response in 
both surveys. In Section 5.4 we introduce the empirical models for self-assessed health 
and describe the estimation strategy. Section 5.5 reports and discusses the results 
for the models of socioeconomic status and self-assessed health and a conclusion is 
provided in Section 5.6.
5.2    DATA
5.2.1   BHPS
The sample
We first exploit the panel data available in the first eleven waves (1991-2001) of the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). The BHPS is a longitudinal survey of private 
households in Great Britain that provides rich information on socio-demographic and 
health variables. It was designed as an annual survey of each adult (16+) member 
of a nationally representative sample of more that 5,000 households, with a total of 
approximately 10,000 individual interviews. The first wave of the survey was conducted 
between 1st September 1990 and 30th April 1991. The initial selection of households for 
inclusion in the survey was performed using a two-stage clustered systematic sampling 
procedure designed to give each address an approximately equal probability of selection 
(Taylor et al., 1998). The same individuals are re-interviewed in successive waves 
and, if they split off from their original households are also re-interviewed along with 
all adult members of their new households. In this analysis we use both balanced 
samples of respondents, for whom information on all the required variables is reported 
at each wave, and unbalanced samples, that exploit all available observations for wave 
1 respondents. Both samples do not include new entrants to the BHPS; they only track 
all of those who were observed at wave 1. In this sense, the analysis treats the sample 
as a cohort consisting of all those present at wave 1. To be included in the analysis 
individuals must be original sample members (OSMs) who were aged 16 or over and who 
provided a valid response for the health measure at wave 1. Our broad definition of non-
response encompasses all individuals who are missing at subsequent waves.
Measures of health
The principal health outcome is self-assessed health (SAH), defined by a response to: 
‘Please think back over the last 12 months about how your health has been. Compared 
to people of your own age, would you say that your health has on the whole been 
excellent/good/fair/poor/very poor?’ SAH should therefore be interpreted as indicating 
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a perceived health status relative to the individual’s concept of the ‘norm’ for their 
age group. SAH has been used widely in previous studies of the relationship between 
health and socioeconomic status (e.g., Ettner, 1996; Deaton and Paxson, 1998; Smith, 
1999; Benzeval et al., 2000; Salas, 2002; Adams et al., 2003; Frijters et al., 2003; 
Contoyannis et al., 2004b) and of the relationship between health and lifestyles (e.g., 
Kenkel, 1995; Contoyannis and Jones, 2004). SAH is a simple subjective measure of 
health that provides an ordinal ranking of perceived health status. However it has been 
shown to be a powerful predictor of subsequent mortality (see e.g., Idler and Kasl, 
1995; Idler and Benyamini, 1997) and its predictive power does not appear to vary 
across socioeconomic groups (see e.g., Burström and Fredlund, 2001). Socioeconomic 
inequalities in SAH have been a focus of research (see e.g., Van Doorslaer et al., 1997; 
Van Ourti, 2003; Van Doorslaer and Koolman, 2004) and have been shown to predict 
inequalities in mortality (see e.g., Van Doorslaer and Gerdtham, 2003). Categorical 
measures of SAH have been shown to be good predictors of subsequent use of medical 
care (see e.g., Van Doorslaer et al., 2000; Van Doorslaer et al., 2004).
Unfortunately there was a change in the wording of the SAH question at wave 9 of 
the BHPS. For waves 1-8 and 10-11, the SAH variable represents “health status over 
the last 12 months”. However, the SF-36 questionnaire was included in wave 9. In this 
questionnaire, the SAH variable for wave 9 represents “general state of health”, using 
the question: “In general, would you say your health is: excellent, very good, good, fair, 
poor?”. Note that the question is not framed in terms of a comparison with people 
of one’s own age and the response categories differ from the other waves. Item non-
response is greater for SAH at wave 9 than for the other waves and these factors would 
complicate the analysis of non-response rates. Hernandez et al. (2004) have explored 
the sensitivity of ordered probit models of SAH to this change in the wording, but for 
simplicity we exclude wave 9 from the analysis.
Other indicators of morbidity are used to describe health-related non-response and as 
predictors of non-response. The BHPS variable HLLT measures self-reported functional 
limitations and is based on the question “does your health in any way limit your daily 
activities compared to most people of your age?” Respondents are left to define their 
own concepts of health and their daily activities. In contrast, for the variable measuring 
specified health problems (HLPRB), respondents are presented with a prompt card and 
asked, “do you have any of the health problems or disabilities listed on this card?” The 
list is made up of problems with arms, legs, hands, etc; sight; hearing; skin conditions/
allergies; chest/breathing; heart/blood pressure; stomach/digestion; diabetes; anxiety/
depression; alcohol/drug related; epilepsy; migraine and other (cancer and stroke were 
added as separate categories in wave 11 but are not included here). Also respondents 
are asked to report whether they are registered as a disabled person (HLDSBL).
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Socioeconomic status
Two dimensions of socioeconomic status are included in our models of SAH: income 
and education. Income is measured as equivalised and RPI-deflated annual household 
income (INCOME). This variable is transformed to natural logarithms to allow for 
concavity of the relationship between health and income (e.g., Ettner, 1996; Frijters et 
al., 2003; Van Doorslaer and Koolman, 2004; Contoyannis et al., 2004a,b). Education 
is measured by the highest educational qualification attained by the end of the 
sample period in descending order of attainment (DEGREE, HND/A, O/CSE). NO-QUAL 
(no academic qualifications) is the reference category for the educational variable. 
In addition to income and education, variables are included to reflect individuals’ 
demographic characteristics and stage of life: age, ethnic group, marital status and family 
composition. Marital status distinguishes between WIDOW, SINGLE (never married) and 
DIVORCED/SEPARATED, with married or living as a couple as the reference category. 
Similarly, we include an indicator of ethnic origin (NON-WHITE), the number of individuals 
living in the household including the respondent (HHSIZE), and the numbers of children 
living in the household at different ages (NCH04, NCH511, NCH1218). Age is included 
as a fourth-order polynomial, (AGE, AGE2 = AGE2/100, AGE3 = AGE3/10000, AGE4 = 
AGE4/1000000). A vector of wave dummies is included to account for aggregate health 
shocks, time-varying reporting changes, and any effects of age which are not captured 
by the polynomial.
5.2.2   ECHP
The sample
The detailed analysis of the BHPS is complemented by a second source of data: the full 
eight waves, 1994-2001, of the European Community Household Panel User Database 
(ECHP-UDB) designed and coordinated by Eurostat, the European Statistical Office. This 
puts the UK data in the context of a broader analysis of patterns of health-related non-
response across European countries. The ECHP is a standardised multi-purpose annual 
longitudinal survey carried out at the level of the European Union (Peracchi, 2002). The 
survey is based on a standardised questionnaire that involves annual interviewing of a 
representative panel of households and individuals of 16 years and older in each of the 
participating EU member states. It covers a wide range of topics including demographics, 
income, social transfers, health, housing, education and employment. We use data for 
the following fourteen member states of the EU for the full number of waves available 
for each: Austria (waves 2-8), Belgium (1-8), Denmark (1-8), Finland (3-8), France (1-8), 
Germany (1-3), Greece (1-8), Ireland (1-8), Italy (1-8), Luxembourg (1-3), Netherlands 
(1-8), Portugal (1-8), Spain (1-8) and the United Kingdom (1-3). Sweden did not take part 
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in the ECHP although the living conditions panel is included with the UDB. The ECHP-
UDB also includes comparable versions of the BHPS and German Socioeconomic Panel 
(GSOEP) and descriptive evidence is provided for these. 
Drop Re- Survi- EX GOOD FAIR POOR VPOOR
Wave No. Ind. outs joiners val rate Raw Net at t-1 at t-1 at t-1 at t-1 at t-1
1 4832 652
2 4180 428 0 86.5 13.5 13.5 12.2 13.5 14.2 14.6 26.9
3 3878 285 126 80.3 10.2 7.2 8.9 9.5 11.5 14.6 24.0
4 3675 283 82 76.1 7.4 5.2 6.7 7.4 7.3 8.5 14.5
5 3464 156 72 73.8 7.7 5.7 5.4 7.4 9.6 9.7 23.0
6 3408 159 100 70.5 4.5 1.6 3.6 3.1 4.8 12.2 25.4
7 3280 175 31 67.9 4.7 3.8 3.3 4.5 4.6 9.7 11.5
8† 3137 - 32 64.9 5.3 4.4 4.1 4.4 6.4 7.0 22.9
10‡ 2899 137 - 60.0 - - - - - - -
11 2820 58 58.4 4.7 2.7 4.5 4.5 4.8 5.2 10.4
1 5424 21.4
2 4777 647 0 88.1 11.9 11.9 10.8 11.8 12.1 13.2 16.4
3 4532 373 128 83.6 7.8 5.1 7.2 7.0 8.2 11.3 14.0
4 4303 305 76 79.3 6.7 5.1 6.7 5.8 6.3 11.6 12.0
5 4106 268 71 75.7 6.2 4.6 7.1 5.2 6.6 8.3 14.3
6 4016 179 89 74.0 4.4 2.2 2.6 3.4 5.2 9.3 7.1
7 3882 166 32 71.6 4.1 3.3 3.0 3.3 4.9 8.3 12.6
8† 3775 151 44 69.6 3.9 2.8 2.7 3.3 4.5 5.2 -
10‡ 3522 - - 64.9 - - - - - - 13.5
11 3403 183 64 62.7 5.2 3.4 4.3 3.7 6.8 7.4
Drop-outs – respondents at wave t-1, non-respondents at wave t.
Re-joiners – non-respondents at wave t-1, respondents at wave t. 
* Raw drop-out rates exclude re-joiners; Net drop-out rates include re-joiners.
SF-36 questionnaire response rates appear lower than those for hlstat and therefore are not 
used as a basis for calculating drop-out rates.   
due to the change in the self-assessed health question at wave 9
† At wave 9 the self-assessed health question was changed to one based on the SF-36 questionnaire.
‡ Drop-out rates conditional on previous wave reporting of self-assessed health are not possible
Table 5.1 SAH sample size, drop outs, re-joiners, survival rate (%) and drop-out rates (%) by 
wave and previous period health status, BHPS
drop out rates
Men
Women
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Measures of health
Self-assessed general health status (SAH) is measured as either very good, good, fair, 
poor or very poor. Unlike the BHPS, respondents are not asked to compare themselves 
with others of the same age. In France a six-category scale was used but this is 
recoded to the five-category scale in the ECHP-UDB. Responses are also available for 
the question “Do you have any chronic physical or mental health problem, illness or 
disability? (yes/no)” and if so “Are you hampered in your daily activities by this physical 
or mental health problem, illness or disability? (no; yes, to some extent; yes, severely)”. 
We use two dummy variables to indicate either some limitation or severe limitation. 
Socioeconomic status
The ECHP income measure is disposable household income per equivalent adult, using 
the modified OECD equivalence scale (giving a weight of 1.0 to the first adult, 0.5 to 
the second and each subsequent person aged 14 and over, and 0.3 to each child 
aged under 4 in the household). Total household income includes all net monetary 
income received by the household members during the reference year. Education 
is measure by the highest level of general or higher education completed, i.e. third 
level education (ISCED 5-7), second stage of secondary level education (ISCED 3-4) 
or less than second stage of secondary education (ISCED 0-2)). Marital status 
distinguishes between married/living in consensual union, separated/divorced, widowed 
and unmarried. Activity status includes employed, self-employed, student, unemployed, 
retired, doing housework and ‘other economically inactive’. Region of residence uses 
the EU’s NUTS 1 level (Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units) except for countries 
where such information was withheld for confidentiality reasons (The Netherlands, 
Germany) or because the country is too small (Denmark, Luxembourg). 
5.3 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF NON-RESPONSE RATES
5.3.1  BHPS
Table 5.1 shows how the sample size and composition evolves across the waves of the 
BHPS for respondents who provided information on SAH. The table, which gives figures 
men and women separately, shows the number of observations that are available at 
each wave and the corresponding number of drop-outs and re-joiners between waves. 
These are expressed as wave-on-wave survival and drop-out rates. The survival rate is 
the percentage of original sample members remaining at wave t. The drop-out rate is 
the percentage of the number of drop-outs between waves t-1 and t to the number of 
observations at t-1. The raw drop-out rate excludes re-joiners, while the net drop-out rate 
includes them. Drop-out rates are highest between waves 1 and 2, with the rate tending 
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to decline over time. The table also disaggregates the raw drop-out rates according 
to individuals’ SAH at wave t-1. This shows that drop-out rates are inversely related to 
past health and, in particular, non-response is highest among those who were in very 
poor health prior to dropping-out. This pattern of health-related non-response persists 
throughout the panel and is stronger for men than women. 
Table 5.2 shows that the overall drop-out rate across all 11 waves of the panel varies 
with socioeconomic characteristics measured at wave 1. The average rate of drop-out 
over 11 waves is 39%. As expected, non-response increases with individuals’ age at the 
start of the panel, ranging from 36% for those aged under 30 to 73% for those aged over 
70. Some of this age-related non-response is likely to be associated with health, through 
Ex Good Fair Poor VPoor
at t1 at t1 at t1 at t1 at t1
All data 39 36 37 44 48 64
Gender:
Men 42 38 39 49 53 67
Women 37 33 36 40 45 63
Age group:
<30 36 40 34 37 22 22
31-50 32 30 31 35 32 47
51-70 39 33 37 41 53 64
>70 73 60 69 77 87 95
Income quintile:
1 58 55 57 59 58 74
2 41 36 39 44 47 62
3 37 35 36 41 45 62
4 36 36 34 39 44 45
5 32 32 32 29 38 71
Education:
Degree 26 26 27 29 24 0
Hnd/a level 30 31 28 32 28 67
O level / cse 34 36 32 36 32 49
No qualifications 48 42 46 52 55 65
Marital status:
Widow 62 47 60 64 81 83
Single 42 45 40 44 44 42
Divorced/separated 41 38 37 45 47 60
Married/couple 35 32 34 40 41 64
All
Table 5.2 SAH-related drop-out rates (%) over 11 waves by gender, age, income, 
educational and marital status, BHPS
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deaths, serious illness and moves to institutional care. Non-response is greater among 
those with lower income and with less formal education: the poorest quintile have an 
overall drop-out rate of 58%, compared to 32% among the richest quintile; those with 
no qualifications have an overall drop-out rate of 48% compared to 26% among those 
with a degree. The table also shows that health-related non-response interacts with 
individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics (some caution is required as some of the 
cell sizes are very small). So, for example, drop-out rates are very high among elderly 
individuals (aged >70) who start the survey in poor (87%) or very poor health (95%).
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide a description of simple bivariate relationships between drop-
out rates and socioeconomic characteristics. To extend this to a multivariate analysis 
Table 5.3 presents probit models for response/non-response at each wave of the panel, 
from wave 2 to wave 11, using the full sample of men who are observed at wave 1 
(the results for women are similar and are available from the authors on request). The 
dependent variables for these models equal 1 if the individual responds at the wave in 
question and 0 otherwise and are always defined relative to the full sample at wave 1 
(where a response is defined as providing a usable observation for the ordered probit 
regression models). The probability of response is modelled as a function of the wave 
1 values of all of the regressors that are included in our empirical model of SAH, 
along with additional wave 1 variables for region (NORTH-WEST, NORTH-EAST, SOUTH-
EAST, SOUTH-WEST, MIDLANDS, SCOTLAND, WALES), activity status (SELF-EMPLOYED; 
UNEMPLOYED; RETIRED; family care and maternity leave, FAMILY-CARE; government 
training, students and other, EMP-OTHER) and occupational group (UNCLASSIFIED; 
MANUAL-TECHNICAL; skilled non-manual, SKILL-NON-MAN; skilled manual and armed 
forces, SKILLED-MANUAL; PART-SKILLED; UNSKILLED, LONG-TERM-SICK) and other 
indicators of morbidity (HLPRB, HLDSBL, HLLT). These additional observable variables 
form the basis of the inverse probability weighting approach to correcting for non-
response, which is described in more detail below. 
The table shows the partial effects of the regressors on the probability of response 
at each wave, along with an indication of which of these are statistically significant at 
the 5% level and 1% levels. The partial effects are computed as marginal effects for 
continuous regressors and average effects for discrete regressors, evaluated at the 
sample means of the other regressors in the model. These results reveal statistically 
significant associations between non-response and levels of educational attainment for 
both men and women. Those with DEGREE, HND/A and O/CSE qualifications are more 
likely to remain in the sample and the magnitude of this effect increases over the 
waves. On average, a man with a degree has a 0.07 higher probability of responding at 
wave 2, relative to one without academic qualifications. By wave 11 they have a 0.169 
higher probability of responding. For women the corresponding figures are 0.084 and 
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0.202. Non-whites are less likely to remain in the sample, and this effect increases in 
magnitude as time progresses. By wave 11 the probability of responding among non-
white men is 0.141 lower and among women it is 0.175 lower. There is no clear evidence 
of statistically significant income-related non-response. 
The pattern of health-related non-response shows that, for both men and women, 
very poor initial health (SAHVPOOR) is associated with lower response rates, as is 
functional limitations (HLLT). These associations grow in magnitude and attain statistical 
significance as the panel lengthens. Disability (HLDSBL) does not show a clear-cut 
pattern in the multivariate analysis and health problems (HLPRB) shows that those who 
report health problems are more likely to respond at all waves. This may be because the 
variable HLPRB encompasses some relatively minor ailments – such that the majority 
of the sample report having at least one of them – and, after controlling for other 
measures of health this variable may be capturing other forms of non-response such as 
geographic mobility among healthy young people and the ease of making contact with 
interviewees.
5.3.2  ECHP
Table 5.4 reports the overall drop-out rates across the available waves for each of 
the countries that participated in the ECHP, along with comparable samples from the 
Country (waves) All VGood Good Fair Poor VPoor
Austria (2-8) 41 41 38 40 50 65
Belgium (1-8) 48 44 46 54 61 73
Denmark (1-8) 49 44 47 58 66 75
Finland (3-8) 47 43 45 50 55 65
France (1-8) 44 42 42 44 53 61
Germany (1-3) 13 15 11 13 23 36
Germany (gsoep 1-8) 33 34 30 31 37 50
Greece (1-8) 41 39 41 40 46 59
Ireland (1-8) 69 69 68 68 73 78
Italy (1-8) 40 37 39 40 49 59
Luxembourg (1-3) 12 13 12 10 15 37
Netherlands (1-8) 44 42 43 48 57 63
Portugal (1-8) 30 29 26 29 35 51
Spain (1-8) 49 47 48 49 53 65
UK (1-3) 45 43 44 48 52 56
UK (BHPS 1-8) 29 27 26 32 35 53
Table 5.4 Summary of SAH-related drop-out rates (%) over all available waves by country, 
ECHP-UDB
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BHPS and German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) that are included in the ECHP-UDB. 
The evidence reinforces earlier studies (Peracchi, 2002; Behr et al., 2002; Behr, 2004). 
In particular the UK and Ireland stand out as having above average rates of drop-out, 
with 45% drop-out after only three waves in the UK and 69% after eight waves in Ireland. 
The high non-response in the UK is largely attributable to the decision by the national 
data unit (NDU) to follow only households with complete sets of personal interviews, 
rather than adopting the standard ECHP following rules. For the other countries that 
participated for the full eight waves overall drop-out rates are broadly similar, ranging 
from 40% in Italy to 49% in Spain. Germany and Luxembourg only participated for 
waves 1-3 and have low drop-out rates of 13% and 12%. The drop-out rates over the 
comparable period of 29% for the BHPS and 33% for the GSOEP are lower than the ECHP, 
reflecting the fact that these samples were established prior to 1994. As in the BHPS 
there is evidence of health-related non-response in the ECHP. When the samples are split 
by initial levels of self-assessed health a consistent pattern emerges across all countries, 
with higher rates of non-response among those in poor or very poor initial health. The 
gradient is not always monotonic, in some countries the lowest drop-out rates are for 
those with good or, in the case of Luxembourg, fair health.
To provide a sense of how drop-out rates vary by socioeconomic characteristics, Table 5.5 
shows the overall drop-out rates across the available waves and across the countries split 
by socioeconomic characteristics at the first wave. The table shows the drop-out rates 
across all available waves for the upper and lower categories of income and education. 
However the results should be treated with caution as the number of observations 
in some of the cells are quite small. Patterns of overall non-response by income and 
education are different across countries: with a positive income gradient in Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain and a positive education gradient in Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France Germany, Netherlands and the UK. Generally the pattern of health-
related drop-outs are similar across income and education groups, taking account of the 
small cell sizes in some cases for very poor health.
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All VGood Good Fair Poor VPoor
Income quintile 1 43 41 41 40 51 60
Income quintile 5 43 45 42 38 37 67
Primary education 45 48 43 44 33 50
Tertiary education 42 41 38 40 53 64
Income quintile 1 57 54 54 60 66 74
Income quintile 5 43 41 40 51 66 71
Primary education 41 39 40 46 47 71
Tertiary education 53 45 50 57 68 76
Income quintile 1 60 54 59 65 72 83
Income quintile 5 37 35 38 48 50 83
Primary education 37 35 36 48 55 69
Tertiary education 60 57 57 63 71 78
Income quintile 1 49 45 45 52 58 65
Income quintile 5 44 43 42 46 57 67
Primary education 41 40 41 44 45 100
Tertiary education 53 49 52 53 59 68
Income quintile 1 49 49 46 48 59 63
Income quintile 5 40 37 38 43 52 67
Primary education 37 34 35 39 45 65
Tertiary education 46 43 42 46 55 61
Income quintile 1 18 20 15 20 24 32
Income quintile 5 12 14 10 11 19 38
Primary education 11 15 9 10 14 35
Tertiary education 15 16 12 15 24 36
Income quintile 1 35 34 31 35 41 57
Income quintile 5 48 46 48 53 59 67
Primary education 49 47 52 57 56 100
Tertiary education 36 29 34 37 45 57
Table 5.5 Summary of SAH-related drop-out rates(%) over all available waves by income 
quintile and educationalstatus by country, ECHP-UDB
France (1-8)
Germany (1-3)
Greece (1-8)
Austria (2-8)
Belgium (1-8)
Denmark (1-8)
Finland (3-8)
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 All VGood Good Fair Poor VPoor
Income quintile 1 66 65 66 66 71 72
Income quintile 5 71 70 71 79 57 100
Primary education 70 69 69 73 89 .
Tertiary education 66 65 64 68 72 80
Income quintile 1 37 33 33 37 44 57
Income quintile 5 45 46 45 42 55 65
Primary education 40 39 40 39 48 100
Tertiary education 40 36 38 40 48 58
Income quintile 1 19 28 17 15 7 42
Income quintile 5 13 11 17 10 14 50
Primary education 12 7 17 11 33 0
Tertiary education 12 15 11 9 13 37
Income quintile 1 47 46 43 51 63 68
Income quintile 5 44 39 42 52 53 67
Primary education 40 35 39 50 38 60
Tertiary education 53 48 51 55 63 65
Income quintile 1 31 24 23 29 38 54
Income quintile 5 37 47 36 35 41 56
Primary education 40 35 38 44 58 100
Tertiary education 28 25 23 28 35 50
Income quintile 1 48 43 48 49 50 62
Income quintile 5 49 51 48 46 61 68
Primary education 51 51 50 52 60 92
Tertiary education 49 45 47 49 53 65
Uk (1-3)
Income quintile 1 49 46 49 50 53 51
Income quintile 5 42 41 42 44 56 78
Primary education 38 38 38 39 40 62
Tertiary education 48 45 47 50 55 55
Table 5.5 (continued) Summary of SAH-related drop-out rates(%) over all available waves 
by income quintile and educational  status by country, ECHP-UDB
Ireland (1-8)
Spain (1-8)
Italy (1-8)
Luxembourg (1-3)
Netherlands (1-8)
Portugal (1-8)
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5.4  MODELS AND ESTIMATION METHODS
5.4.1  The ordered probit model
To model the association between the current level of self-assessed health (SAH) and 
socioeconomic status (SES) we use pooled ordered probit specifications of a dynamic 
model (see e.g., Contoyannis et al., 2004b). The latent variable specification of the 
model can be written as:
 h*it  = β’xit  + εit            (i=1,…,N; t=2,…Ti)   (5.1) 
where i denotes individuals and t denotes the waves of the panel; h*it  is a latent variable 
that underlies reported SAH; xit is a set of regressors, that includes dummy variables for 
each category of SAH in the previous year (to capture dynamics), along with observed 
socioeconomic variables; and εit is a time and individual-specific error term, which is 
assumed to be normally distributed. The pseudo-ML estimator of the pooled ordered 
probit model is consistent even if the error terms are not serially independent and 
does not require that the regressors are strictly exogenous, so it can accommodate 
pre-determined variables (see e.g., Wooldridge, 2002b). This makes the estimator more 
robust in comparison to a random effects specification. A robust estimator of the 
covariance matrix is used to allow for clustering within individuals. As we do not have 
a natural scale for the latent variable the variance of the error term (ε) is restricted to 
equal one. 
In our data the latent outcome h*it is not observed; instead, we observe an indicator of 
the category in which the latent indicator falls (hit). The observation mechanism can be 
expressed as,
 hit = j   if  μj-1 < h*it ≤ μj  ,   j = 1,......,m   (5.2)   
where μ0 = -∞,  μj ≤ μj+1,  μm = ∞. Given the assumption that the error term is normally 
distributed, the probability of observing the particular category of SAH reported by 
individual i at time t (hit ), conditional on the regressors is,
 Pitj = P(hit = j) =  Φ(μj - β’xit )  -  Φ(μj-1  - β’xit )   (5.3)
where Φ(.) is the standard normal distribution function. This formulation makes it clear 
that it is not possible to separately identify an intercept in the linear index (β0) and the 
cutpoints (μ), the model only identifies (μj -β0). To deal with this we have adopted a 
conventional normalisation by setting β0=0 (an alternative is to set μ1=0). 
We do not impose an explicit error components specification in equation (5.1), but 
to understand the nature of the non-response problem, it will often be helpful to 
think in terms of time invariant unobservable heterogeneity (an “individual effect”) 
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and idiosyncratic random shocks that vary over time (“health shocks”). Non-response 
associated with individual effects implies that there are certain “types” of individual 
who are prone to drop out of the panel and whose health is permanently different from 
those who stay in. This kind of non-response can therefore be detected by comparing 
the outcomes that are observed prior to drop-out. Non-response associated with 
idiosyncratic shocks is more problematic. A transient health shock would be reflected in 
h*it , and hence in hit, but not necessarily in past health. The fundamental identification 
problem arises if the transient shock leads to the individual dropping-out of the panel, 
as hit is unobservable for those who have dropped-out.
5.4.2  Non-response bias
Testing
The descriptive analysis has shown evidence of systematic patterns of non-response by 
socioeconomic characteristics and previous levels of health, but it remains to be seen 
whether this will lead to non-response bias in our empirical models of SAH. To provide 
an initial test for non-response bias we use the simple variable addition test proposed 
by Verbeek and Nijman (1992, p.688). The test variable we use is a count of the number 
of waves that are observed for the individual (NUMBER OF WAVES). This is added to 
our pooled ordered probit model and estimated with the unbalanced sample. The t-ratio 
on the added variables provides a test for non-response bias. The intuition behind the 
test is that, if non-response is random, indicators of an individual’s pattern of survey 
responses (R) should not be associated with the outcome of interest (h) after controlling 
for the observed covariates (x): in other words, it tests a conditional independence 
condition E(h|x,R)=E(h|x). Additional evidence can be provided by Hausman-type tests 
that compare estimates from the balanced - for whom we have complete information 
at all waves - and unbalanced - for whom we have incomplete information for some 
individuals - samples. In the absence of non-response bias these estimates should be 
comparable, but non-response bias may affect the unbalanced and balanced samples 
differently leading to a contrast between the estimates. It should be noted that the 
variable addition tests and Hausman-type tests may have low power; they rely on the 
sample of observed outcomes for hit and will not capture non-response associated with 
idiosyncratic shocks that are not reflected in observed past health (Nicoletti, 2002).
Estimation
To allow for non-response we adopt an inverse probability weighted (IPW) estimator 
and apply it to the pooled ordered probit model (Robins et al., 1995; Fitzgerald et al., 
1998; Moffitt et al., 1999; Wooldridge, 2002a, 2002b). This approach is grounded in the 
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notion of missing at random or ignorable non-response (Rubin, 1976; Little and Rubin, 
1987). Using R as an indicator of response (R=1 if observed, 0 otherwise) and h and x as 
the outcome and covariates of interest: missing completely at random (MCAR) is defined 
by P(R=1|h,x)=P(R=1) and missing at random (MAR) is defined by P(R=1|h,x)=P(R=1|x). 
The latter implies that, after conditioning on observed covariates, the probability of non-
response does not vary systematically with the outcome of interest. By Bayes rule, the 
MAR condition can be inverted to give P(h|x,R=1)=P(h|x), which provides a rationale for 
the Verbeek and Nijman (1992) approach to testing. 
Fitzgerald et al. (1998) extend the notion of ignorable non-response by introducing the 
concepts of selection on observables and selection on unobservables. This requires 
an additional set of observables, z, that are available in the data but not included 
in the regression model for h. Selection on observables is defined by Fitzgerald et 
al. by the conditional independence condition P(R=1|h,x,z)=P(R=1|x,z). Selection on 
unobservables occurs if this conditional independence assumption does not hold. 
Selection on unobservables, also termed informative, non-random or non-ignorable non-
response, is familiar in the econometrics literature where the dominant approach to 
non-response follows the sample selection model (Heckman, 1976; Hausman and Wise, 
1979). This approach relies on the z being “instruments” that are good predictors of non-
response and that satisfy the exclusion restriction P(h|x,z)=P(h|x). This is quite different 
from the selection on observables approach that seeks z’s which are endogenous to h. 
The statistics literature has related methods for non-ignorable non-response, some of 
which use the EM algorithm for data imputation (see e.g., Diggle and Kenward, 1994; 
Fitzmaurice et al., 1996; Molenberghs et al., 1997). Also it is worth mentioning that 
linear fixed effects panel estimators are consistent, in the presence of selection on 
unobservables, so long as the non-ignorable non-response is due to time invariant 
unobservables (see e.g., Verbeek and Nijman, 1992). 
The validity of the selection on observables approach hinges on whether the conditional 
independence assumption holds and non-response can be treated as ignorable, once 
z is controlled for. If the condition does hold, consistent estimates can be obtained by 
weighting the observed data by the inverse of the probability of response, conditional on 
the observed covariates (Robins et al., 1995). This gives more weight to individuals who 
have a high probability of non-response, as they are under-represented in the observed 
sample. 
Fitzgerald et al. (1998) make it clear that this approach will be applicable when interest 
centres on a structural model for P(h|x) and that the z’s are deliberately excluded 
from the model, even though they are endogenous to the outcome of interest. They 
suggest lagged dependent variables as an obvious candidate for z. Rotnitzky and Robins 
(1997) offer a similar interpretation when they describe possible candidates for z being 
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intermediate variables in the causal pathway from x to h. This property implies that it 
would not be sensible to use solely “field variables” such as changes in interviewer as 
candidates for the additional observables (see e.g., Behr et al., 2002). These kinds of 
variables may be good predictors of non-response but are unlikely to be associated 
with SAH. Horowitz and Manski (1998) show that if the observables (z) are statistically 
independent of h, conditional on (x, R=1), then the weighted estimates reduce to 
the unweighted ones. This would explain why no difference between weighed and 
unweighted estimates may be reported in empirical analyses that use inappropriate 
variables for z.
In our application we are interested in the distribution of self-assessed health conditional 
on socioeconomic status, rather than the distribution conditional on socioeconomic 
status and on other indicators of morbidity. We use past morbidity among our z variables. 
Of course, this approach will break-down if an individual suffers an unobserved health 
shock, that occurs after their previous interview, that leads them to drop out of the 
survey and that is not captured by conditioning on lagged measures of morbidity. In 
this case non-response would remain non-ignorable even after conditioning on z. It is 
possible to test the validity of the selection on observables approach. The first step is 
to test whether the z’s do predict non-response; this is done by testing their significance 
in the probit models for non-response at each wave of the panel (as in Table 5.3). The 
second is to do Hausman-type tests to compare the coefficients from the weighted and 
unweighted estimates. In addition the ordered probit models are compared in terms of 
the magnitudes of estimated average partial effects. 
Implementation of the Fitzgerald et al. (1998) form of the ignorability condition implies 
that x is observable when R=0. In the case of the kind of unit non-response we are 
dealing with in the BHPS and ECHP, non-response means that there is missing data for 
the current period covariates (x) as well as self-assessed health (h). So we implement 
a stronger form of conditional independence P(R=1|h,x,z)=P(R=1|z) as proposed by 
Wooldridge (2002a). To compute the IPW estimator we estimate (probit) equations for 
response (Rit=1) versus non-response (Rit=0) at each wave, t=2,…,T, conditional on a 
set of characteristics (zi1) that are measured for all individuals at the first wave (as in 
Table 5.3). As described above, this relies on selection on observables and implies that 
non-response can be treated as ignorable non-response, conditional on zi1 (Fitzgerald 
et al., 1998; Wooldridge, 2002b, p.588). Selection on observables requires that zi1 
contains variables that predict non-response and that are correlated with the outcome 
of interest (SAH) but which are deliberately excluded from the model for health. 
In practice zi1 includes the initial values of all of the regressors in the health equation. 
Also it includes initial values of SAH and of the other indicators of morbidity: for the 
BHPS, whether the individual reports a specific health problem (HLPRB), whether they 
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report that health limits their daily activities (HLLT) and whether they report a disability 
(HLDSBL); for the ECHP, whether the individual was mildly or severely hampered in their 
daily activities. In addition, zi1 includes initial values of the respondent’s activity status, 
occupational socioeconomic group and region. The probits for response/non-response 
are estimated at each wave of the panel, from wave 2 to wave 11 in the case of the BHPS 
and waves 2 to 8 for the ECHP, using the full sample of individuals who are observed at 
wave 1. 
The inverse of the fitted probabilities from these models, 1/ it p1/ˆ , are then used to weight 
observations in the IPW-ML estimation of the pooled ordered probit model using:
 Lo gL 
i 
n 
t 
T 
it it itR p Lo gL = ( )/ ˆ Σ Σ     (5.4)
Wooldridge (2002a) shows that, under the ignorability assumption:
 
P(Rit =1|hit, xit, zi1 ) = P(Rit =1|zi1 ),  t=2,…,T   (5.5)
the IPW-ML estimator is n -consistent and asymptotically normal. Wooldridge (2002a) 
also shows that using the estimated it p ˆ  rather than the true itp  and ignoring the implied 
adjustment to the estimated standard errors leads to “conservative inference” so that 
the standard errors are larger than they would be with an adjustment for the use of fitted 
rather than true probabilities (see also Robins et al., 1995). 
The IPW-ML estimator can be adapted to allow the elements of z to be up-dated and 
change across time, for example adding z variables measured at t-1 to predict response 
at t. This should improve the power of the probit models to predict non-response and 
hence make the ignorability assumption more plausible. In this case the probit model 
for non-response at wave t is estimated relative to the sample that is observed at 
wave t-1. This relies on non-response being an absorbing state and is therefore confined 
to “monotone attrition” where respondents never re-enter the panel. Also, because 
estimation at each wave is based on the selected sample observed at the previous 
wave, the construction of inverse probability weights has to be adapted. The predicted 
probability weights are constructed cumulatively using it i2 p ˆ =    ×    ... ×     i2 i2 ˆ ˆ ˆ , where 
the      it ˆ  denote the fitted selection probabilities from each wave. In this version of the 
estimator the ignorability condition has to be extended to include future values of h 
and x (see Wooldridge, 2002b, p. 589). Once again Wooldridge shows that omitting a 
correction to the asymptotic variance estimator leads to conservative inference.
We have not pursued a selection on unobservables approach in this paper. This stems 
from the lack of credible exclusion restrictions that would define variables that predict 
health-related non-response but are not associated with SAH. Also, the use of fixed 
effects estimators is not possible for probit and ordered probit models, due to the 
Health-related non-response in panel data 111
incidental parameters problem (although we have experimented with models that use 
Mundlak (1978) type specifications to deal with correlated effects and this had little 
impact on our findings concerning non-response (see also Contoyannis et al., 2004b). 
With the public use versions of the BHPS and ECHP-UDB we do not have any scope 
for using methods based on refreshment samples (see e.g., Dolton, 2004). The IPW 
approach is attractive as it is easy to apply in the context of nonlinear models, such as 
the ordered probit model, and only requires a re-weighting of the data. In contrast to 
the published longitudinal weights that are supplied with the BHPS and ECHP, our IPW 
weights are model-specific and specifically designed for the outcome of interest (SAH) 
and the associated problem of health-related non-response. Past values of SAH, along 
with other indicators of morbidity, provide promising candidates for the z-variables; 
although the validity of the approach depends on the credibility of the ignorability 
assumption. For comparison, we present estimates based on the published BHPS and 
ECHP weights alongside estimates based on our own weights.
5.5 ESTIMATION RESULTS
The results for the various model specifications outlined above are reported in this 
section. For the detailed analysis of the BHPS, models for men and women are presented 
separately throughout. For the more parsimonious analysis of the ECHP the samples are 
pooled.
5.5.1  Tests for non-response 
Table 5.6 presents the Verbeek and Nijman (1992) variable addition tests for non-
response bias in the pooled ordered probit model for SAH in the BHPS and ECHP. This is 
based on adding the NUMBER OF WAVES to the model. The first set of results are for the 
benchmark pooled ordered probits with covariates x. The second includes the additional 
observables (z) that are used to compute the inverse probability weights. The latter can 
be regarded as a test for the ignorability assumption behind the IPW estimator. With 
the exception of Austria and Luxembourg, all of the test statistics show evidence of non-
response bias. Adding these test variables to the model is not intended to “correct” 
the estimates for non-response, but it is informative to compare the estimates with 
the baseline model that does not include the test variables. It is striking that, for 
key variables such as income and education, the differences between the estimated 
coefficients are small (these results are available on request). 
5.5.2  Estimates of ordered probits for SAH
Table 5.7 presents the coefficient estimates for the dynamic pooled ordered probits for 
SAH estimated with the BHPS data for men (the results forwomen are available from 
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Table 5.6 Verbeek and Nijman tests for non-response, BHPS and ECHP-UDB
Model based on regressors x Model based on regressors x
Country (waves) )oitar t()oitar t(
BHPS (IPW-1)
Men: 72.624.6
Women: 42.3  35.3
BHPS (IPW-2)
Men: 59.467.4
Women: 01.2 30.2
Echp (ipw-2)
Austria (2-8) 72.0  93.0 
Belgium (1-8) 61.4 54.5 
Denmark (1-8) 51.3 20.4 
Finland (3-8) 47.4 82.5 
France (1-8) 59.4 30.6 
Germany (1-3) 97.2 51.3 
Greece (1-8) 08.2 96.3 
Ireland (1-8) 72.6 18.6 
Italy (1-8) 28.5 45.6 
Luxembourg (1-3) 44.0-46.0-
Netherlands (1-8) 30.2 22.3 
Portugal (1-8) 98.5 52.7 
Spain (1-8) 88.4 70.6 
UK (1-3) 49.1 40.2 
the authors on request). The models were estimated on the balanced, the unbalanced 
sample and the available observations for the sample of drop-outs. The estimates for 
the pooled ordered probit models allow for clustering within individuals in the errors by 
using a robust estimator of the covariance matrix. In addition we estimated the model 
using the published longitudinal weights supplied with the BHPS, along with our own 
inverse probability weights (IPW) to adjust for non-response. Both variants of the IPW-ML 
estimator are presented: IPW-1 uses the full sample and wave 1 regressors to predict 
non-response, with IPW-2 the sample is restricted by excluding observations that exhibit 
non-monotone attrition and previous period regressors are used. The unbalanced 
sample is selected so that the same observations are used for the unweighted and all of 
the unweighted estimators, to allow a direct comparison of the estimators.
The LR tests reject the poolability of the unweighted models for the balanced and drop-
outs samples when they are compared to the combined results for the unbalanced 
panel. The coefficients on lagged SAH show a clear gradient in the magnitude of the 
coefficients, running from good to very poor SAH (excellent is the omitted category), 
Health-related non-response in panel data 113
across all of the models. The results in Table 5.7 show differences in the sign and size 
of the coefficients on the age variables and on WIDOW between the three samples 
and between the weighted and unweighted estimates for the unbalanced sample, 
reflecting age-related non-response. The sign and size of the coefficients on the 
education variables are similar across all samples and comparing the weighted and 
unweighted estimates. The coefficients for ln(INCOME) are also similar across all of 
the specifications, but with a larger coefficient for the balanced sample than the 
sample of drop-outs and with the unbalanced sample bracketed between them. Pairwise 
comparisions of the contrasts between weighted and unweighted estimates of the 
coefficients on ln(INCOME) and the education variables shows that the differences are 
small in magnitude, relative to the size of the coefficients, with the largest differences 
when the IPW-2 weights are used. Pairwise Hausman-type t-tests suggest that the 
differences between coefficients from the unweighted, BHPS-weighted and IPW-1 
weighted estimates are not significantly different. But they do reject the null that there is 
no statistically significant difference between the unweighted estimates and the IPW-2 
estimates. Although this may be due, in part, to the smaller sample size when the 
sample is restricted to monotone attrition.
Average partial effects
The scaling of the ordered probit coefficients is arbitrary. To provide an indication of 
the magnitude of the associations between SAH and the regressors we present average 
partial effects (APEs). For continuous regressors, such as income, these are obtained 
by taking the derivative of the ordered probit probabilities with respect to the variable 
in question. For discrete regressors, such as the educational qualifications, they are 
obtained by taking differences. In general, average partial effects are averaged over the 
population distribution of heterogeneity and computed using the population averaged 
parameters (see e.g., Wooldridge, 2002b). In the pooled ordered probit models the 
total error variance is normalised to 1 and the estimated bs are population averaged 
parameters by default, so the APEs are given by the standard formula for partial 
effects. 
In the ordered probit model it is possible to compute APEs for each of the five categories 
of self-assessed health. For parsimony, Table 5.8 summarises the APEs of lagged SAH, 
income and educational attainment on the probability of reporting excellent health in the 
BHPS data. In this case the sign of the APE has a clear qualitative interpretation, with a 
positive sign implying a positive association with health and vice versa. A partial effect is 
computed for each observation in the sample, evaluated at the observed values of the 
regressors. The table presents the sample mean of the partial effects – the APE – along 
with the sample standard deviation, in parentheses, to give a sense of the variability 
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Table 5.7  Dynamic ordered probit models for SAH – Men, BHPS
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
IPW-1 IPW-2
NT = 18,616 NT = 6,593 NT = 25,209 NT = 25,209 NT = 25,209 NT=21,630
-.981 (.029) -.939 (.050) -.970 (.025) -.954 (.026) -.966 (.025) -.953 (.030)
- 1.867 (.039) - 1.794 (.064) - 1.845 (.033) - 1.820 (.035) - 1.841 (.034) - 1.808 (.041)
- 2.757 (.062) - 2.597 (.081) - 2.723 (.049) - 2.701 (.051) - 2.725 (.050) - 2.677 (.065)
- 3.356 (.126) - 3.309 (.124) - 3.383 (.089) - 3.385 (.086) - 3.414 (.087) - 3.305 (.114)
Ln(Income)  .146 (.016)  .103 (.023)  .130 (.013)  .125 (.015)  .129 (.015)  .149 (.016)
Widow  .004 (.055)  .048 (.070)  .015 (.044) -.012 (.044)  .011 (.047)  .012 (.057)
Single -.079 (.033)  .004 (.049) -.067 (.027) -.066 (.028) -.075 (.028) -.083 (.033)
Div/sep  .046 (.048) -.063 (.063) -.003 (.039) -.004 (.042) -.009 (.041)  .014 (.048)
Non-white -.174 (.048) -.161 (.072) -.165 (.040) -.181 (.041) -.160 (.041) -.118 (.057)
Degree  .180 (.035)  .166 (.053)  .177 (.029)  .182 (.030)  .180 (.030)  .170 (.034)
HND/A  .144 (.028)  .156 (.045)  .153 (.024)  .163 (.025)  .159 (.024)  .130 (.027)
O/CSE  .110 (.029)  .145 (.039)  .121 (.023)  .124 (.024)  .120 (.024)  .103 (.027)
HHSize  .030 (.013) -.018 (.018)  .013 (.010)  .004 (.011)  .015 (.011)  .019 (.013)
NCH04  .001 (.025)  .019 (.043)  .007 (.022)  .012 (.024)  .013 (.022)  .004 (.025)
NCH511 -.009 (.020)  .046 (.034)  .008 (.017)  .008 (.018)  .0005 (.017)  .008 (.022)
NCH1218  .026 (.023)  .035 (.041)  .030 (.020)  .038 (.021)  .022 (.020)  .041 (.025)
Age -.013 (.045) -.024 (.054) -.030 (.034) -.022 (.037) -.041 (.039) -.014 (.042)
Age2  .028 (.144)  .100 (.170)  .081 (.107)  .054 (.117)  .120 (.125)  .025 (.134)
Age3 -.035 (.193) -.180 (.224) -.103 (.142) -.069 (.156) -.159 (.168) -.024 (.179)
Age4  .020 (.093)  .102 (.104)  .046 (.067)  .031 (.074)  .074 (.081)  .007 (.086)
Cut 1 - 2.789 (.531) - 2.956 (.634) - 3.009 (.400) - 2.980 (.435) - 3.136 (.459) - 2.664 (.495)
Cut 2 - 1.728 (.531) - 2.040 (.633) - 2.019 (.400) - 1.984 (.434) - 2.148 (.458) - 1.667 (.491)
Cut 3 -.561 (.529) -.952 (.633) -.883 (.400) -.849 (.434) - 1.004 (.457) -.548 (.490)
Cut 4  1.117 (.529)  .641 (.633)  .770 (.399)  .789 (.433)  .643 (.457)  1.092 (.490)
- 18568.9 - 7139.7 - 25782.0 - 26058.2 - 26041.9 - 22450.2
Ln(INCOME) -.668 -.134  2037
Degree  .651  .391 -.394
HND/A  1429  1034 -1859
O/CSE  .438 -.146 -1273
Hausman test: 
1. SEs are reported in parentheses, 2. Cut 1-4 are estimated cut points or thresholds, 3. Coeff. for the year dummies are 
not reported, 4. Descriptive summary of BHPS longitudinal weights: Mean = 1.056, SD = 0.351, Min = 0.190, Max = 2.5, 
5. Descriptive summary of IPW–1 with health variables weights:  Mean = 1.440, SD = 0.388, Min = 1.01, Max = 15.73, 
6. Descriptive summary of IPW–2 with health variables weights: Mean = 1.908, SD = 1.173, Min = 1.01, Max = 33.89, 7. 
The LR test for pooling compares the unrestricted estimates (balanced+drop-outs samples) with the restricted estimates 
(unbalanced sample). The statistic is chi-squared, 8. The Hausman test reports the t-test for pairwise comparisons of the 
contrast between the weighted estimates of the coeff. (models 4-6) with those from the unweighted estimate (model 3).
Drop-outs
sample
BHPS longi-
tudinal weights
Unbalanced
sample
Inverse probability weights Balanced
sample
LR test for pooling  146.8 (0.000)
Log Likelihood
SAHGood(t-1)
SAHFair(t-1)
SAHPoor(t-1)
SAHVPoor(t-1)
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of the partial effects across observations. These are presented for all versions of the 
model. Comparing the balanced sample, drop-outs sample and unbalanced samples 
gives very similar results, suggesting that non-response does not lead to differences 
in the estimated APEs. This is reinforced by the fact that the estimates with and 
without weights are very similar in magnitude. The largest differences are between 
the unweighted and the IPW-2 estimates in the sample of women for educational 
qualifications.
Table 5.9 summarises the APEs on the probability of reporting very good health, the 
highest category in the ECHP, for the lagged SAH variables, estimated with the ECHP-
UDB data. While Table 5.10 presents the APEs for ln(INCOME) and education. The tables 
compare the estimates for the unweighted ordered probit and the weighted (ECHP 
published weights and IPW-2 weights) ordered probit estimated on the unbalanced 
sample. The estimates for lagged SAH, in Table 5.9, are very stable across all three 
estimators in all of the countries. Table 5.10 shows that, in all of the countries, there is 
a positive association between both income and education and SAH in the unweighted 
estimates and those based on the published. The average partial effects of income are 
lowest in Portugal, Italy and Spain and highest in Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg. The 
average partial effect of completing tertiary education is lowest in Portugal and France 
and highest in Ireland and Denmark. As with the BHPS, the quantitative differences 
between the unweighted and weighted estimates of the average partial effects are small 
for most countries when the published ECHP weights are used. However there is more 
difference when the IPW-2 weights are used in place of the published weights and in 
some cases the partial effects change sign. This occurs in the countries where less than 
eight waves are available (Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, UK). In all of these cases the 
underlying coefficients for income and education are not statistically significant.
5.6 DISCUSSION
This analysis shows that there is clear evidence of health-related non-response in both 
the BHPS and ECHP. In general, individuals in poor initial health are more likely to 
drop out, although for younger groups non-response is associated with good health. 
Furthermore, variable addition tests provide evidence of non-response bias in the models 
of SAH. Nevertheless a comparison of estimates based on the balanced samples, the 
unbalanced samples and corrected for non-response using inverse probability weights 
shows that, in many cases, substantive differences in the magnitudes of the average 
partial effects of lagged health, income and education are small. The largest differences 
in the BHPS results are for the comparison of the weighted and IPW-2 weighted 
estimates of the APEs for education among women. For the ECHP the estimates 
of dynamics are unaffected by weighting but the IPW-2 estimates for income and 
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Table 5.9 Average partial effects on the probability of reporting very good SAH, ECHP-UDB  
Very poor health -0.172 (0.190) -0.171 (0.190) -0.170 (0.183)
Poor health -0.187 (0.189) -0.185 (0.190) -0.184 (0.183)
Fair health -0.270 (0.171) -0.269 (0.173) -0.266 (0.166)
Good health -0.208 (0.155) -0.213 (0.158) -0.202 (0.149)
Very poor health -0.209 (0.206) -0.212 (0.207) -0.227 (0.209)
Poor health -0.225 (0.206) -0.228 (0.208) -0.244 (0.210)
Fair health -0.301 (0.192) -0.304 (0.193) -0.323 (0.193)
Good health -0.268 (0.164) -0.270 (0.165) -0.272 (0.162)
Very poor health -0.442 (0.264) -0.440 (0.262) -0.455 (0.269)
Poor health -0.453 (0.248) -0.450 (0.245) -0.462 (0.248)
Fair health -0.466 (0.176) -0.460 (0.173) -0.460 (0.172)
Good health -0.255 (0.117) -0.249 (0.113) -0.257 (0.113)
Very poor health -0.309 (0.270) -0.308 (0.267) -0.351 (0.282)
Poor health -0.325 (0.259) -0.324 (0.256) -0.366 (0.266)
Fair health -0.364 (0.210) -0.364 (0.207) -0.396 (0.202)
Good health -0.260 (0.154) -0.255 (0.151) -0.254 (0.142)
Very poor health -0.117 (0.116) -0.116 (0.116) -0.111 (0.108)
Poor health -0.116 (0.116) -0.115 (0.115) -0.110 (0.107)
Fair health -0.183 (0.111) -0.181 (0.110) -0.168 (0.100)
Good health -0.124 (0.099) -0.124 (0.099) -0.107 (0.085)
Very poor health -0.127 (0.142) -0.128 (0.143) -0.124 (0.134)
Poor health -0.137 (0.143) -0.139 (0.144) -0.131 (0.132)
Fair health -0.188 (0.137) -0.191 (0.139) -0.165 (0.121)
Good health -0.179 (0.125) -0.180 (0.126) -0.121 (0.090)
Very poor health -0.483 (0.312) -0.477 (0.306) -0.505 (0.336)
Poor health -0.471 (0.264) -0.463 (0.257) -0.503 (0.292)
Fair health -0.417 (0.176) -0.407 (0.170) -0.483 (0.213)
Good health -0.225 (0.112) -0.219 (0.108) -0.292 (0.154)
Finland (w3-8, n*t 34439)
France (w1-8, n*t 66988)
Germany (w1-3, n*t 16403)
Greece (w1-8, n*t 63826)
1. The partial effects are computed for each individual using their observed values of the regressors. The 
table presents the sample mean of the partial effects – the APE – along with the sample standard 
deviations in parentheses.
Country (waves)
Unbalanced 
sample
ECHP published 
weights
Inverse probability 
weights IPW-2 
Austria (w2-8, n*t 26368)
Belgium (w1-8, n*t 31699)
Denmark (w1-8, n*t 26848)
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Very poor health -0.444 (0.251) -0.446 (0.251) -0.452 (0.253)
Poor health -0.447 (0.239) -0.448 (0.237) -0.455 (0.240)
Fair health -0.456 (0.155) -0.454 (0.152) -0.457 (0.152)
Good health -0.251 (0.100) -0.251 (0.098) -0.252 (0.098)
Very poor health -0.173 (0.180) -0.174 (0.178) -0.183 (0.200)
Poor health -0.190 (0.176) -0.191 (0.174) -0.203 (0.197)
Fair health -0.236 (0.153) -0.238 (0.151) -0.264 (0.177)
Good health -0.173 (0.128) -0.171 (0.126) -0.205 (0.154)
Very poor health -0.214 (0.198) -0.217 (0.201) -0.243 (0.212)
Poor health -0.226 (0.194) -0.229 (0.197) -0.252 (0.204)
Fair health -0.282 (0.160) -0.286 (0.162) -0.272 (0.152)
Good health -0.191 (0.126) -0.195 (0.128) -0.183 (0.109)
Very poor health -0.177 (0.164) -0.178 (0.166) -0.182 (0.159)
Poor health -0.189 (0.166) -0.190 (0.168) -0.193 (0.159)
Fair health -0.255 (0.157) -0.257 (0.159) -0.256 (0.145)
Good health -0.232 (0.135) -0.235 (0.137) -0.205 (0.119)
Very poor health -0.030 (0.054) -0.033 (0.058) -0.034 (0.073)
Poor health -0.042 (0.059) -0.047 (0.065) -0.056 (0.085)
Fair health -0.065 (0.075) -0.074 (0.083) -0.088 (0.107)
Good health -0.076 (0.091) -0.086 (0.102) -0.112 (0.134)
Very poor health -0.173 (0.148) -0.174 (0.147) -0.177 (0.148)
Poor health -0.184 (0.137) -0.184 (0.136) -0.187 (0.135)
Fair health -0.183 (0.110) -0.183 (0.110) -0.189 (0.109)
Good health -0.086 (0.059) -0.083 (0.057) -0.071 (0.048)
Very poor health -0.317 (0.239) -0.316 (0.239) -0.321 (0.224)
Poor health -0.337 (0.233) -0.335 (0.233) -0.334 (0.213)
Fair health -0.397 (0.187) -0.396 (0.188) -0.368 (0.161)
Good health -0.257 (0.146) -0.257 (0.147) -0.225 (0.118)
Spain (w1-8, n*t 85111)
Uk (w1-3, n*t 12587)
1. The partial effects are computed for each individual using their observed values of the regressors. 
The table presents the sample mean of the partial effects – the APE – along with the sample standard 
deviations in parentheses.
Italy (w1-8, n*t 96509)
Luxembourg  (w1-3, n*t 3503)
Netherlands  (w1-8, n*t 55673)
Portugal  (w1-8, n*t 69236)
Table 5.9 (continued) Average partial effects on the probability of reporting very good SAH, 
ECHP-UDB  
Ireland (w1-8, n*t 37699)
Country (waves) Unbalanced sample ECHP published weights
Inverse probability 
weights IPW-2 
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education are substantially different than the unweighted estimates in the countries 
where less than eight waves are available (Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, UK). So, 
while health-related non-response clearly exists, on the whole it does not appear to 
distort the magnitudes of the estimated dynamics of SAH and the relationship between 
socioeconomic status and self-assessed health. Similar findings have been reported 
concerning the limited influence of non-response bias in models of income dynamics 
and various labour market outcomes (see e.g., Hausman and Wise, 1979; Becketti et al., 
1988; Lillard and Panis, 1998; Zabel, 1998; Ziliak and Kniesner, 1998; Jimenez-Martin 
and Peracchi, 2002; Behr, 2004) and on measures of social exclusion such as poverty 
rates and income inequality indices (Watson, 2003; Rendtel et al., 2004). To understand 
our findings, recall that the descriptive analysis for the BHPS shows little evidence of 
income-related non-response. There is evidence of strong education-related and health-
related non-response, but the latter is concentrated among those in poor initial health 
who are relatively few in number. There is no clear interaction between health-related 
non-response and levels of income or education. The finding that non-response has a 
limited impact on the estimates of health dynamics and, to a lesser extent, estimates 
of the association between socioeconomic status, measured by income and education, 
and self-assessed health holds for the BHPS and for many of the countries within the 
ECHP. 
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ABSTRACT
This paper presents new international comparative evidence on the factors driving 
inequalities in the use of GP and specialist services in 12 EU member states. The data 
are taken from the 1996 wave of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). We 
examine two types of utilisation (the probability of a visit and the conditional number of 
positive visits) for two types of medical care: general practitioner and medical specialist 
visits using probit, truncated Negbin and generalized Negbin models. We find little or no 
evidence of income-related inequity in the probability of a GP visit in these countries. 
Conditional upon at least one visit, there is even evidence of a somewhat pro-poor 
distribution. By contrast, substantial pro-rich inequity emerges in virtually every country 
with respect to the probability of contacting a medical specialist. Despite their lower 
needs for such care, wealthier and higher educated individuals appear to be much 
more likely to see a specialist than the less well-off. This phenomenon is universal 
in Europe, but stronger in countries where either private insurance cover or private 
practice options are offered to purchase quicker and/or preferential access. Pro-rich 
inequity in subsequent visits adds to this access inequity but appears more related to 
regional disparities in utilisation than other factors. Despite decades of universal and 
fairly comprehensive coverage in European countries, utilisation patterns suggest that 
rich and poor are not treated equally.
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6.1   INTRODUCTION
It is well known that, despite many years of near universal coverage for physician 
services, income-related inequalities in the use of such services continue to persist 
in many European countries. There is abundant evidence that in many countries - 
European and non-European alike - both the probability of seeing a doctor and the 
number of contacts, given at least one contact, are not identically distributed across 
income groups after correcting for differences in the need for such care at different 
income levels. But there are also important differences between countries in the degree 
to which this occurs. Previous cross-country comparative work has concentrated on 
the measurement and testing of horizontal inequity in the use of physician services 
by assessing to what extent any observed differentials in use across income groups 
cannot be accounted for by need differences (Van Doorslaer et al., 1993). The premise 
of this research was that those in equal need ought to be treated equally, irrespective 
of income position and that violations of this principle constitute empirical evidence of 
horizontal inequity (Van Doorslaer et al., 1992; Wagstaff and Van doorslaer, 2000; Van 
Doorslaer et al, 2000).
More recently, attention has shifted from the measurement to the explanation of the 
differences in the degree of horizontal inequity observed in different countries. Using 
ECHP data, Van Doorslaer et al. (2002) not only generated comparable estimates of 
horizontal inequity, they also explored the role of differences in private health insurance 
status and region of residence in the generation of these findings. As in earlier work 
(Van Doorslaer et al., 2000), they found relatively little evidence of income-related 
inequity in the GP visits but substantial evidence of inequity favouring the rich in visits 
to a medical specialist: after controlling for need differences, higher income individuals 
report significantly more specialist visits than lower income individuals. Moreover, they 
found that – while insurance and location of residence do contribute to these findings – 
these two determinants do not “explain away” the inequity results. 
This paper goes beyond the earlier work. First, it explicitly incorporates the two-stage 
decision process in physician utilisation. It examines inequity in the probability of a 
visit and the conditional (positive) number of visits separately by adopting two-part 
models and comparing these to a one-part model. This allows for an analysis of total 
inequity, as well as first and second part inequity. Secondly, it adopts a new (indirect) 
need standardisation approach by using the partial contributions of the need indicators 
as estimated in the decomposition procedure. Third, it allows for a decomposition ‘by 
factors’ of inequality (Wagstaff et al., 2003). The paper starts with an outline of the 
measurement and decomposition methodology in section 6.2. Section 6.3 provides a 
description of the data and estimation methods and section 6.4 presents the main 
results. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the findings in section 6.5. 
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6.2 EXPLAINING INEQUITY IN HEALTH CARE UTILISATION
6.2.1 Measuring and decomposing inequality in use
The method we use in this paper to explain inequality in health care utilisation is 
conceptually identical to the method used in Van Doorslaer and Koolman (2002) to 
explain health inequality. We use a concentration index (CM) as our measure of relative 
income-related inequality in use of health care. For weighted data, CM can be computed 
conveniently using the (weighted) covariance between yi and the fractional rank (based 
on weights) as (Lerman and. Yitzhaki, 1989):
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where y is our measure of medical care, covw denotes the weighted covariance. N is the 
sample size, y is the (weighted) mean health care use, wi is the sampling weight of each 
individual i (with the sum of wi equal to N). Ri is the relative fractional rank (based on 
weights) of the ith individual which indicates the weighted cumulative proportion of the 
population up to the midpoint of each individual weight.
A straightforward way of decomposing the measured degree of inequality into the 
contributions of explanatory factors was proposed by Wagstaff et al. (2003) in the 
context of a linear additive explanatory model such as:
 
α         βyi ki k i =    + + ε Σ xk      (6.2)
where the x variables are a set of regressors associated with health care demand and ε 
is a disturbance term. One could think of this equation as a reduced form of a demand 
for health care equation where all the x variables are exogenous determinants. Given the 
relationship between yi and xki in equation (6.2), the concentration index can be written 
as (Wagstaff et al., 2003):
 
k k  k k 
x y  C G  C+( )β ε Σ CM = / / y    (6.3)
where y  is the mean of y, xk  is the mean of xk, Ck is the concentration index for xk (defined 
analogously to CM) and GCε is the generalized concentration index for  εi.  Equation (6.3) 
shows that CM can be thought of as being made up of two components.  The first is 
the deterministic component, equal to a weighted sum of the concentration indices of 
the k regressors, where the weight or “share” for, say, xk, is simply the elasticity of y 
with respect to xk. The second is a residual component, captured by the last term. This 
reflects the inequality in health care that cannot be explained by systematic variation 
across income groups in the xk. Thus equation (6.3) shows that, by coupling regression 
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analysis with distributional data, we can partition total inequality into inequalities 
associated with each of the regressors, xk. 
The decomposition also makes clear how each regressor’s separate contribution to 
total income-related inequality in health care demand can be decomposed into two 
meaningful parts: (i) its impact on demand, as measured by the demand elasticity, 
and (ii) its degree of unequal distribution across income, as measured by the (income) 
concentration index (Ck). This decomposition method therefore not only allows us to 
separate the contributions of the various regressors, but also to identify the importance 
of each of these two components within each factor’s total contribution. This property 
makes it a powerful tool for unpacking the mechanisms contributing to a country’s 
degree of inequality in use of health care. 
One problem in this context is that demand for health care may not be very well modelled 
using linear estimation techniques such as OLS. Typically, models are intrinsically non-
linear, either because of the probability or count data nature of the utilisation variables 
or because of the two-part structure of the demand decision process (Jones, 2000). 
In section 6.2.3 below we indicate how we have dealt with the non-linearity of the 
estimated models. 
6.2.2 Measuring horizontal inequity in health care utilisation
Many OECD countries have explicitly included equity in the use of to health care as one 
of the main objectives in their health policy documents (Van Doorslaer et al., 1993; 
Hurst 2002). In most European countries, an egalitarian viewpoint of social justice 
seems to have been an important source of inspiration for these positions with respect 
to health care access. Usually, the horizontal version of the egalitarian principle is 
interpreted to require that people in equal need of care are treated equally, irrespective 
of characteristics such as income, place of residence, race, etc. In line with most of 
the previous work in this area (cf Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (2000) for a review), 
the present study uses this principle of horizontal inequity (HI) as the yardstick for 
the international comparisons. While the concentration index of medical care use (CM) 
measures the degree of inequality in the use of medical care by income, it does not 
yet measure the degree of inequity. For any inequality to be interpretable as inequity, 
legitimate or need-determined inequality has to be taken into account. 
There are two broad ways of standardising distributions for need differences: the direct 
and the indirect method. The direct method proceeds by computing a concentration 
index for the medical care use that would emerge if each individual (or income group) 
had the same need characteristics as the population as a whole. Wagstaff et al. (1991) 
have used this procedure to compute what they call HIWVP indices, which are essentially 
directly standardised concentration indices. Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (2000) have 
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advocated the technique of indirect standardisation for the measurement of so-called 
HIWV indices on the grounds that it is computationally easier and does not rely on grouped 
data. A measure of the need for medical care is obtained for each individual as the 
predicted use of a regression on need indicators. This means that in order to statistically 
equalize needs for the groups or individuals to be compared, one is effectively using the 
average relationship between need and treatment for the population as a whole as the 
vertical equity norm and horizontal inequity is measured by systematic deviations from 
this norm by income level.
Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000) proposed to measure HI by the difference between 
the inequality in actual and needed use of medical care:
 HI C CWV M N= -
      
(6.4)
where CM and CN denote the concentration index corresponding to actual and needed 
use of medical care, respectively. CN is computed using predicted values ˆ yi , which 
can be estimated for each individual i as the expected amount of medical care he or 
she would have received if he or she had been treated as others with the same need 
characteristics were, on average, treated by the system. Typically, these are obtained 
from regressing actual yi on a set of need indicators like health status and morbidity 
measures and demographics. The average relationship between need indicators and 
utilization, as embodied in the regression coefficients, is the implied norm for assessing 
equity in this health care system. A positive (negative) value of HIWV indicates horizontal 
inequity favoring the better-off (worse-off). A zero index value indicates no horizontal 
inequity, i.e. that medical care and need are proportionally distributed across the income 
distribution. It is worth emphasizing that coinciding concentration curves for need and 
actual use provide a sufficient but not a necessary condition for no inequity. These 
indices were used to measure, test and compare horizontal inequity across countries in 
van Doorslaer et al. (2000). 
One further step in the direction of explaining horizontal inequity was made in Van 
Doorslaer et al. (2002) by including other, non-need determinants in the (indirect) need 
standardisation process. In their search for an explanation of cross-country differences 
in the HIWV indices, they found, for instance, that inclusion of factors like health 
insurance and regional fixed effects in the standardisation did reduce the degree of pro-
rich inequity in specialist use, but seldom to an extent that made it insignificant. They 
interpreted this as evidence that health insurance and regional variation do play a role in 
explaining the occurrence and degree of horizontal inequity. 
The issue of the role of explanatory models in the measurement of inequity deserves 
some further attention. Some authors have drawn attention to the potential biases 
involved in these standardisation procedures. First, the problem of determining which 
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systematic variations in medical care use by income are “needed” and therefore, in 
a sense, justifiable, and which are not, bears some resemblance to the problem of 
determining legitimate compensation in the risk adjustment literature. Schokkaert and 
Van de Voorde (2000) have argued that while there is a difference between the positive 
exercise of explaining medical care expenditure (or use) and the normative issue of 
justifying medical expenditure (or use) differences, the results of the former exercise 
have relevance for the second. Drawing on the theory of fair compensation, they show 
that failure to include ‘responsibility variables’ (which do not need to be compensated for 
in the capitation formula) in the equation used for estimating the effect of ‘compensation 
variables’ (which do need to be compensated for) may give rise to omitted variable 
bias in the determination of the ‘appropriate’ capitations (or fair compensations). Their 
proposed remedy to this problem is to include the ‘omitted variables’ in the estimation 
equation but to ‘neutralize’ their impact by setting these variables equal to their means 
in the need-prediction equation. They claim that the argument that even this more fully 
specified model may suffer from omitted variable bias due to the unavailability of certain 
variables cannot be used as an excuse for not including what is available. Schokkaert 
and Van de Voorde point out that the procedure to neutralize the responsibility variables 
does not hold if the model is not linearly additive. 
A similar argument to Schokkaert and Van de Voorde (2000) was made and taken further 
by Gravelle (2001) in the context of the measurement of income-related inequality of 
health or health care. He uses an ‘augmented partial concentration index’ which is 
defined as the (directly) standardised concentration index, but controlling for income and 
other non-standardising variables in the process. In effect, he distinguishes between 
three types of xk variables in equation (6.2): income itself (x
r ), need standardising 
variables (a vector xn ) and other, possibly policy-relevant variables (a vector xp ):
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The equivalent of equation (6.3) for this specification then becomes:
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where the first term denotes the (partial) contribution of income inequality ( ˆ C r  equals 
the Gini coefficient of income inequality if income is entered linearly), the second the 
contribution of need variables, the third the contribution of other, potentially policy-
relevant variables and the last term is, as before, the generalised concentration index 
of å. Gravelle (2001) labels the first term the partial concentration index and the sum of 
the first and third term the ‘augmented partial concentration index’. 
In the context of a linear model, equation (6.6) therefore provides a neat way to 
decompose the total measured inequality in medical care use into four sources: (a) the 
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contribution of income, defined as the product of the income elasticity of medical care 
use and the concentration index of income; (b) the contribution of the need variables, 
(c) the contribution of other variables, potentially amenable to policy intervention, and (d) 
a residual term which basically captures the degree to which the residual is correlated 
with income rank. Assuming that equation (6.5) leads to a better estimate of the (partial) 
need contribution, then a model without the xr and xp variables, equation (6.6) provides 
an alternative estimate of horizontal inequity as the CM minus the second term, or 
equivalently as the sum of (a), (c) and (d). 
As long as the model for y is linear, as in equation (6.5), then the Schokkaert and Van 
de Voorde (2000) approach of estimating the full regression first and then neutralizing 
the non-need variables by setting them equal to their mean (or, in fact, any constant 
value) and the decomposition approach lead to the same measure of horizontal inequity 
(see Appendix). The decomposition approach has the additional advantage of greater 
transparency in the presentation of results. Estimating a regression model for use of 
health care does not require a priori agreement on what constitute ‘justifiable’ and 
‘unjustifiable’ causes of inequality in health care use by income. Some may, for instance, 
prefer to exclude variables like gender or age from the xn vector and to include 
them in the xp vector, on the grounds that, after having controlled for other health 
differences, age and gender in and of themselves do not constitute legitimate reasons 
for differential medical care consumption. Similarly, the question arises whether the 
residual contribution - term (d) in equation (6.8) - needs to be attributed to justifiable 
or unjustifiable sources of inequality. In our approach, we have decided to classify all of 
it as unjustifiable variation. At the other extreme, it could be argued that the residuals 
mainly capture unmeasured need and hence that the residual contribution should be 
subtracted from HI. The decomposition method and, in particular the graphical analysis, 
make the implications of these different assumptions transparent. 
6.2.3 Nonlinear regression models
One important problem with measuring horizontal inequity and applying the 
decomposition analysis in the present context is that they will not be linear because the 
dependent variable in health care demand models is modelled as a nonlinear function 
of the x variables. Our empirical models of health care use are based on logistic and 
truncated and generalized negative binomial regression models, which are intrinsically 
nonlinear. The general functional form G of such a nonlinear model can be written as:
 
E y  x G  x i i  k i  
k 
k 
= ( )β Σ ( )     (6.7)
To compute horizontal inequity in the context of a nonlinear model, again we have used 
a two-step approach. In the first step we predict need-expected utilisation based on the 
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actual values of the xn variables, but these predictions are contingent on the level of the 
non-need variables (xr and xp) that is selected. By analogy with the linear case, we have 
chosen to set the non-need variables equal to their sample means. So:
 
β                β β + +i i  y E  G x( ,y x  ˆ , ) ( ˆ                ˆ ˆ ) x x x x
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As before, in the second step the HI index is then obtained by subtracting the 
concentration index of ˆ y from the concentration index of y. A complication compared 
to the linear case is that the HI index for the nonlinear model is contingent on the 
values used for the non-need variables and therefore their effect is not completely 
neutralised. 
It was noted above that, in the context of linear models, the two-step approach to 
neutralizing the non-need variables and the decomposition approach give the same 
measure of horizontal inequity. This does not hold for a nonlinear model, as the 
linear decomposition does not directly apply to equation (6.7). However it is possible 
to approximate the decomposition analysis. To do this, we have opted to use the 
‘partial effects’ representation for the decomposition. This has the advantage of being 
a linear additive model of actual utilisation, but it is only an approximation. A linear 
approximation of this function is given by:
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where the β k 
m  are the partial effects of each x and ui is the implied error term which 
includes approximation errors. For the dummy variables local average partial effects 
are computed using a procedure equal to computing treatment effects evaluated for 
the treated (Wooldridge, 2002). This means that β k 
m  is measured by computing the 
average effect for each individual with characteristic k and then taking the sample mean 
over this sub-set of individuals. So, for instance, the average effect of unemployment is 
calculated as the mean of β k 
m  for those who are unemployed. This captures the fact that 
the unemployed differ from the population as a whole in terms of other characteristics 
such as age, education, etc. The partial effect for the continuous variable (income) 
was computed by evaluating the change in ˆ yi  for each individual around the observed 
income and other characteristics. To obtain our estimate we added and subtracted a 
small number to the observed value, we computed the difference and divided it by twice 
the fraction. 
While equation (6.9) is an approximation of the non-linear relationship estimated by 
the logit or the truncated or generalised Negbin models, it does allow us to restore the 
mechanics of the decomposition framework by replacing the β k  parameters in equation 
by the β k 
m  parameters. This modified version of equation (6.3) provides the basis for 
our decompositions of the first and the second part of two-part models presented in 
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section 6.5. They provide an estimate of the contributions of individual factors to the 
overall level of inequality in use of health care, but because of the linear approximation 
error, the HI estimate obtained through the decomposition equation (6.10) will, in 
general, not be identical to the HI estimate obtained through the two-step approach 
using equation (6.6).  
One way of checking the reliability of the linearization method is to apply the two-step 
standardization method described in equation (6.8) to each of the groups of variables 
(need, non-need, income) to obtain estimates of their contributions to inequality. Like 
the linearization method, this still induces an approximation error, but it tends to be 
smaller since it still captures the curvature of the nonlinear function, G(.), and it does 
not suppress multiplicative interactions within the groups of variables, only between 
the variables of interest and the ‘standardising’ variables. As such, it represents a 
somewhat closer approximation of the partial contributions. However, unlike the linear 
approximation, it does not restore the full mechanics of the decomposition into the 
contributions of elasticities and of inequalities of the regressors.
6.2.4  Statistical inference
In addition to measuring inequality and inequity, we aim to test for cross-country 
differences. Standard errors for the C and HI indices were computed using the 
convenient regression procedure for weighted data, and corrected for heteroscedasticity 
and clustering on a household level. For the contribution terms we have opted to use 
a “bootstrap” method (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993; Deaton, 1997) to assess sampling 
variability and to obtain standard errors for the estimates of the contributions in the 
decomposition analysis. A standard bootstrap procedure hinges on the assumption that 
the observed distribution is a random sample of the underlying population distribution, 
and that individuals within the sample are independent. This assumption does not 
hold for the complex multi-stage sampling designs used to gather the ECHP data. 
Therefore we have implemented the bootstrap using the following procedure. First, for 
the countries for which data were sampled in two stages (i.e. BE, UK, IE, IT, GR, ES, 
PT), we have drawn a random sub-sample (with replacement) of the primary sampling 
units (PSU) of a size equal to the original sample size. This step was not used for 
Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, where PSU information was not made available, 
or for Denmark and Luxembourg, where PSUs were not used. Second, we have drawn 
a random sub-sample (with replacement) of households within each of the sampled 
PSUs, and included all members of these households. Third, for each draw, we have 
normalised the sampling weights to a mean of one, and have run the entire (weighted) 
procedure to obtain the factor contributions, including the regressions, marginal effects, 
fractional rank construction and covariance computations. Fourth, repeating this whole 
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process, we have generated 100 resample data sets each providing us with estimates 
of the contributions. Sixth, using these datasets we have computed the standard 
deviations as an estimate of the standard error of each factor’s contribution and for the 
HI index.
6.3 DATA AND ESTIMATION METHODS
6.3.1  ECHP Data
The data are taken from the third wave (held in 1996) of the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) conducted by Eurostat, the European Statistical Office. The 
ECHP is a survey based on a standardised questionnaire that involves annual interviewing 
of a representative panel of households and individuals of 16 years and older in each EU 
member state (Eurostat, 1999). It covers a wide range of topics including demographics, 
income, social transfers, health, housing, education, employment, etc. We use data for 
the following twelve member states of the EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
The three missing member states are France (missing utilisation questions), Finland 
(missing income data) and Sweden (not taking part in ECHP). 
The ECHP income measure (our ranking variable) is disposable (i.e. after-tax) household 
income per equivalent adult, using the modified OECD equivalence scale (giving a 
weight of 1.0 to the first adult, 0.5 to the second and each subsequent person aged 
14 and over, and 0.3 to each child aged under 4 in the household). Total household 
income includes all net monetary income received by the household members during 
the reference year (which is 1995 for the 1996 wave). It includes income from work 
(employment and self-employment), private non-labour income (from investments and 
property and private transfers to the household), pensions and other direct social 
transfers received. No account has been taken of indirect social transfers (e.g. 
reimbursement of medical expenses), receipts in kind and imputed rent from owner-
occupied accommodation. 
Measurement of utilisation of general practitioner (GP) and medical specialist services 
in the ECHP is based on the question “During the past 12 months, about how many 
times have you consulted a GP/medical specialist?” We use one-year lagged health 
measures from wave 2 (1995) based on two questions: (a) responses to a question on 
self-assessed general health status as either very good, good, fair, bad or very bad; and 
(b) responses to “Do you have any chronic physical or mental health problem, illness or 
disability? (yes/no)” and if so “Are you hampered in your daily activities by this physical 
or mental health problem, illness or disability? (no; yes, to some extent; yes, severely)”. 
We use two dummies to indicate either some limitation or severe limitation. 
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We also included a number of other variables which have been shown in the literature to 
affect health care utilisation of health care but are not direct indicators of health status 
or need for care. Education and marital status are assumed to affect then efficiency of 
health production and the propensity to seek care, while both activity status and 
region of residence are more likely to affect the time price of health care use. We 
included the following variables: (i) the highest level of general or higher education 
completed, i.e. third level education (ISCED 5-7), second stage of secondary level 
education (ISCED 3) or less than second stage of secondary education (ISCED 0-2)); (ii) 
Marital status, distinguishing between married/living in consensual union, separated/
divorced, widowed and unmarried; (iii) Activity status includes employed, self-employed, 
student, unemployed, retired, doing housework and ‘other economically inactive’. Region 
of residence uses the EU’s NUTS 1 level (Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units) 
except for countries where such information was withheld for privacy reasons (The 
Netherlands, Germany) or because the country is too small (Denmark, Luxembourg). 
Regional identifiers are presented in the companion paper (Van Doorslaer and Koolman, 
2002). Although most country’s sample sizes are between 7000 and 11,000 adults, 
some are larger (Spain, Italy) and some are smaller (Denmark and Luxembourg). Cross-
sectional sample weights at the individual level were applied in all analyses.
6.3.2  Cross-country differences
All 12 countries included in this analysis had, by 1996, achieved close to universal 
coverage of their population for the majority of physician services, but some important 
between-country differences remain with respect to potentially equity-relevant features 
of their financing and delivery systems. Van Doorslaer et al. (2002) have summarized 
some of the salient system characteristics which may have an impact on any differential 
utilisation of the general practitioners or medical specialists by income level. In some 
countries, there are different groups of insured with varying degrees of coverage or rules 
of reimbursement at different levels of income. This is the case for rather small numbers 
of high-income earners with private coverage in Denmark and Germany, but it concerns 
sizeable portions of the population in Ireland and the Netherlands. Some countries’ 
public insurance have substantial co-payments for GP and specialist consultations (e.g. 
up to 30-40% of fees in Belgium and Luxembourg; €20 for higher income patients in 
Ireland), some charge small co-payments (e.g. Portugal) while in many other countries 
(like Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain and the UK) visits to public sector doctors are 
free at the point of delivery [cf tables in Mossialos (2002) and Robinson (2002) for 
details]. In some countries, notably Denmark, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain and the UK, the primary care physician acts as a “gatekeeper” referring to 
secondary care provided by medical specialists, whereas in other countries, there is 
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direct access to all physicians. Some countries pay their general practitioners mainly by 
capitation (Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, UK) or salary (Greece, Portugal, Spain) whereas 
others rely mainly on fee-for-service payment. We will have to keep these system 
differences in mind when interpreting the cross-country comparative results.
6.3.3  Estimation methods 
Health care utilisation data like physician visits are known to have a very skewed 
distribution with the majority of survey respondents reporting zero or few visits and 
only a very small proportion reporting frequent use. In such cases, integer count 
data regression is appropriate and a variety of models have been proposed and 
used (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). The negative binomial model, which allows for 
overdispersion, has often been shown to be an adequate choice in studies of health care 
utilisation. Many studies have also emphasised the principal-agent relationship between 
doctor and patient and stressed the distinction between patient initiated decisions, 
such as the first contact with a GP, and decisions that are influenced by the doctor, 
such as repeat visits, prescriptions, and referrals (Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995). The 
consequence, in statistical terms, is a hurdle or two-part model (TPM) which allows the 
participation decision and the positive count, to be generated by separate probability 
processes. The two-part model has often been estimated using a logit for the first stage 
and a truncated negbin model for the second stage (Grootendorst, 1995; Gerdtham, 
1997; Hakkinen et al., 1996; Jones and O’Donnell, 2002). 
We have chosen to adopt a TPM model combining a logit and a truncated negbin for both 
the GP and specialist equations because we are interested to see whether the effect of 
income differs between first and subsequent contacts. In addition, we have estimated 
equations for the total number of visits using the generalised negbin model (cf Jones, 
2000). The generalisation consists of modelling the excess zeros as unobservable 
heterogeneity; allowing the heterogeneity parameter (alpha) to be a function of the x’s 
rather than being constant. Like Jimenez et al. (2002), we have exploited the availability 
of previous waves of the ECHP to use lagged values of the health variables in order 
to reduce the risk of endogeneity in the health status variables. Because of their 
rejection of cross-country homogeneity, we have chosen not to pool the data across 
countries. For all countries and surveys, cross-sectional sample weights were used in 
all computations in order to make the results more representative of the countries’ 
populations. Robust standard errors were obtained by applying White-Huber-sandwich 
estimator that corrects for heteroskedasticity of unknown form. This estimator was 
adjusted to also correct cluster sampling. We clustered on households, as this is the 
smallest cluster unit and information on the primary sampling units was not available for 
all countries.  
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6.4 RESULTS
While the focus of this paper is on the differences in relative inequality in utilisation by 
income level within European countries, it is clear that there is tremendous variation also 
in the average levels of physician utilisation across these countries. In Van Doorslaer 
et al. (2002), it is shown that the mean annual number of visits to a GP varies from 
a low of 2.19 in Greece to a high of 5.39 in Austria, and mean visits to a specialist 
from a low of 0.62 in Ireland to a high of 3.29 in Germany. Some countries, notably 
Germany and Austria, have above-European average rates of utilization for both GP 
and specialist visits. Countries with below-average utilisation rates for both types of 
visits include Ireland, Netherlands, Denmark, UK, Portugal, Spain and Greece. Belgium 
and Italy have above-average GP visit rates only and Luxemburg is the only country 
with above-average specialist visit rates only. These inter-country differences in mean 
utilisation levels are probably closely related to GP and specialist availability and 
remuneration across countries. They have to be interpreted carefully given the cross-
country differences in the definition of GP visits (office, home, health centre) and 
specialist visits (private practice, in hospital, etc). 
6.4.1  Indices for total inequality and horizontal inequity 
GP care utilisation
The results summarized in Table 6.1 can be compared with those obtained in Van 
Doorslaer et al. (2002) for the total number of visits, but here the findings are 
decomposed by parts of the decision process. Statistically significant contributions are 
indicated in bold. Virtually all concentration indices for the probability of a visit , the 
conditional and the total number of visits are negative. This means that generally lower 
income groups are both more likely to seek care from a GP than higher income groups, 
and they do so more frequently. But the unequal distribution of GP care to a large 
extent appears to be in line with the similarly unequal distribution of the need for 
such care. After controlling for the unequal need distributions, the resulting horizontal 
inequity indices are insignificant in seven countries, pro-poor in Spain and Denmark, and 
significantly pro-rich in Belgium, UK and the Netherlands. However, in all countries, the 
horizontal inequity (HI) index for the visit probability is fairly small, i.e. within the range 
[-0.01; 0.02]. There appears to be only a very small degree of income-related horizontal 
inequity in the GP contact probability. 
The picture is somewhat different for the conditional (positive) number of visits. Table 6.1 
shows that income-related inequity is more negative (i.e. favouring the lower income 
groups) and significant in eight of the twelve countries in the second part of the demand 
model. Both the CM and the HI indices here are generally more negative than for the 
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Table 6.1 Inequality and inequity in GP visits, ECHP, 1996
GP visits
Inequality Inequity Inequality Inequity Inequality Inequity
(CM ) (HI ) (CM ) (HI ) (CM ) (HI )
Ireland -0.0187 0.0035 -0.1136 -0.0657 -0.1323 -0.0696
Belgium 0.0037 0.0121 -0.1183 -0.0564 -0.1145 -0.0508
Spain -0.0294 -0.0167 -0.0612 -0.0371 -0.0906 -0.0492
Luxembourg -0.0076 0.0002 -0.0841 -0.0428 -0.0918 -0.0406
Italy -0.0055 -0.0002 -0.0594 -0.0322 -0.0649 -0.0349
Greece -0.0413 -0.0041 -0.0845 -0.0212 -0.1258 -0.0308
Germany -0.0124 -0.0082 -0.0513 -0.0173 -0.0636 -0.0268
UK -0.0076 0.0109 -0.0930 -0.0301 -0.1006 -0.0240
Netherlands -0.0019 0.0103 -0.0517 -0.0201 -0.0535 -0.0113
Denmark -0.0200 0.0061 -0.0631 -0.0085 -0.0831 -0.0008
Portugal -0.0143 0.0099 -0.0549 -0.0038 -0.0692 0.0051
Austria -0.0082 -0.0018 -0.0417 0.0114 -0.0499 0.0146
Notes: Countries ranked by inequity index for total visits (last column). Inequity indices computed using a 
logit model for the probability, a truncated negbin model for the conditional number and a generalised 
negbin for the total number of visits. Statistically significant HI  indices in bold (P<0.05).
Probability of a visit Conditional  # of visits Total # of visits
Table 6.2 Inequality and inequity in specialist visits, ECHP 1996
Inequality Inequity Inequality Inequity Inequality Inequity
(CM ) (HI ) (CM ) (HI ) (CM ) (HI )
Luxembourg 0.0195 0.0346 -0.0899 -0.0594 -0.0704 -0.0282
Belgium 0.0125 0.0344 -0.0394 -0.0008 -0.0269 0.0255
Netherlands -0.0041 0.0307 -0.0137 0.0197 -0.0178 0.0413
Greece -0.0175 0.0355 -0.0242 0.0216 -0.0418 0.0492
Germany 0.0130 0.0243 0.0029 0.0269 0.0158 0.0517
UK 0.0163 0.0723 -0.0397 -0.0062 -0.0234 0.0524
Italy 0.0416 0.0617 -0.0237 -0.0035 0.0179 0.0537
Spain 0.0439 0.0658 -0.0171 0.0121 0.0267 0.0714
Austria 0.0108 0.0214 0.0237 0.0554 0.0345 0.0740
Denmark -0.0074 0.0223 0.0297 0.0581 0.0223 0.0844
Ireland 0.0621 0.1168 0.0149 0.0299 0.0770 0.1388
Portugal 0.0774 0.1103 0.0197 0.0549 0.0971 0.1604
Note: Countries ranked by total inequity index (last column). Contributions computed using a logit model 
for the probability, a truncated negbin model for the conditional number and a generalised negbin for the
total number of visits. Statistically significant HI  indices in bold (P<0.05). 
Probability Cond Number Total
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Figure 6.1 Inequity indices for number of GP visits (with 95% confidence intervals)
 
probability of a visit. As a result, we also find substantial inequity in total GP visits, 
which are concentrated among the poorer segments in most countries, with significant 
inequity favouring the lower income groups in eight of the countries. The index values 
with the corresponding 95% confidence intervals for total number of GP visits are shown 
graphically in Figure 6.1. All the significant values are in the range [-0.02; -0.05] except 
for Ireland, for which it equals -0.07. In only four countries — Austria, Denmark, Portugal 
and Netherlands — the hypothesis of no inequity cannot be rejected. There does not 
appear to be one system characteristic that explains this finding since these four 
countries all have very diverse characteristics. There appears to be a general tendency 
— irrespective of the system characteristics — for lower income groups to have more 
frequent GP visits in European countries. In the two countries with most negative index 
values, this tendency is exacerbated by pro-poor discrimination. In Ireland, only the 30% 
on the lowest incomes are medical cardholders and entitled to free GP services, while 
others must pay out-of-pocket. In Belgium the elderly and chronically ill on low incomes 
pay much reduced co-payments. 
Specialist care utilisation
The distribution of specialist care utilisation by income, summarized in Table 6.2, looks 
dramatically different from the use of GP services. In all but three countries (the 
Netherlands, Denmark and Greece), higher income groups are more likely to report at 
least one visit to a specialist, while the need for such care is invariably higher among the 
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Figure 6.2 Inequity indices for total number of specialist visits (with 95% confidence 
intervals)
lower income groups. It is therefore not a surprise that, after controlling for these need 
differences, we find substantial degrees of horizontal inequity favouring the rich for this 
probability, which are statistically significant in all countries except Denmark. In seven of 
the countries, this is compounded by similar pro-rich inequity in the conditional number 
of specialist visits. Overall, we see a high and significant degree of pro-rich inequity in 
total specialist visits in all countries except Luxembourg and Belgium. Luxembourg is 
a somewhat special case because of its small size (and sample), the lack of academic 
hospitals, the high degree of cross-border care delivery and the unclear distinction 
between a specialist and a general practitioner. Belgium’s more equal distribution may 
be due to its positive discrimination in favour of certain lower income groups through 
lower rates of co-payment. 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the between-country differences and confidence intervals. Most 
countries show inequity indices between 0.04 and 0.08 which are not significantly 
different from one another. Portugal and Ireland, in particular, show significantly 
horizontal inequity index values than many of the other countries, and only the indices 
for Luxembourg and Belgium are not significantly different from zero. The reason for the 
strong pro-rich pattern in Ireland seems fairly obviously related to the dual insurance 
system by income level in this country, where low income groups with a medical card 
(30%) are entitled to free GP services but higher income groups have to pay out-of-
pocket and increasingly buy private insurance to cover outpatient (specialist service) 
charges. The situation is different in Portugal where much of the pro-rich distribution 
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appears related to the high share paid for out-of-pocket (or through private insurance) 
for private consultations and the low access to specialist services in poorly endowed 
regions. 
6.4.2 Decomposition analysis
In the companion paper on health inequalities (Van Doorslaer and Koolman, 2002), 
we have demonstrated in more detail how the estimated elasticities and concentration 
indices of the regressors translate into contributions to inequality. In the extended 
version of this paper, we have illustrated the ‘mechanics’ of the decomposition method 
for the example of specialist visit probability in Spain. The illustration shows how, for 
instance, positive use elasticities combined with negative concentration indices lead to 
negative inequality contributions for most of the need variables (e.g. those indicating 
older age groups and lower health states). As such, these variables contribute to 
pro-poor inequality. On the other hand, variables like income, education and living in 
one of the richer Spanish regions (Madrid, the East and the North-east) show both 
positive elasticities and positive concentration indices and therefore contribute to pro-
rich inequality in the use distribution.
For reasons of space, we have included inequality contributions by type of utilisation and 
by country for just one type of utilization (the probability of a specialist visit) in Table 6.3. 
Here we concentrate on the broad picture by looking at the inequality decomposition 
into the contribution of four sources: (i) income itself, (ii) need variables, including health 
status at the beginning of the reference period and age and gender dummies, (iii) other 
demand determinants like education, labour force or marital status and region, and 
(iv) the residual term. As explained in section 6.2.1, each of these determinants will 
contribute to the total income-related inequality in use to the extent that (a) it has a 
significant demand elasticity, and (b) it is unequally distributed by income. 
As explained in section 6.2.3, in the nonlinear model setting, the degree of horizontal 
inequity can only be decomposed approximately using an equation like equation (6.10). 
The generalized concentration index of the error term then includes both an estimation 
error and an approximation error. This is an inevitable price to be paid to restore linearity. 
As a result, the HI indices estimated using the two-step approach explained in equation 
(6.6) with the need predictions generated by equation (6.8) will not, in general, be 
identical to estimates generated with the linear approximation of the decomposition. 
The approximate contribution estimates nonetheless provide some useful insight into 
the direction and magnitude of the various source contributions. A comparison of the 
contributions estimated with the linearization and the standardisation methods (as 
described in section 6.2.3) shows that in the great majority of cases the results are 
very similar. Where they do differ, the size of the error term tends to be smaller in 
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the standardization method estimates and this is often accompanied by a smaller 
contribution of the need variables. In other words, if the approximation causes bias in 
the partial effect, it tends to somewhat underestimate the need contributions. The linear 
approximation clearly appears to perform much better for the probability of use than 
for the conditional positive use. And for conditional positive use, it performs better for 
specialist visits than for GP visits, probably because of its inability to properly capture 
the infrequent number of very high counts in GP visits. 
GP care utilisation
Figure 6.3 presents the contributions of the four sources of inequality as distinguished 
in equation (6.6). Inequality in the probability of a GP visit in each of the 12 countries is 
(approximately) decomposed into the partial contributions of (a) (the log of) household 
income, (b) need indicators (self-reported morbidity, age and sex), (c) other non-need 
variables (education, marital and activity status and region) and (d) a residual term. 
As explained in section 6.2.3, the latter term includes both a prediction error and an 
error generated by the linear approximation used to obtain the marginal effects. It is to 
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Portugal 
Figure 6.3 Decomposition of inequality in GP visit probability
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Income Need Other Resid 
Contribution to CI of prob. of GP visit 
Note: Decomposition based on linear approximation using marginal effects from a logit regression. 
Countries ranked by degree of horizontal inequity
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be noted that aggregating the contributions of several (dummy) variables means that 
positive and negative contributions may cancel out in the aggregate so that a small 
contribution may ‘hide’ the summation of larger positive and negative contributions. The 
income variable was transformed logarithmically in keeping with previous practice in the 
literature. 
One way of reading the chart is as follows. In a country where the probability of a GP visit 
were equally distributed across income, the sum of the bars would be zero. In a country 
with a perfectly equitable distribution of GP visits across income, the sum of the bars 
would be equal to the need bar, which indicates the distribution of need by income. As 
soon as discrepancies emerge between the actual and the need-expected distribution, 
the other bars appear. They indicate what share of the discrepancy between need and 
use is due to either income itself, or to other variables included in the equation, or to 
variables not included. 
We can see that inequality in the GP use probability is fairly small and pro-poor, and 
mainly accounted for by the contribution of need factors in all countries. This means 
that the distribution is pro-poor because the need distribution is pro-poor. The partial 
contribution of income is generally positive but rather modest. All other variables show 
negative but small contributions. Where inequality is substantial, as in Greece, it is 
mainly a consequence of the unequal distribution of education by income: the higher 
educated tend to be richer but, ceteris paribus, less likely to use GP services. The 
influence of education may capture differences in communication skills or simply taste 
differences.
Figure 6.4 shows greater inequality in the distribution of the conditional (positive) 
number of GP visits. It is more pro-poor, but again this is mainly due to the greater 
needs of the poor. The often negative partial contribution of income indicates pro-poor 
treatment patterns (except in Austria, Germany and Denmark). The full decomposition 
results show that important ‘other’ non-need variables contributing to the pro-poor 
distribution are education (in all countries except Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg 
and Austria), non-active status like retired, unemployed, housewives, inactive status 
in Belgium, Ireland, and Italy (in all countries except Netherlands, Luxembourg and 
Greece) and region (in the Mediterranean countries). To the extent that some of these 
categories may reflect a greater need for care (like e.g. inactive status may include 
recipients of disability pensions) and have a negative contribution, we may, in effect, be 
underestimating the need contribution and therefore overestimating the degree of pro-
poor inequity. 
The residual contribution in this chart is comparatively larger than in the other charts 
and always positive. We have decomposed the “linear” residual, that appears in the bar 
charts, into the genuine residual from the nonlinear model and the approximation error 
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and found that the tendency to observe positive bars is predominantly attributable to 
the approximation error.
Specialist care utilisation
From the (aggregate) decomposition in figure 6.5 we can see that pro-rich inequity is 
mainly the result of a strong partial contribution of income in most countries (lowest in 
Austria and the Netherlands), which is exacerbated by the contribution of other variables 
in some countries, notably in Ireland, Spain, Italy and Portugal. Table 6.3 shows that 
the effect of these ‘other variables’ is primarily due to the very pro-rich contribution 
of higher education. While we did not include a variable indicating coverage by private 
health insurance in these reduced form equations, it is likely that such private cover will 
contribute significantly to the pro-rich distribution of specialist visit probabilities. It may 
not be a coincidence that the highest pro-rich inequity indices are found for precisely the 
five countries for which such ‘duplicate private coverage’ is most prevalent (i.e. Ireland, 
Portugal, UK, Spain and Italy). In other words, much of the income and ‘other’ variable 
Income Need Other Resid 
Contribution to CI of cond # of GP visit 
Figure 6.4 Decomposition of inequality in conditional number of GP visits
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Note: Decomposition based on linear approximation using marginal effects from a truncated negbin 
regression. Countries ranked by degree of horizontal inequity
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contributions may, in fact, reflect the role of the unequal distribution of private insurance 
coverage (cf. Van Doorslaer et al. (2002).
Figure 6.6, on the other hand, shows that the contribution of income is less important 
for inequity in subsequent specialist visits. It is only significantly positive in Denmark 
and Germany, and significantly negative in Luxembourg. In a few countries, e.g. Portugal, 
Spain and Greece, other variables contribute more to the pro-rich distribution of these 
visits. The full decomposition results reveal that in this case it is the regional disparities 
which play an important role. In the three southern countries, a sizeable share of the 
pro-rich inequity is due to the much higher use of specialist visits in the richer capital 
regions of Madrid, Lisbon and Athens. This finding highlights the usefulness of the 
decomposition approach to trace the sources of inequality patterns in medical care 
use. 
6.5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
This paper provides new evidence on the sources of differences between European 
countries in the degree to which health care use is unequally distributed by income. 
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Figure 6.5 Decomposition of inequality in specialist visit probability
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Contribution to CI of prob of specialist visit 
Note: Decomposition based on marginal effects from logit regression. Countries ranked by 
degree of horizontal inequity
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Figure 6.6 Decomposition of inequality in conditional number of specialist visits
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Note: Decomposition based on linear approximation using marginal effects from a truncated 
negbin regression. Countries ranked by degree of horizontal inequity
While it builds on previous international comparative work, it also offers a number of 
advances, both in terms of new data analysed and in terms of new methods used. 
First, it exploits new and comparable data on the use of general practitioner and 
specialist services in 12 EU member states collected in the 1996 wave of the European 
Community Household Panel. Secondly, it employs new methods for decomposing the 
total observed inequality in utilisation by ‘sources’. While such methods have been 
deployed previously and successfully for the decomposition of inequalities in health, 
they have hitherto not been used to examine the sources of inequality in utilisation. 
The main reason for this is that the decomposition method was developed for linear 
models, while it is well known that medical care use is typically and most appropriately 
modelled using inherently non-linear models. We show that a linear approximation of 
these models using a ‘marginal effects’ representation of the decomposition is one 
way of dealing with this non-linearity problem. As a result, we can decompose (an 
approximation of) the inequality in actual use, not in the latent index representing the 
propensity to use medical care. Thirdly, we also perform a decomposition ‘by parts’ of 
the decision process by doing this separately for the probability of a visit and for the 
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conditional positive number of visits. As such, we are better able to distinguish between 
factors driving inequality in initial visits and in subsequent visits. Finally, we illustrate 
how statistical inference can be based on standard error estimates of the inequality 
contributions generated with bootstrapping methods.
The results provide a number of new insights. First, we find that in all European 
countries, both the need for GP services and the use of such care are more concentrated 
among the poorer population segments. But in many cases the actual distribution is 
even more pro-poor than the need distribution. Violations of the principle of “equal 
treatment for equal need” by income are very modest: rich and poor face very similar 
probabilities of seeing a GP when need differences have been adjusted for. Some pro-
poor inequity emerges for the conditional number of visits, but it is relatively small. 
To the extent that the decision for subsequent or repeated visits is more likely to be 
influenced by the doctor than by the patient, this pro-poor discrimination may be doctor-
driven.
Secondly, the findings are dramatically different in the case of specialist visits. While 
needs are often greater among the poor, specialist use is often higher among the rich or, 
at best, distributed fairly equally. Consequently, after controlling for the greater needs 
of the poor, substantial degrees of horizontal inequity favouring the rich emerge in all 
countries. Everywhere in Europe, the use of specialist visits is higher (than expected on 
the basis of need) for the rich and lower for the poor, but the degree to which occurs 
differs substantially between countries: the pro-rich pattern is strongest in Ireland and 
Portugal, and weakest in the Benelux countries. But also the ‘decomposition by parts’ 
provides a different picture for specialist visits: the probability of an (initial) visit is much 
more important than the (conditional) number of (subsequent) visits in generating the 
observed patterns of income-related horizontal inequities. In most countries, by far the 
greater share of overall inequity in specialist use stems from the unequal distribution of 
an initial contact. This would suggest that inequity here is rather more patient-initiated 
than doctor-driven, although in countries with gatekeeping roles for GPs it may be 
GP-initiated. Notable exceptions to this rule are Austria and Denmark, where most of 
the inequity stems from the conditional number of positive visits and may therefore be 
related to specialist self-referral patterns.
Third, the paper also sheds light on the relative contributions of the factors driving the 
cross-country differences in inequalities. For GP care utilisation, the most important 
variables contributing to a more pro-poor distribution are not income itself but rather 
other indicators of social disadvantage, such as low education, retirement, and non-
participation in the labour force. In so far as regional disparities can be captured with 
our data, they appear relatively unimportant here. This may either be interpreted as 
some sort of positive discrimination by GPs of lower socio-economic categories but 
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an alternative and equally plausible explanation is measurement error in the need 
variables. It is not impossible that self-reporting of morbidity is systematically different 
among these categories. If these groups were to under-report morbidity compared to 
some objective measure of health then, for a given level of self-reported morbidity, 
their needs may actually be greater than those of other, more advantaged groups. 
Unfortunately, this hypothesis cannot be tested in the absence of a more objective 
measure of need. In the case of specialist visits, the contribution of income to the pro-
rich distribution is much clearer, especially for the probability of seeing a specialist. 
Particularly in those countries where higher income can buy quicker or preferential 
access to a medical specialist, this contribution seems to be larger. It can be because 
those with higher incomes buy supplemental private insurance, as in Ireland, Spain and 
the UK, or because they are more likely to use the private sector, as in Portugal and Italy. 
It is less obvious why income also contributes substantially to a pro-rich distribution of 
specialist visits in a country like Denmark, where both private insurance and private 
practice (for specialist services) are nearly non-existent. In that country, the horizontal 
inequity definitely arises within the public system. Among the other non-need variables 
included in the analysis, education and region stand out as other important contributing 
factors. In almost all countries, the higher educated (which tend to be richer) also tend to 
be (much) more inclined to contact a specialist than the lower educated. Whether such 
medical consumption behaviour is ‘more appropriate’ is impossible to answer from this 
analysis, but it does mean that rich and poor do not get the same kind of treatment, 
given need. If it is the case that, given the same need, specialist visits represent higher 
quality treatment than GP visits, then the better-off are getting more out of their health 
care systems than the less well-off.
We conclude by reminding the reader of the limitations of our analysis. First of all, it 
only refers to differences in quantities of use, not qualities. We cannot but assume that 
“a visit is a visit” since we have no means of controlling for differences in the quality 
of doctor visits within or between countries. Adjusting for quality differences (e.g. by 
distinguishing public from private visits) might make the differentials larger or smaller. A 
similar remark applies to the appropriateness of care use. We had to assume that the 
average relationship observed in a country between reported morbidity and use is the 
norm for “appropriateness of care” and register systematic relative deviations from this 
norm. In practice, it is almost certain that there are differences between countries in 
the extent to which such as a norm is indeed “appropriate”. Finally, while the ECHP data 
offer some fascinating new options for cross-European comparisons by coupling rich 
information on socio-economic characteristics with information on health and health 
care use, it is still constrained in its coverage. In particular, the limited information on the 
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type and degree of insurance coverage and the type of health care use precludes a more 
detailed analysis of the public-private sector interactions in medical care utilisation. 
But keeping these limitations in mind, we find that in European countries, despite 
decades of universal and fairly comprehensive coverage, utilisation patterns suggest 
that rich and poor are not treated equally. At equal levels of need, the access to and 
use of specialist services is greater for higher income groups. Only in some countries, 
like Ireland, Spain or Belgium, this seems to be somewhat compensated by pro-poor 
patterns in the use of GP care. Unless this finding is a consequence of a deliberate policy 
to offer such groups private access options over and above their public entitlements, we 
cannot but conclude that — despite a long tradition of public intervention in health care 
— there is still some way to go before equals are treated equally in Europe.
153chapter 6 Appendix
Proof of equivalence of one-step and two-step estimator of horizontal inequity index in 
linear models.
Using a method of indirect standardisation, Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2000) define 
an index of horizontal inequity for utilisation (y) as in equation (6.6) as
 ) (  HI C C  C y  C y  C y  y WV M N  = - = - = -( )  ( ˆ  ˆ)   (6.A.1)
where ˆ y is need-predicted utilisation from regressing y on a vector of need variables x n.
Following Schokkaert and van de Voorde (2000), one could propose that, in order to use 
the partial effects of the need variables in the standardisation process, the estimated 
regression should also include a vector of non-need variables xp, but their effect should 
be ‘neutralized’ when generating the need predictions, e.g. by setting these equal to 
their mean values ( )x p . For example, if 
 y x  = +' '  x n p  +β ε α      (6.A.2)
and
 n py x  ˆ ' '  x PN = +β α      (6.A.3)
then a horizontal index defined on the basis of these partial need effects is 
 
HI C y  C y  PN PN = -( )  ( ˆ  )      (6.A.4)
Substituting (6.A.2) and (6.A.3.) in (6.A.4) gives
 x C  + -' )HI C x  x x  PN 
n p n p  = + +( '  ( ' ' )β ε α α β   (6.A.5)
Using the covariance definition of a CI (equation (6.1)) and additive separability of 
covariances
  ) (  HI C x  C x  C C  x C  xPN 
n p  n p  = + + - -( '  ) (  ' ) ( )  ( '  ' )  β ε α β α   (6.A.6)
Note that C x  p ( ' ) α = 0 because the covariance of a constant is zero, and this is true 
whatever fixed values for xp are used. So,
 = +HI C x  C PN 
p ( '  ) ( ) α ε     (6.A.7)
This expression is equivalent to the HI definition based on the decomposition methods 
in equation (6.8) (if income xr is included in the non-need vector xp). Note that the 
equivalence of both approaches relies on the linearity of equation (6.A.2) but not on the 
choice of the fixed values for xp.
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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to use the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 
to estimate the impact of having private health insurance coverage on the use of 
specialist visits in four European countries that have systems which allow supplementary 
coverage: Ireland, Italy, Portugal and the UK. The central questions are whether access 
to supplementary private insurance encourages greater utilisation and whether it 
contributes to horizontal inequity in the use of specialists. Empirical analysis of this 
issue is complicated by the fact that the decision to take out voluntary health insurance 
is an individual choice that is likely to be influenced by risk selection. We compare 
different estimators to correct for this cause of endogeneity. The empirical results show 
that the probability of having private insurance increases with income and with better 
reported health. Private insurance has a positive association with the probability of 
specialist visits in all countries although the magnitude of the effect is sensitive to the 
choice of method. These findings imply that private insurance contributes to ‘pro-rich’ 
horizontal inequity in the use of specialist visits.
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7.1 INTRODUCTION
Recently, a number of studies have reported that in many, if not all, European and OECD 
countries the probability of consulting a medical specialist is positively related to income, 
after controlling for differences in need for such services. Van Doorslaer, Koolman 
and Jones (2004) found a significant and substantial degree of pro-rich inequity in 
the probability of seeing a specialist for all European countries but did not explicitly 
examine the role and contribution of private insurance options in these countries. Van 
Doorslaer, Koolman and Puffer (2003) showed that the degree of such pro-rich inequity 
was reduced when access to private insurance was controlled for, indicating that private 
insurance has a pro-rich contribution to inequity. This was confirmed in a study by Van 
Doorslaer, Masseria et al (2004) who estimated significant pro-rich contributions of 
private insurance coverage when decomposing the degree of inequity in the probability 
of a specialist visit in France, Ireland, Switzerland and the UK. 
From a policy point of view, however, it is of critical importance to know whether, and 
to what extent, the contribution of insurance is due to selection effects or to a direct 
utilisation effect or both. If the observed effect of insurance were entirely due to self-
selection of those more likely to use specialists, then private insurance coverage merely 
acts as a marker for such propensity and reducing private insurance options will not 
reduce the pro-rich distribution of care. If, on the other hand, the association is mostly 
due to the effect of access to insurance on utilisation, then the expansion or reduction of 
private insurance options will have an impact on the degree to which care is distributed 
by income. Therefore, a central question becomes whether access to private insurance 
encourages greater utilisation or not. In general, insurance coverage may influence 
utilisation for a variety of reasons: 
•  A moral hazard effect; that the level of utilisation is greater when insurance 
  reduces the out-of-pocket price for health care (Pauly, 1968, Manning et al., 
  1987, Coulson et al., 1995, Chiappori et al., 1998). 
•  A risk reduction effect; that the desired level of utilisation is greater 
  under the financial certainty created by insurance than under uncertainty 
  (Meza, 1983, Vera-Hernández, 1999).
•  An income transfer effect; that insurance creates an ex post transfer of 
  income from the healthy to the ill and this may increase utilisation through an 
  income effect on the demand for medical care (Pauly, 1968, Nyman, 1999a, 
  Nyman and Maude-Griffin, 2001).
•   Another dimension of the income effect is the access effect; that insurance 
  may extend an individual’s opportunity set by giving access to health 
  care that would not otherwise be affordable to them. Nyman (1999b) has 
  argued that the pooling effect of insurance provides access to expensive 
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  medical technologies that would not be affordable out-of-pocket. In the context 
  of supplementary private insurance in European systems, private insurance 
  may provide access to a ‘quality’ of care that is not provided by the public 
  system, for example offering reduced waiting times for elective surgery (see 
  e.g., Jofre-Bonet, 2000). 
All of these factors may encourage greater utilisation and they will be referred to 
collectively as the insurance effect on utilisation. We are not able to distinguish between 
the four factors in our empirical analysis of the insurance effect, but the relevance 
of each factor will depend on the specific health care system under investigation. For 
example, in a system where private insurance provides supplementary cover alongside 
a universal public system - that offers a basic package of services that are free at the 
point of use - the access effect may be the prime reason for increased utilisation among 
those with private cover (see e.g., Shmueli, 2001). Indeed, a study by Harmon and Nolan 
(2001) for Ireland finds that the most important reasons quoted by respondents for 
buying private health insurance were “being sure of getting into hospital quicker when 
you needed treatment” and “being sure of getting consultant care”. So it is likely that the 
access effect will dominate in our analysis of supplementary insurance; the insurance 
will mainly reflect a demand for amenity and quality of care that can be purchased 
through private insurance. It is important to emphasise that our aim is to measure 
the effect of having, versus not having, private insurance. We do not have information 
on the choice of different insurance plans or on different levels of coverage, through 
deductibles and copayments. The potential for adverse selection of risks may be more 
relevant for analysis of plan choice and levels of coverage (see e.g. Gardiol et al., 
2005). 
Our aim is to estimate the impact of having private health insurance on the use of 
specialist visits in four European countries that have systems which allow supplementary 
coverage and that have suitable data for our empirical methods available in the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP): Ireland, Italy, Portugal and the UK.a This 
insurance can take the form of providing cover for services that are not available in 
the public system, including coverage for copayments charged in the public system. 
Mossialos and Thomson (2002) refer to this as ‘complementary’ insurance. Alternatively 
private insurance may supplement the public system by providing access to different 
services, such as increased amenities and reduced waiting time. Mossialos and 
Thomson (2002) refer to this as ‘supplementary’ insurance. As supplementary private 
insurance covers services that are also funded through the public system, this is 
sometimes known as ‘double coverage’ (see e.g., Vera-Hernández, 1999). Table 7.1 
provides a summary of the kind of private insurance available and the estimates of its 
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prevalence in each country. The table makes it clear that possession of private insurance 
may provide easier access to specialists in all of the countries under investigation. The 
demand for private insurance is likely to reflect factors that influence the demand for 
enhanced quality of care, which may include more immediate and responsive treatment, 
rather than a price effect of different levels of coverage.
Empirical analysis of international differences in the impact of private insurance on 
use of specialists is complicated by the fact that the decision to take out voluntary 
health insurance is an individual choice that is likely to be influenced by unobservable 
individual characteristics, such as the individual’s level of ‘risk’. This may give rise to 
adverse selection where those with higher risk are more likely to take out private health 
insurance and to make more use of health care (e.g. Van de Ven, 1987, Coulson et 
al., 1995, Ettner, 1997, Chiappori et al., 1998). It may also create an incentive for risk 
selection (or cream skimming) where private insurers attempt to attract good risks to 
their policies and to avoid bad risks (e.g. Coulson et al., 1995, Ettner, 1997). Shmueli 
(2001) provides empirical evidence of the offsetting effects of adverse selection and 
risk selection by insurers on the ownership of supplementary insurance in Israel: sicker 
individuals are more likely to apply for insurance but also more likely to be rejected, such 
that there are no health effects in the reduced form for ownership of supplementary 
insurance.
In the United States, the RAND Health Insurance Experiment took an experimental 
approach to deal with the problem of selection in plan choice, with participants 
Complementary Supplementary
Ireland Copayments for 
outpatient care
Care in private hospitals, 
consultants, private beds, some 
outpatient costs
42.0 43.8
Italy Hospital 
convalescence, 
outpatient costs
Upgraded hospital accommodation, 
free choice of doctor, diagnostic 
services/specialist visits
5.0 15.6
Portugal Cash benefits for hospital care, total 
coverage for other treatments, free 
choice of doctor or hospital
10.0 14.8
UK Dental care, 
alternative therapies
Upgraded hospital accommodation, 
cash benefits, private beds, care in 
private hospitals
11.5 10.0
Table 7.1 Coverage of complementary and supplementary private health insurance 
(sources: Mossialos and Thomson (2002) and Colombo & Tapay (2004))
% pop covered
Mossialos 
& Thomson 
(2002) 
Colombo & 
Tapay 
(2004)
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randomised to different insurance plans (Manning et al., 1987). Chiappori et al. (1998) 
were able to exploit a quasi- or natural experiment in which French insurees faced 
an exogenous change in levels of copayment. With the ECHP we have to rely on non-
experimental data and follow the general approaches for dealing with endogeneity of 
earlier studies (see e.g., Cameron et al., 1988; Coulson et al., 1995; Holly et al., 1998; 
Vera-Hernández, 1999; Schellhorn, 2001; and Buchmueller et al., 2004). 
The aim is to separate the insurance effect from the selection effect. The problem 
of distinguishing adverse selection from moral hazard in observational data is well 
known and presents a severe challenge, particularly with cross section data (see e.g., 
Chiappori, 2000; Geoffard, 2006). Our approach is to compare a variety of empirical 
methods for estimating casual effects in the presence of selection bias and see whether 
they provide robust estimates under different identifying assumptions. Our empirical 
strategy exploits the longitudinal data available in the ECHP and estimates the partial 
effect of ownership of private insurance on the probability of using specialist care by a 
variety of methods: a standard probit model, propensity score matching (PSM) and a 
recursive structural model for binary measures of health insurance and specialist visits 
estimated using full-information maximum likelihood (FIML).
7.2 ECONOMETRIC STRATEGIES 
Our empirical methods are based on binary variables for whether an individual (i) has 
private health insurance during year t (
it 
y 1 ) and whether they have visited a specialist 
at least once during the last year (
it 
y 2 ). To gain statistical power we pool the waves and 
compute robust standard errors allowing for clustering within individuals to take account 
of the repeated measurements on each individual. We compare estimators based on 
two different identification strategies: ‘selection on observables’ and ‘selection on 
unobservables’.
7.2.1 Simple probit model
Our baseline estimate is given by the partial effect of private health insurance in a simple 
probit model for at least one visit to the specialist. As well as insurance coverage, the 
model for any specialist visit conditions on a set of observable individual characteristics 
(x) including a constant equal to one which are described in more detail in Section 7.3 
below. So,
  γ β  = =(
2 1P it it it it it 
y x y x , ) ( )
1 1 + ' Φ y   (7.1)
where Ф(.) is the standard normal distribution function. The average partial effect (APE) 
of insurance on specialist visits (the ‘insurance effect’) is computed by taking the 
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sample mean of the partial effect (PE) for each individual observation. The partial effect 
is,
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Then the average partial effect (APE) is given by the mean across the sample 
observations,
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As well as reporting the average effect, the availability of individual-specific partial 
effects allows us to explore heterogeneity in the effect across individuals, for example, 
by displaying a histogram of the effects.
7.2.2 Propensity score matching (PSM)
Matching provides a more general approach to deal with selection on observables. 
It addresses the problem that in the observed data confounding factors (matching 
variables) are non-randomly distributed over the treated and control individuals. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that, rather than matching on an entire set 
of observable characteristics, the dimensions of the problem could be reduced by 
matching on the basis of their probability of receiving treatment, ( )P y x zit it it1 1= | , , 
known as the propensity score. In practice the estimators do not rely on exact matching 
and instead weight observations by their proximity, in terms of their propensity score.
We construct the propensity scores using a probit model for private and use predicted 
probability of treatment,
 = +Φ ( α' x       φ' x  it it P )  it     (7.4)
We match treated individuals with non-treated individuals inversely weighted for the 
distance in terms of propensities, { }  ˆ      ˆ P   P  it jt - . More precisely, weights are constructed 
using kernel smoothed distance weighting. The Epanechnikov kernel is used as it is 
computationally convenient and efficient. We ensure that all cases are supported by 
controls. The quality of the matching can be assessed by computing the reduction of the 
pseudo R-squareds of the insurance regression before and after matching (Table 7.A.2). 
To evaluate the extent to which matching on propensity scores balances the distribution 
of the x’s between the insured and the uninsured group, we computed the bias reduction 
due to matching for each of the x’s (Table 7.A.3). 
Following the matching we use the relative weights of the treated and controls to 
compute the insurance effect as the weighted mean difference in the probability of at 
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least one specialist visit between the two groups. It should be noted that an important 
requirement is that th«e participation model, used to construct the propensity score, 
should only include variables that are unaffected by participation, or the anticipation 
of participation (Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). This suggests that matching 
variables should be either time invariant characteristics or variables that are measured 
before participation in the treatment and that are not affected by anticipation of 
participation.
7.2.3 The FIML estimator
The approaches described above rely on the notion of selection on observables. In 
contrast, selection on unobservables, also termed informative, non-random or non-
ignorable selection, is familiar in the econometrics literature where the dominant 
approaches follow the instrumental variables and the sample selection or control 
function approaches (Heckman, 1976). These approaches typically rely on there being 
“instruments” (w) that are good predictors of the endogenous treatment and that 
satisfy an exclusion restriction: that they do not have a direct effect on the outcome of 
interest. 
Here we adopt a structural approach with full information maximum likelihood estimation, 
based on FIML estimates of a recursive bivariate probit model. The first issue in 
specifying a structural model for insurance and specialist visits is how to specify a 
coherent econometric model that allows for the potential endogeneity of insurance. A 
similar question is addressed by Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997), who use data 
from the 1991 British Health and Lifestyle Survey to investigate nonlinear simultaneous 
equations models for GP visits in which self-assessed health is treated as an endogenous 
binary regressor. They adopt Blundell and Smith’s (1993) framework, and compare type 
I and type II specifications. In the type II model, recorded health status is assumed to 
influence GP visits. In the type I model it is the latent health index that influences the 
number of visits. The coherency conditions for the type II model imply that the model 
is only logically consistent when it is specified as a recursive system. In other words, 
the type II specification can only be coherent when the endogeneity of self-assessed 
health stems from unobservable heterogeneity bias rather than classical simultaneous 
equations bias. 
In our application a type II specification makes more sense than a type I specification: 
we want to identify the impact of actually having private insurance on specialist visits 
rather than the impact of the propensity to have insurance. For this reason we adopt a 
recursive model in which insurance coverage during the year is assumed to influence the 
probability of a specialist visit during the subsequent year. This exploits the longitudinal 
data available in the ECHP. The chronology of events means that the use of specialist 
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visits cannot have a direct feedback effect on the decision to take out insurance in the 
previous year, thus ruling out simultaneity bias. Insurance may still be an endogenous 
regressor due to unobservable heterogeneity, such as an individual’s level of risk or risk 
aversion, that has a direct influence on both their decision to take out insurance and 
their use of health care in the subsequent wave. This unobservable heterogeneity can 
be captured by using a bivariate probit specification.
The bivariate probit model applies to a pair of binary dependent variables and allows 
for correlation between the corresponding error terms. In our application, the use of 
specialist visits is modelled as a recursive bivariate probit model (see e.g., Maddala, 
1983 p.123; Holly et al., 1998; Waters, 1999; Greene, 2000 p.852; Buchmueller et al., 
2004). The model consists of two latent variable equations for insurance and specialist 
visits:
 y *1 = it α' x  + η'w  + ε 1 it it it 
     
(7.5)
 y *2 = it γ y   + β'x  + ε2 it it 1 it      (7.6)
where, (ε1,ε2) ~ N(0, Ω) and yj = 1, if y*j > 0 and yj = 0 otherwise.
Our identification strategy relies on the fact that we are modelling sequential decisions: 
utilisation is a function of prior uptake of insurance which depends on lagged values of 
the regressors. Estimation of the model by FIML, taking account of the joint distribution 
of ε1 and ε2 deals with the endogeneity of y1 (see Holly et al., 1998, Greene, 2000 p.852). 
The log-likelihood for the model is,
 γ y   + β'x  ), d   d   ρ}α' x   + η'w     ( ), d  (g {
1 lo L 
t 
T 
i 
n 
it it it =
== 1 1 
Φ Σ Σ d 
 
2 
it 
1 
it it 
1 
it 
2 
it  (7.7)
  
where Φ[.] is the bivariate normal CDF, dj = 2yj –1 and ρ is the coefficient of correlation 
between ε1 and ε2. The asymptotic t-ratio for the estimate of ρ provides a test for 
exogeneity. The partial effects of insurance in this model can be computed from the 
marginal distribution for specialist visits, using the same formula as the univariate 
probit, but with the parameter estimates from the bivariate probit model.
Wilde (2000) shows that, given the full rank of the regressor matrix, it is only necessary 
to have varying exogenous regressors to avoid identification problems in this recursive 
bivariate probit model and exclusion restrictions are not required. This identification 
by functional form relies on the assumption of normality and it is common practice 
to impose additional exclusion restrictions to improve identification. In our model the 
regressors in the insurance equation are measured at the previous wave, while those in 
the utilisation equation are measured at the current wave: so identification relies on the 
timing of events. In addition, we add lagged information for each household on whether 
at least one individual’s employer provides free or subsidized health care or medical 
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insurance to the model for insurance coverage. According to Mossialos and Thomson 
(2002), group contracts now account for almost all voluntary health insurance policies in 
Portugal, well over two-thirds in Ireland and Italy and more than 50% of voluntary health 
insurance subscriptions in the UK. Previous studies have included the price of insurance 
as a predictor of choice of insurance (see e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 1991, p.18). Price 
cannot be measured directly in our data but institutional differences in access to private 
insurance, in particular whether the respondent’s employer offers access to insurance, 
provide a proxy for the cost of acquiring insurance.b 
7.3 DATA AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
The data used in this paper are taken from the European Community Household Panel 
User Database (ECHP-UDB). The ECHP was designed and coordinated by Eurostat, the 
European Statistical Office and is a standardised multi-purpose annual longitudinal 
survey carried out at the level of the European Union (see e.g., Peracchi, 2002). The 
survey is based on a standardised questionnaire that involves annual interviewing of a 
representative panel of households and individuals of 16 years and older in each of the 
participating EU member states. It covers a wide range of topics including demographics, 
income, social transfers, health, housing, education and employment. The first wave 
was conducted in 1994, Austria was added to the second wave in 1995, and Finland 
to the third in 1996. The analysis presented in this paper is based on information for 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and the UK for the first four waves, 1994-97, when insurance 
data are available. 
Our binary indicator of private insurance coverage is based on question PH013 which 
asks whether the respondent is covered by private medical insurance. Our measure 
equals 0 if they are not insured and 1 if they covered in their own name or through 
another family member at both the beginning and the end of the year in question.c 
Our binary indicator of specialist visits is based on question PH009 which asks for the 
number of times the person has consulted a specialist over the past 12 months.d
We have followed previous studies of the demand for health insurance (e.g., Propper, 
1989; Cameron and Trivedi, 1991; Rhine and Ng, 1998; Shmueli, 2001) and health 
care (e.g., Cameron et al., 1988; Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995; Hakkinen et al., 1996; 
Gerdtham, 1997; Vera-Hernández, 1999; Harmon and Nolan, 2001; Schellhorn, 2001; 
Buchmueller et al., 2004; Rodríguez and Stoyanova, 2004) in selecting a set of 
explanatory variables from the information available in the ECHP. The variables that are 
common to both the insurance and the specialist visits equation include the logarithm 
of equivalised household income, indicators of the respondent’s education, gender, age, 
activity, marital and health status. Health status is measured by self-assessed health, 
on a 5-point categorical scale from very bad to very good, and by whether and to what 
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degree the respondent is hampered in their daily activities by a physical or mental health 
problem, illness or disability. 
Our income measure is the log of disposable household income per equivalent adult, 
using the modified OECD equivalence scale. This scale gives a weight of 1.0 to the 
first adult, 0.5 to the second and each subsequent person aged 14 and over, and 0.3 
to each child aged under 4 in the household. Total household income includes all the 
net monetary income received by the household members during the reference year. 
It includes income from work (employment and self-employment), private income (from 
investments and property and private transfers to the household), pensions and other 
direct social transfers received. In the income measure available in the ECHP-UDB, no 
account has been taken of indirect social transfers (e.g. reimbursement of medical 
expenses), receipts in kind and imputed rent from owner-occupied accommodation. 
Education is measured by the highest level of general or higher education completed and 
is available at three levels: recognised third level education (ISCED 5-7), second stage 
of secondary level of education (ISCED 3) and less than second stage of secondary 
education (ISCED 0-2). The ECHP coding is based on the pre-1997 ISCED.
Table 7.2 presents sample sizes and descriptive statistics for some of the key variables. 
The ‘eligible sample’ size includes all eligible cases. The ‘analysis sample’ is the selection 
of the eligible cases without missing values for any of the variables used in any of 
the models. The means for current insurance coverage, and coverage throughout the 
past year - show that the proportion of people with private insurance coverage is fairly 
stable over the waves. The difference between current coverage and coverage over the 
whole year shows that - in Italy and Portugal– substantial proportions of respondents 
are reported as switching during the year. The highest penetration of private insurance is 
in Ireland and the lowest is in Italy. The prevalence of at least one specialist visit during 
the year is fairly similar on average, with Ireland lower (21% on average) than the other 
countries (31-37%). The final column shows that the prevalence of employer provided 
Table 7.2 Descriptive statistics for key variables
Ireland 14355 7714 0.21 0.48 0.44 0.23
Italy 34330 19016 0.37 0.06 0.03 0.20
Portugal 23327 13445 0.34 0.10 0.04 0.19
UK 6940 3332 0.31 0.22 0.17 0.36
Sample proportion with:
Eligible 
Sample
Analysis 
Sample
Private 
cover now
Private 
cover now 
and last 
year
Employer 
provided 
health 
benefits
Specialist 
visit last 
year
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health benefits to at least one household member, is higher — often much higher — than 
the prevalence of actual individual PI cover reported in all countries except Ireland. 
7.4  RESULTS
Before considering the regression results, some diagnostic tests are reported in the 
Appendix. Table 7.A.1 shows the pseudo R-squareds for the model we use to estimate 
the propensity scores before and after matching (the weighted model). Even though the 
pseudo R-squareds reduce dramatically when the cases are IP-weighted, the LR-based 
chi-squared test shows that the combination of variables remains significant in all 
countries but the UK. This imbalance can be studied in more detail by looking at the 
bias (unbalance) between the treated and the non-treated in the distribution of the 
covariates (definitions given in Table 7.A.2). Table 7.A.3 shows that the percentage bias 
reduction is often substantial, but varies considerably between the covariates and is 
frequently not close to 100%. As a result, residual confounding may remain an issue. 
The results for the insurance effect on utilization are presented as the average partial 
effect (APE) of private insurance coverage on the probability of a specialist visit, in 
Table 7.3. We also present the histograms of individual PE’s in Figure 7.1 to provide 
an indication of the individual heterogeneity in these effects and the shifts in their 
distributions across different estimators. We compare simple binary probit models for 
the probability of a specialist visit with propensity score matching weighted estimates 
and FIML estimates of the bivariate probit model. 
7.4.1 Insurance choice
All countries show a positive income effect on the probability of having private insurance 
and these estimates are highly statistically significant (see Tables A5 and A6).e This 
finding has implications for equity in the use of health care. In the health economics 
literature horizontal inequity in the use of health care has typically been measured 
by concentration indices (see e.g., Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2000, van Doorslaer, 
Koolman and Jones, 2004). Wagstaff et al. (2002) present methods for decomposing 
concentration indices to give the contribution of explanatory factors, such as health 
insurance. The contribution of a factor depends on the product of the elasticity of health 
care with respect to the factor and the concentration index for the factor itself. In turn, 
the sign of this concentration index depends on the covariance between the factor and 
an individual’s relative rank in the distribution of income. So, a positive elasticity of 
specialist visits with respect to insurance, coupled with a positive covariance between 
insurance and income rank, would imply that insurance contributes to ‘pro-rich’ inequity 
in the use of specialist visits. 
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Previous studies have tended to find only limited evidence of a relationship between 
observed health status and choice of supplemental private insurance and not to find 
support for the existence of adverse selection (e.g. Cameron et al., 1988, Cameron and 
Trivedi, 1991, Ettner, 1997, Hurd and McGarry, 1997, Vera-Hernández, 1999). This is 
borne out in our results. There are statistically significant effects of self-assessed health 
in Ireland and of being hampered by health problems for Italy, Portugal and Spain. But 
the striking thing about the estimated effects is that we find that, in general, those in 
poorer health are less likely to have insurance. This contradicts the notion of adverse 
selection effects, with respect to health indicators that are observed in the survey, which 
would suggest the opposite finding. Of course the existence of adverse selection would 
rely on these indicators of health being known to the respondent but not their insurer. 
The result may reflect the fact that selection of good risks by insurers (probably through 
employment) more than offsets adverse selection (Shmueli, 2001). The finding is also 
consistent with the notion that we are modelling the demand for amenity and quality of 
care provided by access to supplementary insurance, if this demand is higher among 
better-off and healthier individuals. Employer-offered health benefits, has a statistically 
significant positive effect on private insurance for all countries. When it was included in 
the specialist equation, it was never significant (not shown). 
7.4.2 Specialist visits
The full results for the specialist visits equations are given in Tables 7.A.4 and 7.A.5 
in the Appendix. Table 7.3 provides a summary or the estimated average partial effect 
(APE) of insurance on the probability of using a specialist. The first column of Table 
7.3 shows the (pooled) binary probit estimates of the partial effect of insurance on the 
probability of a specialist visit, which do not allow for the endogeneity of insurance. 
For ease of comparison, bootstrapped standard errors of the APEs were generated for 
all methods using identical bootstrap procedures. These procedures incorporate the 
entire estimation procedure, i.e. both the private insurance equation and the specialist 
Ireland 0.056 (5.17) 0.068 (5.71) 0.076 (2.51)
Italy 0.090 (4.06) 0.124 (4.38) 0.199 (1.80)
Portugal 0.072 (3.26) 0.041 (1.67) 0.283 (2.92)
UK 0.073 (3.38) 0.058 (2.18) 0.100 (1.54)
Table 7.3 Estimates of the average partial effect (APE) of insurance on the probability of 
visiting a specialist (t-values in parentheses based on bootstrapped standard errors)
Probit PSM FIML
170 chapter 7
visit equation when applicable. The bootstrapping itself entails 50 random draws with 
replacement (resamples) from the sample, where each resample has a size equal to the 
sample. The APE was computed for each of the resamples, and the distribution of the 
50 APEs was used to compute standard deviation. These standard deviations were then 
used to construct t-values. All countries show a significantly positive partial association 
between the ownership of private insurance and the probability of a specialist visit. The 
probability of visiting a specialist among those who report to have had private insurance 
cover both at the beginning and the end of last year is, on average, about 0.07 higher 
than among those without cover, with estimates ranging from 0.05 in Ireland to 0.09 in 
Italy.
When comparing propensity score matching (PSM) to the default probit results, we see 
that Ireland and Italy show stronger insurance effects and Portugal and the UK smaller 
effects. The full results for FIML are given in Table 7.A.5. The estimates of rho show 
that the null of exogeneity is only rejected for Portugal. However, for all countries, the 
bivariate probit model provides a higher estimate of the insurance effect than the probit. 
The increase in the insurance effect is more important in Italy and Portugal than in 
the UK and Ireland. The estimates for Portugal in particular suggest that, because 
of positive selection, the unadjusted insurance effect underestimates the utilisation 
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Figure 7.1 Histograms of individual partial effects (PE’s) of insurance on the probability of 
visiting a specialist for probit and FIML estimates
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effect occurring as a result of private insurance coverage. This positive selection (on 
unobservables) could be the result of occupational choice or – what is more likely – 
be a consequence of cream-skimming by insurers through the employment-tied group 
insurance purchases. While, on average, the insured are lower risk, once they are 
insured they do seem to exploit their additional coverage through increased use of 
specialist care. 
7.5  CONCLUSION
In this paper we have used the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to 
estimate the impact of private health insurance coverage on the use of specialist visits 
in four European countries that allow for supplementary private insurance coverage: 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and the UK. The evidence suggests that the probability of having 
private insurance increases with income and, to some extent, with better health. For 
all countries there is a positive insurance effect on the use of specialists. The fact that 
the probability of having private insurance increases with income, coupled with the fact 
that having private insurance increases the probability of seeing a specialist means that 
private insurance contributes to ‘pro-rich’ inequality in the use of specialists. 
For policy purposes, however, it is of relevance to know to what extent this insurance 
effect is a result of selection, and to what extent it represents a genuine utilisation 
effect of additional cover. If it is entirely driven by selection, changing the availability of 
private insurance coverage will not alter the degree to which the use of specialists is 
related to income. If, on the other hand, the insurance effect is mostly a direct effect 
on utilisation, then expansion or reduction of access to private insurance (through tax 
or other incentives) will have an effect on the distribution of specialist care by income. 
Our findings suggest that expansion or reduction of private insurance will, through its 
effects on utilisation, have an important effect on the degree to which specialist care 
gets distributed by income. The results also appear consistent with the observation that 
private insurance is often obtained as a (group) fringe benefit in certain employment 
contracts. While, for insurers, this may result in cream-skimming, our analysis does 
show that, once insured, the beneficiaries are more likely to consult a medical specialist 
than they would have done in the absence of such coverage. As a result, our findings 
suggest that the presence of supplementary private coverage has consequences for the 
degree of horizontal inequity in the use specialist visits. Private insurance is not simply 
a marker of a higher propensity to consume specialist care but induces additional use 
over and above what would be used in the absence of such cover. 
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Notes 
a Empirical analysis (e.g. Spain).
b Vera-Hernández (1999) uses measures of social class and occupation as instruments for insurance 
 choice. In his analysis of Swiss data Schellhorn (2001) uses measures of the availability of supplementary
 insurance cover and of differences in premium levels between cantons as instruments. Buchmueller 
 et al. (2004) use an indicator for public employees along with measures of labour market and 
 occupational status.
c There was an important change in the wording of this question between wave 1 in 1994 – Are you 
 medically insured, either in your own name or through another family member? – and wave 2 in 1995 
 – Are you (also) covered by private medical insurance, whether in your own name or through another 
 family member? 
d Information is available in the ECHP on the total number of visits to a specialist during the year. Our 
 binary measure can be thought of as the first part of a ‘two-part’ model of utilisation. Van Doorslaer 
 et al. (2004) estimate reduced form versions of a two-part model for specialist visits, that do not include 
 a measure of private insurance. They find that most of the pro-rich inequity in the use of specialists is 
 attributable to the probability of contact rather than the number of visits.
e The full results for all of the equations and each country are presented in the Appendix. This paragraph 
 refers in particular to the insurance equation in the FIML estimates.
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Variable name Definition
specialist 1 if visited a specialist, 0 otherwise
private insurance 1 if privately insured, 0 otherwise
age2635 1 if age between 26 and 36, 0 otherwise
age3645 1 if age between 36 and 46, 0 otherwise
age4655 1 if age between 46 and 56, 0 otherwise
age5665 1 if age between 56 and 66, 0 otherwise
age66plus 1 if age older than 66, 0 otherwise
male 1 if male, 0 if female
sahgood 1 if self assessed health is good, 0 otherwise
sahfair 1 if self assessed health is fair, 0 otherwise
sahbad 1 if self assessed health is bad, 0 otherwise
sahvbad 1 if self assessed health is very bad, 0 otherwise
hampsome 1 if hampered to some extend, 0 otherwise
hampsev 1 if severely hampered, 0 otherwise 
selfemploy 1 if self employed, 0 otherwise
student 1 if student, 0 otherwise
unemployed 1 if unemployed or inactive, 0 otherwise
retired 1 if retired, 0 otherwise
housework 1 if housekeeping, 0 otherwise
separated 1 if separated, 0 otherwise
divorced 1 if divorced, 0 otherwise
widowed 1 if widowed, 0 otherwise
never married 1 if never married, 0 otherwise
ln(income) log modified OECD equivalised household income
secondary educ 1 if second stage of secondary education, 0 otherwise
tertiary educ 1 if tertiary education, 0 otherwise
employer benefit 1 if employer provided health care benefits to household member, 0 otherwise
{variablename}L value of variable of preceding year
Table 7.A.2 Definitions of variables
Table 7.A.1 Summary PSM Balancing test
Pseudo R2 Chis2 p>chi2
Ireland 0.251 2658.8 0.000
0.007 75.9 0.000
Italy 0.138 645.5 0.000
0.031 805.3 0.000
Portugal 0.123 503.8 0.000
0.027 497.9 0.000
UK 0.127 386.6 0.000
0.002 8.3 0.998
Diagnostic and regression results by country
174 chapter 7 Appendix
Ta
bl
e 
7
.A
.3
 P
SM
 B
al
an
ci
ng
 te
st
%
 b
ia
s
%
 b
ia
s 
re
du
ct
io
n
%
 b
ia
s
%
 b
ia
s 
re
du
ct
io
n
%
 b
ia
s
%
 b
ia
s 
re
du
ct
io
n
%
 b
ia
s
%
 b
ia
s 
re
du
ct
io
n
ag
e2
6
3
5
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-7
3
.4
7
.8
-8
.4
M
at
ch
ed
-2
.1
7
0
.4
3
1
1
.7
3
.6
5
3
.6
0
.1
9
8
.8
ag
e3
6
4
5
U
nm
at
ch
ed
2
0
.6
2
9
.8
2
5
.4
1
2
.3
M
at
ch
ed
2
.6
8
7
.3
1
0
6
6
.6
7
.5
7
0
.6
-2
.2
8
2
ag
e4
6
5
5
U
nm
at
ch
ed
2
1
.4
1
.1
-0
.9
1
2
.4
M
at
ch
ed
0
.9
9
5
.9
1
.8
-6
5
.9
-1
.4
-4
4
.8
2
.3
8
1
.9
ag
e5
6
6
5
U
nm
at
ch
ed
4
.2
0
.2
-1
6
.7
5
.5
M
at
ch
ed
3
.6
1
3
.5
-1
.4
-6
2
7
.1
-5
.9
6
4
.8
1
.5
7
3
ag
e6
6
pl
us
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-1
3
.4
-8
.5
-3
0
.7
-8
.5
M
at
ch
ed
4
.4
6
7
.2
-2
.7
6
8
-1
1
.9
6
1
.3
1
.3
8
5
m
al
e
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-6
.3
2
8
.9
2
1
7
.9
M
at
ch
ed
-1
0
.2
-6
3
1
0
.8
6
2
.6
8
.3
6
0
.8
-0
.2
9
7
.5
sa
hg
oo
d
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-3
.3
8
.4
1
4
.8
3
.7
M
at
ch
ed
0
.3
9
2
.3
1
.9
7
7
.6
5
.4
6
3
.4
-0
.7
8
0
.7
sa
hf
ai
r
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-1
3
.7
-8
1
-1
6
.8
M
at
ch
ed
-0
.5
9
6
.7
-2
.7
6
5
.9
0
.5
5
1
.5
-0
.1
9
9
.7
sa
hb
ad
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-1
4
.1
-1
3
.7
-2
3
.7
-1
5
.5
M
at
ch
ed
-1
.2
9
1
.4
-5
.6
5
9
.2
-8
.8
6
2
.9
0
.1
9
9
.1
sa
hv
ba
d
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-5
.1
-2
.7
-7
.1
N
A
M
at
ch
ed
1
.7
6
6
.1
-0
.9
6
7
.6
-2
.4
6
5
.6
N
A
N
A
ha
m
ps
om
e
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-1
1
-5
-6
.8
-6
.1
M
at
ch
ed
0
.4
9
6
-2
.1
5
8
.7
-1
.3
8
0
.3
1
.1
8
2
.4
ha
m
ps
ev
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-1
0
.2
-4
.8
-1
5
.6
-1
4
.8
M
at
ch
ed
-0
.7
9
3
-2
5
8
-6
.3
5
9
.6
-0
.3
9
7
.7
Ire
la
nd
Ita
ly
Po
rt
ug
al
U
K
175chapter 7 Appendix
Ta
bl
e 
7
.A
.3
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 P
SM
 B
al
an
ci
ng
 te
st
%
 b
ia
s
%
 b
ia
s 
re
du
ct
io
n
%
 b
ia
s
%
 b
ia
s 
re
du
ct
io
n
%
 b
ia
s
%
 b
ia
s 
re
du
ct
io
n
%
 b
ia
s
%
 b
ia
s 
re
du
ct
io
n
se
lfe
m
pl
oy
ed
U
nm
at
ch
ed
6
5
3
.3
-1
2
.4
-3
M
at
ch
ed
-8
.9
-4
8
.4
1
4
.2
7
3
.3
-4
6
8
.2
0
.2
9
3
st
ud
en
t
U
nm
at
ch
ed
0
.6
-2
4
.3
2
.7
-1
7
.1
M
at
ch
ed
-4
.8
-7
6
4
.3
-9
.3
6
1
.7
2
.9
-8
.9
-1
.1
9
3
.5
un
em
pl
oy
ed
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-3
5
.3
-3
0
.1
-2
7
.2
-1
9
.3
M
at
ch
ed
-1
9
7
.2
-1
2
.9
5
7
.1
-1
0
.5
6
1
.2
-0
.2
9
8
.7
re
tir
ed
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-1
.1
-8
.7
-2
8
.8
-6
.9
M
at
ch
ed
4
.8
-3
5
2
.2
-1
.7
8
0
.9
-1
1
.2
6
1
.1
-1
.6
7
7
.5
ho
us
ew
or
k
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-1
1
.1
-3
3
.3
-3
1
.1
-2
.6
M
at
ch
ed
9
.7
1
2
.8
-1
2
.6
6
2
.3
-1
2
.8
5
9
4
-5
3
.3
se
pa
ra
te
d
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-6
.7
5
.2
2
.3
-1
2
.1
M
at
ch
ed
2
.1
6
8
.2
1
.2
7
7
.6
2
.3
1
.9
-0
.5
9
5
.7
di
vo
rc
ed
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-5
.2
6
5
.6
-1
1
.7
M
at
ch
ed
0
.3
9
3
.5
0
.8
8
6
.5
-0
.2
9
6
.5
-1
.5
8
6
.8
w
id
ow
ed
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-1
4
.3
-9
-2
6
.7
-1
7
.1
M
at
ch
ed
-0
.2
9
8
.8
-3
.2
6
4
.5
-1
0
.4
6
1
.1
-0
.9
9
5
ne
ve
r m
ar
rie
d
U
nm
at
ch
ed
-4
1
.2
-3
2
.1
-1
4
.3
-2
1
M
at
ch
ed
-1
0
.3
7
4
.9
-1
3
5
9
.6
-4
.7
6
7
.4
-6
.3
7
0
ln
(in
co
m
e)
U
nm
at
ch
ed
8
3
.6
7
9
.2
7
6
.3
7
0
.8
M
at
ch
ed
-0
.4
9
9
.5
3
0
.1
6
2
2
3
.5
6
9
.1
0
.8
9
8
.9
se
co
nd
ar
y 
ed
uc
U
nm
at
ch
ed
2
1
.5
3
0
.9
1
9
.7
2
.8
M
at
ch
ed
-1
.7
9
2
.2
1
4
.4
5
3
.4
1
0
.6
4
6
.4
0
.6
7
6
.8
te
rt
ia
ry
 e
du
c
U
nm
at
ch
ed
5
6
.7
3
3
5
5
.6
3
9
.1
M
at
ch
ed
0
.9
9
8
.4
8
.5
7
4
.2
4
.8
9
1
.5
0
.9
9
7
.6
Ire
la
nd
Ita
ly
Po
rt
ug
al
U
K
176 chapter 7 Appendix
Table 7.A.4 Specialist contact probit regression coefficients
coeff t-value coeff t-value coeff t-value coeff t-value
private insurance 0.218 5.40 0.257 4.31 0.217 3.39 0.222 3.43
age2635 -0.051 -0.75 -0.087 -2.25 0.025 0.56 -0.204 -2.02
age3645 -0.187 -2.44 -0.151 -3.38 0.046 0.94 -0.286 -2.65
age4655 -0.157 -1.98 -0.137 -2.98 0.019 0.37 -0.270 -2.39
age5665 -0.241 -2.72 -0.147 -2.76 -0.092 -1.60 -0.155 -1.23
age66plus -0.441 -3.68 -0.253 -3.44 -0.167 -2.30 -0.220 -1.15
male -0.245 -6.01 -0.456 -20.77 -0.470 -18.39 -0.237 -4.66
sahgood 0.327 8.50 0.308 11.17 0.382 4.80 0.239 4.30
sahfair 0.944 15.70 0.596 18.44 0.746 9.04 0.662 9.13
sahbad 1,267 9.58 1,286 20.45 1,012 10.93 0.872 5.35
sahvbad 1,309 5.19 1,251 6.65 1,231 9.98 NA NA
hampsome 0.616 9.77 0.508 9.93 0.417 9.51 0.523 6.88
hampsev 0.352 2.95 0.466 5.12 0.467 7.57 1,110 6.61
selfemployed -0.021 -0.32 -0.054 -1.37 -0.028 -0.66 -0.165 -1.61
student -0.092 -0.84 0.082 1.79 0.022 0.36 0.171 0.89
unemployed 0.017 0.22 -0.032 -0.78 0.054 1.20 0.061 0.47
retired 0.313 3.17 0.097 2.16 0.161 2.93 -0.016 -0.12
housework -0.052 -0.94 -0.002 -0.05 -0.016 -0.36 0.005 0.06
separated -0.136 -0.97 -0.140 -1.54 -0.101 -0.95 -0.449 -1.86
divorced -0.642 -1.01 0.083 0.71 -0.037 -0.42 0.072 0.75
widowed -0.310 -2.98 -0.133 -2.11 -0.228 -4.13 -0.448 -2.57
never married -0.220 -3.91 -0.318 -9.84 -0.217 -5.62 -0.200 -2.55
ln(income) 0.133 4.22 0.176 10.76 0.288 14.62 0.189 4.36
secondary educ 0.034 0.84 0.173 7.82 0.238 6.04 0.053 0.94
tertiary educ 0.117 2.09 0.213 5.46 0.409 6.83 0.156 2.36
_cons -2,053 -7.91 -1,992 -13.03 -4.598 -16.93 -2,207 -6.02
Ireland Italy Portugal UK
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Table 7.A.5 FIML regression coefficients
coeff t-value coeff t-value coeff t-value coeff
specialist
private insurance 0.294 2.18 0.561 1.76 0.826 2.97 0.303 1.68
age2635 -0.049 -0.67 -0.087 -2.09 0.034 0.71 -0.204 -2.00
age3645 -0.197 -2.34 -0.154 -3.18 0.047 0.90 -0.290 -2.65
age4655 -0.169 -1.95 -0.137 -2.74 0.032 0.58 -0.274 -2.40
age5665 -0.248 -2.61 -0.147 -2.56 -0.073 -1.16 -0.157 -1.24
age66plus -0.442 -3.19 -0.252 -3.05 -0.145 -1.77 -0.222 -1.10
male -0.242 -5.44 -0.459 -19.00 -0.476 -16.68 -0.238 -4.65
sahgood 0.328 8.39 0.308 10.90 0.380 4.86 0.239 4.31
sahfair 0.946 14.79 0.595 17.50 0.743 9.06 0.663 9.16
sahbad 1,269 9.38 1,286 19.60 1,006 10.71 0.874 5.40
sahvbad 1,311 5.39 1,249 6.61 1,227 9.46
hampsome 0.617 8.99 0.507 9.41 0.411 8.69 0.523 6.79
hampsev 0.353 2.80 0.465 4.86 0.462 6.98 1,113 6.84
selfemployed -0.024 -0.34 -0.073 -1.60 -0.023 -0.50 -0.163 -1.60
student -0.110 -0.96 0.081 1.65 0.021 0.33 0.167 0.87
unemployed 0.020 0.26 -0.033 -0.77 0.057 1.17 0.061 0.50
retired 0.310 2.73 0.099 2.02 0.167 2.71 -0.015 -0.11
housework -0.050 -0.83 -0.002 -0.05 -0.011 -0.21 0.002 0.03
separated -0.119 -0.76 -0.139 -1.51 -0.098 -0.81 -0.442 -1.89
divorced -0.623 -1.34 0.077 0.57 -0.031 -0.30 0.081 0.86
widowed -0.297 -2.28 -0.132 -1.81 -0.225 -3.54 -0.438 -2.33
never married -0.207 -3.18 -0.313 -8.80 -0.201 -4.84 -0.194 -2.41
ln(income) 0.117 2.78 0.170 9.01 0.272 11.53 0.179 3.72
secondary educ 0.019 0.37 0.168 6.69 0.228 5.14 0.049 0.85
tertiary educ 0.089 1.17 0.203 4.51 0.336 4.70 0.148 2.17
_cons -1,946 -5.98 -1,938 -11.14 -4,410 -13.89 -2,134 -5.31
t-value
Ireland Italy Portugal UK
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Table 7.A.5 (continued) FIML regression coefficients
coeff t-value coeff t-value coeff t-value coeff t-value
private insurance
age2635 -0.111 -1.27 0.150 1.19 -0.253 -2.89 0.223 1.48
age3645 0.454 4.59 0.299 2.20 -0.134 -1.45 0.498 3.27
age4655 0.624 6.09 0.173 1.23 -0.330 -3.11 0.506 3.20
age5665 0.429 3.83 0.217 1.39 -0.436 -3.64 0.518 2.98
age66plus 0.150 1.01 0.171 0.83 -0.723 -3.40 0.592 2.25
male -0.106 -2.07 0.165 2.86 0.153 2.83 0.026 0.42
sahgoodL -0.057 -1.43 -0.097 -1.52 0.147 1.41 0.001 0.02
sahfairL -0.149 -2.04 -0.044 -0.55 0.141 1.20 -0.208 -2.05
sahbadL -0.354 -2.12 -0.458 -2.31 0.003 0.02 -0.423 -1.57
sahvbadL -0.370 -1.21 -0.099 -0.29 -0.288 -0.82
hampsomeL -0.009 -0.11 0.203 1.76 0.235 2.21 0.003 0.03
hampsevL 0.015 0.09 0.112 0.49 0.285 1.90 -0.182 -0.70
selfemployedL 0.276 3.43 0.796 11.47 -0.177 -1.66 0.101 0.80
studentL 1,160 10.44 0.004 0.02 0.002 0.01 0.464 1.88
unemployedL -0.587 -5.08 -0.183 -1.33 -0.294 -2.49 -0.465 -1.37
retiredL 0.145 1.19 -0.202 -1.57 -0.280 -1.65 0.169 0.86
houseworkL -0.070 -1.06 -0.124 -1.17 -0.440 -2.80 0.175 1.68
separatedL -0.858 -5.29 -0.137 -0.70 0.018 0.08 -0.554 -1.93
divorcedL -0.728 -1.51 0.210 0.94 -0.005 -0.03 -0.588 -4.70
widowedL -0.613 -4.42 -0.028 -0.14 -0.275 -1.47 -0.865 -2.80
never marriedL -0.588 -8.17 -0.180 -2.30 -0.339 -4.34 -0.295 -3.07
ln(income)L 0.842 20.38 0.464 9.28 0.336 7.85 0.561 10.43
secondary educL 0.629 12.80 0.310 5.23 0.090 1.19 0.248 3.34
tertiary educL 1,075 14.99 0.367 4.12 0.446 4.85 0.385 4.80
employer benefit 0.437 9.62 0.320 6.54 0.594 11.12 0.945 16.08
_cons -7,571 -21.85 -6,674 -14.11 -6,292 -11.20 -6,760 -14.60
-0.048 0.56 -0.144 0.33 -0.298 0.03 -0.052 0.63
rho 
(e1,e2)
Prob > 
chi2
rho 
(e1,e2)
Prob > 
chi2
Ireland Italy Portugal UK
rho 
(e1,e2)
Prob > 
chi2
rho 
(e1,e2)
Prob > 
chi2
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Table 7.A.6 Private insurance probit regression coefficients
coeff t-value coeff t-value coeff t-value coeff t-value
age2635 -0.123 -1.88 0.168 1.64 -0.212 -2.58 0.017 0.12
age3645 0.446 6.14 0.351 3.21 -0.070 -0.81 0.247 1.77
age4655 0.594 7.86 0.224 1.97 -0.304 -3.23 0.206 1.42
age5665 0.397 4.72 0.241 1.89 -0.466 -4.11 0.144 0.91
age66plus 0.082 0.70 0.165 0.93 -0.710 -3.75 0.194 0.80
male -0.085 -2.16 0.170 3.66 0.192 4.03 0.054 0.92
sahgood -0.107 -2.95 -0.078 -1.42 0.268 2.03 -0.011 -0.18
sahfair -0.247 -3.90 -0.155 -2.30 0.409 2.95 -0.201 -2.21
sahbad -0.513 -3.35 -0.324 -2.12 0.312 1.79 -0.281 -1.19
sahvbad -0.309 -1.00 -0.059 -0.13 0.565 2.16
hampsome 0.070 1.00 0.111 0.97 0.079 0.85 -0.018 -0.19
hampsev 0.176 1.29 0.146 0.69 0.075 0.49 -0.179 -0.78
selfemployed 0.100 1.69 0.691 12.04 -0.234 -2.70 -0.139 -1.23
student 1,162 12.49 0.070 0.56 0.071 0.67 -0.656 -1.50
unemployed -0.555 -6.06 -0.110 -0.88 -0.434 -3.57 -0.416 -2.08
retired 0.091 0.91 -0.051 -0.50 -0.366 -2.54 -0.133 -0.84
housework -0.088 -1.63 -0.079 -0.89 -0.372 -2.91 0.112 1.09
separated -0.934 -6.39 -0.193 -1.13 0.010 0.05 -0.892 -2.47
divorced -1,873 -2.62 0.017 0.09 -0.055 -0.37 -0.557 -4.55
widowed -0.598 -5.83 -0.154 -0.95 -0.450 -2.21 -0.997 -3.42
never married -0.612 -11.47 -0.204 -3.15 -0.293 -4.11 -0.411 -4.50
ln(income) 0.831 26.47 0.501 13.11 0.410 10.52 0.658 12.80
secondary educ 0.596 15.85 0.307 6.29 0.110 1.67 0.287 4.13
tertiary educ 1,047 19.50 0.346 5.09 0.529 6.66 0.346 4.61
_cons -7,362 -27.96 -6,970 -18.96 -7,348 -13.60 -6,881 -15.29
Ireland Italy Portugal UK
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8.1 INTRODUCTION
Health and health care inequities have been studied for many years. While many 
methodological advances have been made in the past, state-of-the-art advances 
may still be incapable of accurately capturing societal notions of justice or societal 
preferences. That is because societal notions of justice or societal preferences are not 
clear or even stable across a span of countries, or within countries (Gakidou, Murray et 
al. 2003). As a consequence methods to measure inequalities require assumptions that 
may or may not be supported by society. In fact, as time progresses, researchers may 
develop a better understanding of the properties that underlie popular measures, and 
thus the assumptions implied by such measures (Wagstaff 2002; Bleichrodt and Van 
Doorslaer 2005 and chapter 2 and 3). This thesis builds upon the body of work relating 
to the measurement of income as related to health and also health care inequity and 
aims to extend the frontier of measurement methods.
This thesis also adds to earlier work on international variations in the size of inequalities 
in health and health care (Van Doorslaer and Wagstaff 1992; Mackenbach, Kunst 
et al. 1997; Van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al. 1997; Cavelaars, Kunst et al. 1998; Van 
Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al. 2000; WHO 2000). These studies often used data from 
different sources and consequently suffered from lack of comparability. This study is 
based on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which was designed to 
maximize comparability. 
It extends previous comparative studies by decomposing the variation as measured 
by the concentration index. The decompositions allow a better understanding of the 
underlying patterns of socio-economic inequality in health and health care. Special 
attention is given to health-related drop-outs that may affect the health income 
association and to private health care insurance as a cause of income-related inequity 
in health care.
8.2 MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERPRETATION AND METHODS
8.2.1 A redistribution interpretation of the concentration index
Prior to this thesis several studies showed that complex measures of health  and health 
care variation – such as the concentration index or the relative index of inequality - 
had attractive properties (Wagstaff, Paci et al. 1991; Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer et al. 
1991; Mackenbach and Kunst 1997), but suffered from their complex interpretation 
(Mackenbach and Kunst 1997). For the unstandardised (standardised) concentration 
index it was known it was bounded between -1 and +1 (-2 and +2), but it remained 
difficult to interpret the extent of the inequality. The complex interpretation became 
more problematic when we computed inequality indices based on health rather than ill-
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health and the standardised concentration index reduced almost tenfold. Even though 
statistical significance remained similarly strong, concentration indexes of about 0.003 
(Van Doorslaer and Koolman 2000) raised questions about the ethical relevance of the 
observed variation.
Chapter two facilitates interpretation of the concept of a concentration index by adding a 
new redistribution interpretation. It reveals the percentage of the total amount of health 
or health care that needs redistributing from rich to poor (or vice versa) to achieve a 
concentration index equal to zero. The total percentage to redistribute is approximately 
75 times the concentration index. In other words, given that the health concentration 
index for the Netherlands in 1996 was equal to 0.0034 (chapter four), it would have 
to redistribute 0.25 percent of health in order to obtain a concentration index equal to 
zero. 
While the redistribution results in a concentration index that equals zero, the post 
redistribution concentration curve may not lie on the diagonal. It is possible that post 
redistribution income-related health inequality remains in some parts of the income 
distribution, which will always offset each other. 
8.2.2 Relationship concentration index and relative index of inequality
The concentration index and Pamuk’s relative index of inequality have been shown 
to be related through a multiplication by a factor with a probability limit of 1/6 for 
large samples, resulting in the approximate equality: concentration index ≈ 1/6 relative 
index of inequality (Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer et al. 1991). As a consequence they were 
assumed to share the same properties when based upon large samples. However, the 
current the relative index of inequality is often not based on the concept introduced by 
(Pamuk 1985). Chapter three shows that due to a redefinition of the relative index of 
inequality by (Mackenbach and Kunst 1997) - one that more resembled relative risk - the 
relationship between the two becomes much more complex. Comparability is hampered 
further by the common practice of basing the relative index of inequality on an odds-ratio 
when the outcome variable has a categorical nature (Huisman, Kunst et al. 2003). 
8.2.3 Prevalence proportion ratio based relative index of inequality
Odds-ratios lack an intuitive interpretation when the prevalence of the health state 
under study is higher than a few percent. Chapter three proposes a novel method to 
compute the relative index of inequality on a prevalence proportion ratio rather than 
an odds-ratio, irrespective of the type of outcome variable and thus statistical model 
used. This new procedure allows researchers to compute the concepts suggested in 
demographic and epidemiologic research (Pamuk 1985; Mackenbach and Kunst 1997) 
rather than its (odds-ratio based) approximation. It shows that the relative index of 
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inequality based on a prevalence proportion ratio may lead to very different results from 
an approach based on odds-ratios. The new method results in a different ranking of the 
compared countries. The differences are especially great when prevalences are much 
higher than a few percent. This is frequently the case in health inequality research. 
8.2.4 Statistical inference
Statistical inference on concentration indices was based often computed using the 
convenient linear regression suggested by (Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer et al. 1991). 
However, in practice the relationship between rank of income and health or health care 
may not be linear, and thus the expected value of the error term may depend upon the 
rank, causing a rank-related serial correlation. A correction for serial correlation was 
presented by (Kakwani, Wagstaff et al. 1997). Another cause for the biased estimation 
of the standard errors follows from the variation in both health and health care which 
is often related to rank of income, leading to heteroscedasticity. Chapter two suggests 
a solution to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the form of Newey-West 
standard errors. However, this approach does not correct the inherent underestimation 
of the standard errors that was due to the use of predicted quantities to construct the 
dependent variable of the convenient regression equation. These predicted quantities 
suppressed the variability of the constructed dependent variable. The suppressed 
variability is particularly problematic when the convenient regression is used to construct 
standard errors around the contributions estimated in a decomposition exercise. 
Moreover, the Newey-West standard errors failed to correct the effect of popular 
complex sampling frames (such as stratified multi-stage sampling) on standard errors. 
We therefore use bootstrap techniques to compute the t-statistics (see chapter four 
and six). These resampling techniques allow for a simultaneous correction for serial 
correlation, heteroscedasticity, a complex sampling frame, and suppressed variability on 
dependent variable. 
8.2.5 Decomposing income-related health inequalities 
(Wagstaff, Van Doorslaer et al. 2003) created a useful tool when they introduced a 
decomposition of concentration index into the contribution of factors. The contributions 
allow for a further decomposition in health elasticities and concentration indices of the 
explanatory variables. Chapter applies of the decomposition technique in combination 
with an interval scale outcome variable, where the interval values are assumed to have 
ratio scale properties. It is also applies of the decomposition to explain differences in 
health inequality in European countries. This chapter also applies bootstrap techniques 
to compute the t-statistics for each of the contributions.
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Results of chapter four are based on the third wave of a panel. Panels could suffer 
from informative non-response and attrition. In chapter five we evaluated whether non 
response was related to health using the full eight waves of the ECHP. Descriptive 
evidence shows that there is health-related non-response in the data, with those in very 
poor initial health more likely to drop out, and variable addition tests provide evidence 
of non-response bias in the panel data models of SAH. We both test and correct for non-
response in empirical models with the impact of socioeconomic status on self-assessed 
health. Nevertheless a comparison of estimates - based on the balanced sample, the 
unbalanced sample and corrected for non-response using inverse probability weights – 
shows that, on the whole, there are no substantive differences in the average partial 
effects of the variables of interest. Similar findings have been reported concerning the 
limited influence of non-response bias in models of various labour market outcomes.
Chapter six is similar to chapter four in that it employs the decomposition method 
to the concentration index of health care inequality. However, because health care 
utilisation is modelled using non-linear model, and the decomposition is based upon the 
decomposition of a linear function of determinants of health care, we could not apply 
the standard decomposition technique. For that reason we present a new approach 
based on the average partial effects of all factors concerning the utilisation of health 
care estimated from non-linear models. These average partial effects depend on the 
distribution of all other factors in the model, which explains why they cannot be 
aggregated without creating an approximation error. This error depends on the extent 
of the non-linearity and thus the extent of interaction of the factors in predicting the 
outcome. Since the contributions are based on average partial effects the summation 
of contributions is also sensitive to approximation errors. The extent of these errors may 
render the summation – and, consequently, the decomposition – to be inadequate. 
However, approximation errors do not affect individual factor contributions when all 
other factors are held constant. These contributions can be further decomposed into 
their average partial effect on health care, their distribution by income, and their average 
level. Furthermore, we decompose the overall inequity in physician visits into the 
inequity of general practitioner (GP) visits and the inequity in specialist visits. A further 
decomposition allows a look into inequality in the probability of visiting a specialist at 
least once, and the number of visits conditional on at least one visit. This decomposition 
provides new insights and is also used in a follow up paper by (Van Doorslaer, Masseria 
et al. 2006).
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8.3 NEW CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE IN HEALTH AND 
 HEALTH CARE  INEQUALITY
8.3.1 Income-related inequality in health 
We present income-related differences in less than good self-assessed health for the 
elderly population from the European Union member states as measured by the relative 
index of inequality. These results are constructed to be comparable with (Huisman, 
Kunst et al. 2003). They are however not population-weighted and may therefore not 
be representative for the elderly populations. But more importantly they are measures 
of inequality in the less preferable measure of ill-health rather than good health (see 
chapter one). Therefore, these results are not compared with the results from chapter 
four. 
Chapter four provides new evidence on the sources of differences in the degree of 
income-related inequalities in self-assessed health in 13 European Union member 
states. We use new and more comparable data from the 1996 wave of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). Significant inequalities in health (utility) as 
measured by the concentration index favouring the higher income groups emerge in 
all countries, but are particularly high in Portugal and - to a lesser extent - in the 
UK and in Denmark. By contrast, relatively low health inequality is observed in the 
Netherlands and Germany, and also in Italy, Belgium, Spain Austria and Ireland. There is 
a positive correlation with income inequality per se but the relationship is weaker than 
in previous research. Health inequality is not merely a reflection of income inequality. 
A decomposition analysis shows that the (partial) income elasticities of the explanatory 
variables are generally more important than their unequal distribution by income in 
explaining the cross-country differences in income-related health inequality. This is 
especially true for the relative health and income position of non-working Europeans 
like the retired and disabled explains a great deal of ‘excess inequality’. We also find 
a substantial contribution of regional health disparities in socioeconomic inequalities, 
primarily in the Southern European countries.
8.3.2 Income-related inequities in health care
While we present income-related variation in dental visits for the EU member states 
in chapter two, we cannot say much about income-related inequities because we were 
unable to measure, and therefore correct for, differences in need. And it is quite likely 
that need varied with income due to income-related differences in individual hygiene, 
eating and drinking habits, dental prosthesis etcetera. Moreover, measures of need may 
be hard to construct because, from our ethical perspective we are only interested in 
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need that may affect our concept of health, while much of the demand for dental care 
may result from esthetical considerations.
Chapter six presents new international comparative evidence on the factors driving 
inequities in the use of GP and specialist services as measured by the concentration 
index in 12 EU member states. New and more comparable data from the 1996 wave of 
the ECHP are used. We examine two types of utilisation (the probability of a visit and the 
conditional number of positive visits) for two types of medical care: general practitioner 
and medical specialist visits using probit, truncated negative binomial and generalised 
negative binomial regression models. We find little or no evidence of income-related 
inequity in the probability of a GP visit in these countries. Conditional upon at least 
one visit, there is even evidence of a somewhat pro-poor distribution. By contrast, 
substantial pro-rich inequity emerges in virtually every country with respect to the 
probability of contacting a medical specialist. Despite their lower needs for such care, 
wealthier and higher educated individuals appear to be more likely to see a specialist at 
least once in a year than the less well-off. This phenomenon is universal in Europe, but 
stronger in countries where either private insurance cover or private practice options are 
offered to purchase quicker and/or preferential access. Pro-rich inequity in subsequent 
visits adds to this access inequity but appears more related to regional disparities in 
utilisation than to other factors. Despite decades of universal and fairly comprehensive 
coverage in European countries, utilisation patterns suggest that rich and poor are not 
treated equally.
Both (Van Doorslaer, Koolman et al. 2002) and the above indicate that private health 
insurance coverage may well increase the health care inequity as measured by the 
standardised concentration index. However, both previous studies focus on a partial 
association rather than the causal effect of private insurance in physician visits. In 
chapter eight we try to retrieve the causal impact on the use of specialist visits in four 
selected European countries: Ireland, Italy, Portugal and the UK. The central questions 
are whether access to private insurance encourages greater utilisation and whether it 
contributes to horizontal inequity in the use of specialists. Empirical analysis of this 
issue is complicated by the fact that the decision to purchase voluntary health insurance 
is an individual choice that is likely to be influenced by risk selection. We compare 
different estimators to allow for this cause of residual confounding or endogeneity. The 
empirical results show that the probability of having private insurance increases with 
income and with better reported health. Private insurance has a positive association 
with the probability of specialist visits in all countries. The magnitude of the utilisation 
effect is sensitive to corrections for selection in two of the countries. These findings 
imply that private insurance contributes to ‘pro-rich’ horizontal inequity in the probability 
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of visiting a specialist, and may explain why countries with private insurance experience 
some of the highest inequity in at least one specialist visit a year.  
8.4 ASSUMPTIONS, LIMITATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Below we discuss a small selection of issues that may compromise our results. First, 
we look into the requirements that concentration index demands from the data such as 
on measurement scales and absence of a measurement error. Then we focus on some 
crucial assumptions and alternative approaches chosen by others.
8.4.1 Measurement scales
The health concentration index can be written as (see chapter two):
 
C SI I 
y r 
= 2 2 σ 
      
(8.1)
where 2 2 σ r  has a probability limit equal to 1/6, SII indicates the slope index of inequality, 
y  indicates the mean of y, and y indicates health. This shows that the concentration 
index is a ratio measure – some refer to it as the concentration ratio (Rao 1969). 
Like other relative measures such as relative risk, risk ratio, rate ratio and odds-ratio, 
it therefore requires health to be measured on a ratio scale. Ratio scales have four 
properties:
1.  Equality property: If we measure health with an interval scale, then if y ya b=  
  we can be sure that a and b have the same health. 
2.   Ordinality property:  If we measure health with an interval scale, then if y y>a b 
  we can be sure that a has better health than b. 
3.   Interval ratio property. If y ya b 0 1- = .  and the difference y yb c 0 2- = . , then 
  we know the difference in health between b and c is greater than the 
  difference in health between a and b. In fact we know that the difference 
  between b and c is twice as much as between a and c. 
4.   Value ratios property. If we measure health with a ratio scale, then if a has 
  twice the level of health as b, then y ya b= 2  and vice versa, i.e., ratios of 
  the measured values need to correspond to ratios of the actual measured 
  quantities. 
It is worth noting that cardinal scales at least meet properties 1-3 and that ratio scales 
allow only proportionality transformations (f y  y ( ) = θ where θ is a constant). 
In practice, health inequalities are often measured using lower quality measurement 
scales; i.e., scales that may not meet one or more of the properties of a ratio scale. 
Biases resulting from possible failure to meet requirements one and two are discussed 
under the section Reporting heterogeneity. When health is measured on a two point 
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ordinal scale (healthy/sick) researchers commonly measure inequality in terms of the 
probability of being one or the other. Probabilities require properties one and two to 
hold and meet properties three and four. When health is measured on a multi-point 
ordinal scale (e.g., Likert-scale), then one could (1) dichotomize the dependent variable 
and express inequality in terms of the probability to have one or the other, or (2) study 
the inequality for each cut-off point. Alternatively, one could (3) add information to the 
ordinal variable or use (strong) assumptions to convert it into a ratio scale.
The first option is straightforward but comes at the price of the loss of efficiency as 
information is discarded and, more importantly, results may be sensitive to the arbitrary 
choice of cut-pointa (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1994; Van Doorslaer and Koolman 
2000). The second option will result in as many inequality indicators as cut-points and 
may have little statistical power for individual tests of inequality for cut points with few 
observations on one side.
The third option involves mapping the ordinal response categories onto a ratio scale 
(Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1994). This ratio scale is typically based on an assumed 
distribution of latent health, such as the log-normal distribution of ill-health, from which 
the ordered responses are drawn (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 1994), or on an empirical 
distribution of health that is measured on a ratio scale. For the latter scales concepts 
such as the Euroqol 5D (EQ5D) or the Health Utility Index (HUI) Mark III can be used (Van 
Doorslaer and Jones 2003), even though the latter is an interval rather than ratio scale 
(Horsman, Furlong et al. 2003). 
It is easy to see how this could become problematic by considering the equation (8.1). 
Imagine that for some of the population average health equals zero, then the ratio 
cannot be calculated. If we take a less extreme example, we can see that when average 
health tends to zero, the concentration index will go to infinity. In other words if health 
is measured on an interval rather than a ratio scale then the concentration index 
is unbounded and thus looses its interpretation. No simple solution exists, because 
removing all negative values, which indicate a health state worse than death, would 
make the sample less the representative of the underlying population. Converting all 
negative values into zero would not do justice to negative health states. Absolute 
measures of inequality - such as the generalised concentration index and the slope 
index of inequality - merely require interval scales. Such scales have only the first three 
properties listed above, and therefore require no natural zero point.
8.4.2 Mapping ECHP SAH into Canadian Health Utility Index values
Because we lacked datasets for all member states of the European Union that allowed 
us to do the mapping exercise for all countries, we applied the cut points from Canada 
to all countries in our dataset. In doing so we assumed that the answer categories 
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of the Canadian self-assessed health question (bad, fair, good, very good, excellent) 
are equal to those in the ECHP (very bad, bad, fair, good, very goodb) despite the 
difference in wording. We argued that this mapping may be acceptable because the 
relative frequencies of the European-wide 1996 ECHP responses are remarkably close 
to the relative frequencies for the response categories in the Canadian 1994 NPHS 
despite the different wording. By using the same cut-point values for all countries we 
assume that differences in responses to the self-assessed health question do reflect 
differences in health, contrary to earlier work by (Van Doorslaer, Wagstaff et al. 1997). 
(Lecluyse and Cleemput 2006) however have shown that cut-points may differ for the 
Belgium and may also affect the magnitude of the CI. Clearly, future research should aim 
to relax the assumption we had to impose. 
As explained in chapter one and four, we use the Canadian Health Utility Index values 
to convert the ordinal measure of health into a health utility measure with interval scale 
properties, which we then use as if it had ratio scale properties. The internal validity 
of the mapping was put to the test by (Van Doorslaer and Jones 2003). We assume 
that (1) the approach that performed best in Canada would also be the best in other 
countries, (2) different wording of the self-assessed health question in the European 
panel from the Canadian survey give the answer categories the same meaning in terms 
of health utility and that thus Canadian cut-points are applicable to the European panel 
and (3) that a self-assessed health category means the same in all ECHP countries. 
8.4.3 Informative measurement error (reporting heterogeneity)
Assumption 1 above has not been validated in other studies, but does not seem very 
problematic. The second  and the third assumption, however, appear to be strong 
(Lecluyse and Cleemput 2006). Consider, also, the distribution of the self-assessed 
health of Denmark and Portugal. Table 8.1 presents the population weighted shares 
in the different SAH categories from the third wave of the ECHP of two extreme 
distributions: Denmark and Portugal.
From table 8.1, it seems that the Danish are in much better health than the Portuguese. 
Yet the Portuguese population was younger at the time of the survey and life expectancy 
for women was equal and for men only two years lower (Mackenbach, Bakker et al. 
2002). The difference could be due to Portuguese suffering a much longer part of their 
life from adverse health conditions. It is possible that the differences in health are 
largely differences in the perception of health. In theory, the differences in perception 
could represent differences in health utility derived from a more similar objective health 
state such that the differences in the distribution of self-assessed health reflect the 
true difference in health-related utility. If the latter is not true then this reporting 
heterogeneity may have affected the results presented in chapter four. 
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Reporting heterogeneity may be the most severe between countries - which is why we 
studied variation within countries rather than within Europe as a whole - but it may also 
exist within a country (Simon 2002; Van Doorslaer and Gerdtham 2003; Lindeboom and 
Van Doorslaer 2004; Simon, De Boer et al. 2005) and bias our estimates. Many current 
research projects using vignette evaluation focus on reporting heterogeneity. This type 
of research may be very helpful if the vignettes accurately describe all health states 
that are of moral interest and if the health states are appropriately valued for different 
groups in society.
8.4.4 Random measurement error in health or health care
The association between health and SES could be affected by measurement error. As 
is well known, a random measurement error in the dependent variable in OLS does not 
bias the coefficients but does increase the confidence intervals. In chapter two, we 
show that the concentration index can be computed using OLS, and thus that random 
measurement error in the dependent variable is unlikely to affect the concentration 
index. Non-random measurement error, e.g., reporting heterogeneity related to a socio-
economic class may, however, well affect our estimates (Sen 2002). 
8.4.5 Measurement error in explanatory variables
Measurement error in the explanatory variable of interest, fractional rank of income, 
could affect the results. Breen and Moisio show that measurement error in the 
measurement of income in ten ECHP country surveys is substantial and so are the 
differences in measurement error between countries (Breen and Moisio 2004). 
Under the classical errors in variables (CEV) assumption [Cov(X,e)=0, where X the true 
value of the variable measured with measurement error and e is measurement error], 
measurement error leads to attenuation bias, which is equal to:
 
 ( )( )β     β p X X eli m ˆ  σ σ      σ = +
2 
2 2  
     
(8.2)
Table 8.1 Shares in SAH categories 
Denmark Portugal
very bad health 1.7 4.7
bad health 4.6 17.6
fair health 17.0 29.6
good health 31.7 44.5
very good health 45.1 3.6
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where beta-hat is the estimated coefficient. From this it becomes clear that variance in 
measurement error of the magnitude observed by the authors could lead to (seriously) 
underestimated coefficients. Concentration indices may thus have been underestimated 
and relative positions of countries may have been affected. 
8.4.6 Modelling drop out and conditional independence 
In chapter five we try to allow for (health-related) drop-out by assuming selection on 
observables. Due to the problem of high dimensionality - finding identical individuals in 
terms of observables for those that drop-out in the data is impossible - techniques such 
as direct matching and direct standardisation are ruled out. Alternative approaches 
involve the modelling of the drop-out process and conditioning upon just one dimension: 
the probability of dropping out. Because of this approach, ‘comparable’ respondents 
will often have very different characteristics. This may even lead to an unbalanced 
distribution of characteristics at group level as we have shown using the propensity 
score approach in chapter seven. It remains possible that characteristics with equal 
power to predict drop-out, are related to very different associations between income and 
health. Unbalanced distribution of such characteristics could hamper the ability of the 
inverse probability weighted sample to represent the population. 
8.4.7 Informative drop out
Our procedure to correct for drop-outs requires the assumption that respondents who 
dropped out from the sample, have equal health as those who remained in the sample 
with comparable characteristics up to the year before (selection on observables). This 
assumption seems reasonable when people with lower health are less likely to answer 
the questionnaire, but those who decide not to answer have not experienced a change in 
health like those who still answer the questionnaire. If, however, the individual does not 
answer the questionnaire due to a health shock that differs from comparable individuals 
who remain in the sample, such as death, then this assumption breaks down, and the 
inverse probability weighted sample fails to represent the population of interest.
8.4.8 Standardising by regression
Variation in health or in health care contains both ethically relevant variation and 
ethically irrelevant variation. Filtering out irrelevant variation is often referred to as 
standardising, and standardisation by regression is the most popular technique at 
present. Standardising by regression however only correctly removes the effect of the 
standardising factors - such as age and sex - if the effects of the standardising factors 
are correctly estimated by the regression model. In other words, if the estimated effects 
accurately capture the causal effect of the standardising factors on health or health 
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care. If this is not the case then residual confounding may cause other explanatory 
variables to be correlated with the error term, which would lead to biased estimates, and 
ultimately biased concentration indices.
Estimating causal effects from observational data is no easy task. Epidemiological 
research has produced many examples where efforts in causal modelling did not 
resemble the results from more reliable experiments. Many results from observational 
studies that were disproven by experiments seem to have suffered from unmeasured 
confounding (omitted variable bias). But bias also results from reverse causality, selection 
and information bias, measurement error and false statistical model assumptions. 
By implication, knowledge about content matter (i.e. what is known about the causes of 
variation in health) is necessary to identify all confounders and is likely to be of crucial 
importance when constructing models. These causes could be economical, educational, 
societal, psychological, geographical, medical etc. This makes the building of structural 
models, or more specifically, arguing and defending model assumptions (identifying 
restrictions), an inherently interdisciplinary exercise. An exercise which is hampered by 
the way research is organised.
8.4.9 Decompositions
In this thesis we have applied two decompositions of the concentration index: Milanovich 
decomposition and the decomposition into contribution of factors. Strictly speaking the 
latter is not a true decomposition since to decompose means to separate something 
into its constituent parts or elements or into simpler compounds (Romo 2003). As 
such, a decomposition could be additive or multiplicative, but the parts, elements or 
compounds should ideally be independent. However, the components of the presented 
decompositions are often not completely independent, and thus may not qualify for 
decomposition in the strict sense of the term. For example, the components of the 
decomposition in factors are often not independent as the removal of the contribution 
of one factor could lead to a change in the health effect and the concentration index 
of other factors and a change in the average level of the dependent variable (which is 
part of each contribution). Similarly, other presented decompositions contain factors 
that, if manipulated, are likely to affect other factors. Other decompositions include 
residual contributions or a contribution due to approximation errors without an intuitive 
interpretation and of the which the magnitude may depend on the other contributions. 
As such, we use the term decomposition loosely.
8.4.10 Alternative factor decompositions with non-linear explanatory models
The decomposition of the concentration index in factors requires y (health or health care) 
to be a function that is additively separable into factors; (k), i.e., if for i = 1,2,…n and 
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m 
i = ( )+ = ( )+ ( ) + ( )+1 2  1 1  2 2  , ,  ... ... εε . If y is not additively 
separable into all factors then the decomposition will not work out. In chapter six, we 
compute the contributions of all factors, while holding all other factors constant at their 
observed values. The sum of all contributions no longer equalled the concentration 
index. The differences - or approximation errors - are often substantial, indicating the 
limitations of decomposition methods. So, while adding up contributions may not always 
be meaningful, the contributions themselves show the importance of the factor while 
holding the other factors constant. From a policy making point of view, that is still very 
relevant information.  
Morris et al. (2005) discuss two alternatives. They point out that the non-linear functions 
are often transformations of linear functions, e.g., y f  ( )y f  k k  k i i  i i  m i = = ( ), ,. . ,  1 2  ε ε, , where 
y   is referred to as a latent variable and is a additively separable function of factors k. 
Indeed they show that a concentration index based on y   can be decomposed without 
approximation errors. However, such a decomposition is meaningless because (1) latent 
variables have no ratio scale properties (see above), and consequently no boundaries or 
interpretation and (2) magnitude or ranking of the contributions retrieved this way may 
be unrelated to the ‘true’ but unattainable contributions.  
As an alternative, they discuss the use of linear models in the context of a dichotomous 
y variable. They mention two drawbacks of the linear probability model: (1) statistical 
inference will be sensitive to the heteroscedasticity implied by the model and (2) the 
model may produce impossible estimated probabilities. The first is not an issue if one 
uses the bootstrap methods proposed in chapter six. The second is not problematic if 
the model includes one series of dummies only. In practice models often include both 
continuous variables and an independent series of dummies from several categorical 
variables. However, if no causality is required then one could adjust the model such that 
it contains just one set of dummies. Equally, for non dichotomous variables, one could 
opt for a linear model that may not describe the data just as well, as long as no causality 
is implied. In chapter six, however, we aimed to standardise for the standardising factors, 
which implies that we needed to estimate effects that resemble causal effects. 
8.3.11 Short-run versus long-run socioeconomic inequality in health
If the ultimate aim is to measure inequity in health-related well-being over the life 
span, then measuring variation in cross sectional health utility, health utility at one 
point in time, may not be a good approximation. For example, the may not be any 
association between health and income at any point in time among the living, yet life 
expectancy could still be strongly related to income. Alternatively, reductions in health 
could correlate with reductions in income and consequently a cross section inequity 
measure displays pro rich health inequity, yet each individual could still have an equal 
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quality adjusted life and income over the a lifetime. (Gerdtham and Johannesson 2000) 
have shown that concentration indices for income-related inequality in remaining life-
years is indeed of a different and greater magnitude. Recent work by Andrew Jones 
and Angel Lopez Nicolas - who also use the European Community Household Panel - to 
compute concentration indices based on average health and average income is a step 
to bridge the gap between the cross-sectional inequity and longitudinal inequity (Jones 
and Lopez 2004). 
8.5 CONCLUSION
This thesis adds methodological advances to the measurement and explanation of 
health and health care inequities. These and other recent advances are subsequently 
used to gather new cross-country comparative evidence on income-related inequality in 
health and equity in the use of health care. Some advances help to interpret the extent 
of the inequality as measured by the concentration index or relative index of inequality. 
Others help to clarify the difference between the concentration index and the relative 
index of inequality, both popular measures of socioeconomic differences in health. 
Methods are suggested that may help to make both measures more comparable. 
Advances are made in the measurement of income-related health inequality. These 
measurements that now reflect inequalities in health rather than ill-health. Cross-
country differences can be understood better by looking at the contributions of several 
policy relevant factors in a decomposition analysis. It is shown that cross-country 
differences between all countries and the country with the smallest income-related 
inequalities are mostly related by variation in health elasticities – the effect of a factor 
on health – rather than differences in the income distribution of these factors. For 
example the fact that countries perform poorly is due mostly to the retired people 
reporting worse health, rather than that the retired are more concentrated among the 
poor.
Similar advances are made in the files of inequities in health care consumption. Results 
allow a better insight into the consumption patterns of the different income groups. 
Evidence shows that some of these patterns – such as pro-rich inequity in at least one 
specialist visit a year - are robust to system characteristics, yet their extent sometimes 
depends on whether or not private insurance is endorsed by the system. 
Many questions have, however, remained unanswered. Questions such as whether 
the implicit ethical consequences of the concentration index are endorsed by the 
societies that are evaluated, or whether self-assessed health is fully comparable within 
and between populations. And to what extent do different consumption patterns and 
possible health care substitutions indicate inequity? These are questions that will surely 
be answered in future research. 
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Notes 
a To obtain more efficiency one could impose that the measure for inequality does not depend upon 
 cut-point, for example by estimating an odds-ratio using an ordered logit. A test for irrelevance 
 of the  choice of cut point for odd-ratio’s (proportional odds assumption) is offered by Brant (1990). 
 “Assessing proportionality in the proportional odds model for ordinal logistic regression.” Biometrics 46: 
 1171-1178.
b Except for the French questionnaire in which respondents were asked to indicate the satisfaction with 
 their general health in six categories, ranging from very satisfied to very dissatisfied. 
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SAMENVATTING
Ongelijkheden. Soms zijn ze gewenst en leveren ze de broodnodige stimulans, soms 
zijn ze ongewenst en worden ze als onrechtvaardig ervaren. Uiteindelijk bepaalt de 
samenleving of ongelijkheden wenselijk of onwenselijk zijn. Vele samenlevingen vinden 
gezondheidsongelijkheden onwenselijk. Dat geldt echter niet voor alle oorzaken van 
gezondheidsongelijkheid. Indien ouderen ongezonder zijn dan jongeren, dan is dat 
misschien jammer maar volgens velen niet direct onrechtvaardig. Ook het beoefenen 
van risicovolle sporten, zoals skieen, kan leiden tot gezondheidsverschillen, zonder dat 
dit tot morele verontwaardiging zal leiden. 
Dat is anders voor oorzaken die buiten de invloed van het individu tot ongezondheid 
leiden. Zo was de verontwaardiging groot toen defensie staatssecretaris B.J.M. baron 
Van Voorst tot Voorts wel kennis had van de aanwezigheid van asbest en haar gevaren 
in de Cannerberg (Maastricht) maar volgens TNO onvoldoende maatregelen nam om zijn 
personeel ter plaatse te beschermen. Sociaal-economische verschillen in gezondheid 
worden veelal ook als onwenselijk gezien zoals blijkt uit de uitspraak van de Engelse 
minister van volksgezondheid Frank Dobson (1997): “Ongelijkheid in gezondheid is de 
ergste ongelijkheid van alle ongelijkheden. Er is geen ernstiger ongelijkheid dan te weten 
dat je eerder zult sterven omdat je armer bent.” 
Het meten van de ongelijkheden is een taak van onderzoekers. Een taak waar artsen, 
epidemiologen, demografen, sociologen, economen en andere onderzoekers zich al 
meer dan 150 jaar aan wijden. Ondanks deze lange onderzoekstraditie is de vraag hoe 
ongelijkheden te meten en vervolgens te verklaren nog altijd actueel. Dit proefschrift 
is geschreven om bij te dragen aan de methoden van ongelijkheidsonderzoek. De 
bijdragen zijn ieder voorzien van een toepassing en worden hieronder genoemd en 
toegelicht.
Ongelijkheden worden vaak in relatieve termen uitgedrukt, bijvoorbeeld rijken hebben 
een 10% hogere levensverwachting dan armen. Hierbij kunnen onderzoekers kiezen voor 
een positieve gezondheidsmaat (levensverwachting) of een negatieve gezondheidsmaat 
(kans op sterfte). In dit proefschrift wordt gesteld dat een positieve gezondheidsmaat 
te preferen is boven een negatieve indien men geinteresseerd is in de ongelijkheid 
in (voor kwaliteit gecorrigeerde) levensverwachting. Een negatieve gezondheidsmaat 
verreist een ijkpunt, bijvoorbeeld 80 jaar in volle gezondheid, en die standaard is arbitrair. 
De keuze van dit ijkpunt is evenwel zeer bepalend voor de gemeten omvang van de 
ongelijkheid, rangorde tussen landen en trend over tijd (positief of negatief). In hoofdstuk 
1 blijkt dat indices van ongelijkheid gebaseerd op negatieve gezondheidsmaten niet met 
indices gebaseerd op positieve maten overeen hoeven te komen. De resultaten kunnen 
elkaar zelfs tegenspreken. Hierdoor kan vergelijkend onderzoek naar de ongelijkheid 
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in bijvoorbeeld sterfte volkomen misleidend zijn als benadering van de ongelijkheid in 
levensverwachting. 
Een van de meest gebuikte maten van ongelijkheid is de concentratie-index. Onder 
gebruikelijke voorwaarden kan deze index varieren tussen -2 en +2, maar de waarden 
uit onderzoek zijn soms niet groter dan 0,0034. Dergelijke waarden zijn statitisch 
significant, maar roepen de vraag op of ze wel relevant zijn. Omdat de concentratie-index 
geen eenvoudige interpretatie kende, is hoofdstuk 2 in dit proefschrift gewijd aan de 
interpretatie van de concentratie-index. Daaruit blijkt dat aan de concentratie-index 
een herverdelingsinterpretatie kan worden gegeven. Bij benadering geldt dat indien 75 
maal de waarde van de concentratie-index als percentage wordt herverdeeld volgens 
een bepaalde sleutel, dat de concentratie-index gelijk wordt aan nul. Met andere 
woorden, als de concentratie-index gelijk is aan 0,0034 dan kan de ongelijkheid worden 
opgeheven door 0,25% van alle gezondheid opnieuw te verdelen. Hierdoor is het mogelijk 
geworden om te beoordelen welke waarde van de concentratie-index aanleiding geeft 
tot zorgen of niet.
Een andere veel gebruikte maat van ongelijkheid is de odds-ratio. De odds-ratio 
is te interpreteren als een relatief risico, bijvoorbeeld de rijken hebben een 10% 
hogere kans om goede gezondheid te rapporteren dan de armen. Deze interpretatie 
is enkel geldig indien de kans op de uitkomst goede gezondheid lager is dan 5%. 
In gezondheidsongelijkheid onderzoek is die kans veelal groter dan 5%, ongeacht of 
positieve of negatieve gezondheidsmaten worden gebruikt. En, indien die kans groter 
is, dan  zal de odds-ratio het relatief risico altijd overschatten maar de mate waarin 
varieert. Zo kan het voorkomen dat de ongelijkheids-rangorde van landen en trends 
binnen een land over tijd, sterk afhankelijk zijn van de gekozen maat. Ondanks de 
interpretatieproblemen wordt de odds-ratio vaak gebruikt omdat onderzoekers geen 
relatief risico kunnen berekenen indien gezondheid dichotoom (0-1) is gemeten. In 
hoofdstuk 3 wordt daarom een methode gepresenteerd om op basis van dichotome 
gezondheidsmaten toch een relatief risico uit te rekenen.
Eenmaal gemeten volgt de vraag wat de oorzaken van de waargenomen ongelijkheid 
zijn. Causale relaties kunnen veelal het best onderzocht worden door een experiment 
op te zetten. Echter, experimenten zijn voor deze vraagstelling in de praktijk ondoenlijk. 
Wel kunnen we mensen ‘observeren’ met behulp van vragenlijsten en bestuderen of 
factoren met elkaar samenhangen. Samenhang kan oorzakelijk zijn, maar kan ook 
het resultaat zijn van een niet-representieve steekproef of door andere vertekening. 
Kortom, de oorzaken van ongelijkheid uiteenrafelen is nog niet mogelijk. Wel kunnen 
we met behulp van zogenaamde decompositietechnieken in kaart brengen in welke 
mate bevolkingsgroepen bijdragen aan ongelijkheid. Verder kunnen we binnen een 
groep, bijvoorbeeld werklozen, uitsplitsen of de bijdrage het gevolg is van een slechte 
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gezondheid of juist een lage inkomenspositie. Vergelijkend onderzoek kan uitwijzen of 
de bijdragen van specifieke groepen in het ene land groter is dan in een ander land, en 
waar dit mee samenhangt. De resultaten van vergelijkend onderzoek voor 13 Europese 
landen op basis van de derde jaar van het Europese Unie Huishoud Panel (European 
Community Household Panel) staan gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 4.
De resultaten in hoofdstuk 4 zijn verminderd betrouwbaar indien de steekproef in de 
derde jaar geen goede weerspiegeling is van de totale bevolking boven de 16 jaar. 
Het is bijvoorbeeld mogelijk dat mensen met gezondheidsproblemen de vragenlijst in 
het derde jaar minder vaak hebben ingevuld, waardoor een te positief beeld ontstaat 
over de gezondheid van de bevolking. In hoofdstuk 5 laten wij zien dat mensen met 
gezondheidsklachten inderdaad minder geneigd zijn om deel te nemen aan de enquête. 
We gebruiken inverse probability weighting om te corrigeren voor deze selectieve uitval. 
De correctie laat zien dat, door de bank genomen, de selectieve uitval de relatie tussen 
inkomen en opleiding aan de ene kant en gezondheid aan de andere kant, niet wezenlijk 
beïnvloedt. 
Gezondheidsverschillen zouden ook het gevolg kunnen zijn van ongelijkheid in de 
toegang tot zorg. Zo zouden rijkeren, bij een vergelijkbare gezondheid, gemakkelijker 
toegang kunnen hebben tot de gezondheidszorg dan armeren. Vele Europese overheden 
stellen zich daarom expliciet tot doel hebben om de toegang tot zorg ‘rechtvaardig’ 
te laten zijn. Daarmee wordt bedoeld dat het zorggebruik dient af te hangen van de 
gezondheidssituatie en niet van andere factoren zoals de inkomenssituatie. In hoofdstuk 
6 blijkt in welke mate overheden geslaagd zijn in dit doel. De contacten met de huisarts 
blijken, grosso modo, niet met inkomen samen te hangen of zelfs geconcentreerd te 
zijn bij de lagere inkomens. Toegang tot de specialist lijkt echter wel positief samen te 
hangen met inkomen. En deze ongelijkheid blijkt vooral te bestaan rondom het eerste 
contact. De ongelijkheid in het aantal vervolgcontacten is minder groot. 
Uit hoofdstuk 6 komt ook naar voren dat landen waar het mogelijk is om een private 
gezondheidszorgverzekering af te sluiten, veelal de landen zijn waar de toegang tot 
specialisten ongelijker is verdeeld. In een poging om met behulp van vragenlijsten 
toch iets te zeggen over het causale verzekeringseffect, is in hoofdstuk 7 gebruik 
gemaakt van een combinatie van identificatietechnieken waaronder de instrumentele 
variabele techniek, recursieve modellering en de veronderstelling van een specifieke niet-
lineaire relatie tussen factoren. De resultaten van deze modellering suggereren dat het 
causale verzekeringseffect op zorggebruik groter is dan de associatie die is gemeten in 
hoofdstuk 6. De verschillen zijn zeer relevant, maar in dit geval niet statistisch significant. 
Het toelaten van private verzekeringen lijkt de inkomensgerelateerde ongelijkheid in 
toegang tot de zorg te vergroten.
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